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Preface
“Traditionally, wealth was defined by land and natural resources.
Today the most important resources is between our ears.”
Barack Obama, 2014
The world today is a world of ideas: knowledge, technology, and human capital are
drivers of wealth and economic growth (Jones and Romer, 2010). The increased reliance
on these factors as sources of economic prosperity has been labeled as a change towards
a “knowledge economy” (e.g., The Economist, 2000; Mokyr, 2002; Powell and Snellman,
2004). Using microeconometric methods, this dissertation sheds light on the underlying
mechanisms behind two central elements of the knowledge economy. The first part focuses
on the role of intellectual property rights for the diffusion of ideas. The second part
investigates productivity determinants of “knowledge workers”.1 Both parts consist of
two self-contained chapters each.
The first part of the dissertation provides evidence on how patents shape cumulative inno-
vation. They are motivated by the insight that almost all new knowledge builds on prior
ideas (Scotchmer, 1991). Most famously, this was described by Isaac Newton as “standing
on the shoulders of giants”. This feature of the innovation process is central to theories of
endogenous growth (e.g., Romer, 1986, 1990, 1994; Jones, 1995; Weitzman, 1998). There-
fore, understanding barriers to knowledge diffusion is crucial. One determinant that has
received substantial interest in recent years is the patent system. Due to the public goods
nature of innovation, governments around the world rely on patents to provide incentives
1While there is no unique definition of this expression, knowledge workers are thought to be those
workers whose jobs mainly consist of using and/or generating knowledge and information (e.g., Drucker,
1999; The Economist, 2005; Wall Street Journal, 2016).
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for research and development of new technologies. The classical viewpoint in economics
is that patents should ideally solve the trade-off between incentives for innovation, dis-
closure of ideas, and dead-weight loss due to monopoly power in the period during which
the patent is valid. However, there is evidence that patents impose additional costs on
innovation: in particular, the debate about the dynamic impacts of intellectual property
rights has questioned the benefits of patents (Hall and Harhoff, 2012). An emerging lit-
erature has shown that intellectual property rights may dampen cumulative innovation
(Williams, 2013; Galasso and Schankerman, 2015, forthcoming; Sampat and Williams,
2015). This is a potentially important drawback of patents.
The first chapter, which is based on joint work with Martin Watzinger, Thomas Fackler,
and Monika Schnitzer (Watzinger et al., 2017a), builds on this literature. It investigates
whether patents held by a dominant firm are harmful for follow-on innovation, and if so,
whether antitrust enforcement in the form of compulsory licensing of patents provides
an effective remedy. We advance on these questions by analyzing the effects of one of
the most important antitrust rulings in U.S. history: the 1956 consent decree against the
Bell System. This decree settled a seven-year antitrust lawsuit that sought to break up
the Bell System, which was charged with having foreclosed competitors from the market
for telecommunications equipment. The decree forced Bell to license all its 7’820 patents
royalty-free and the company was barred from being active in any industry other than
telecommunications. At that time, it was one of the most innovative companies in the
world, with their research subsidiary Bell Labs producing path-breaking innovations in a
broad range of technologies.
Our analysis shows that compulsory licensing increased innovation that built on Bell
patents. We find that in the first five years after the decree, follow-on innovation in-
creased by 17% or a total of around 1’000 citations. Additionally, the number of patents
increased in fields with compulsorily licensed patents compared to similar fields without.
These effects are mainly driven by young and small companies. The positive effects of
compulsory licensing were however restricted to industries other than the telecommu-
nications equipment industry. Thus, compulsory licensing without structural remedies
appears to be an ineffective remedy for market foreclosure.
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We contribute to the literature on intellectual property by providing robust causal evi-
dence for the negative effects of patents on follow-on innovation, especially of small and
young companies. We examine both short-run direct effects as well as long-run effects
in a unique set-up that enables us to address key challenges for the impact evaluation of
compulsory licensing. Our finding of company entries as the main mechanism driving its
positive innovation effects is consistent with concerns that patents may prevent new and
innovative firms from entering markets.
We are also the first to empirically investigate the effect of antitrust enforcement on
innovation. Overall, our results suggest that market foreclosure slows down technological
progress and that antitrust enforcement can have a lasting positive impact on the long-run
rate of technological change if market entry is not hindered by exclusionary practices. Yet,
compulsory licensing without structural remedies is not sufficient to overcome foreclosure.
This chapter finally contributes to our understanding of innovation and growth in the
United States in the twentieth century. By providing free state-of-the-art technology to
all U.S. companies, compulsory licensing increased U.S. innovation because it opened up
new markets for a large number of entrants.
The way in which patents affect cumulative innovation is more nuanced, however. To
balance monopoly rights, patents require the disclosure of underlying technical informa-
tion. This is deemed one of the main advantages of the patent system as inventors can
build on previous ideas (e.g., Machlup, 1958; Hall and Harhoff, 2012). This feature is
therefore crucial when analyzing dynamic effects of patents on cumulative innovation.
Yet, the question whether this aspect is indeed important is particularly challenging to
analyze empirically (Graham and Hegde, 2015; Hegde and Luo, 2017; Williams, 2017).
Since the patent system makes monopoly rights dependent on the disclosure of technical
information, there is little variation allowing identification of the “enablement effect” of
disclosure separately from the effects of exclusion. Therefore, it is hard to judge whether
the “grand bargain” in the patent system is a profitable one for society.
The second chapter, which builds on joint work with Jeffrey Furman and Martin Watzinger
(Furman et al., 2017), takes advantage of the expansion of the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Depository Library Program from 1977 to 1997 to investigate the effects of disclosure of
3
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patent information on innovation. This patent library system was created in the late
1800s to provide patents and innovation-related resources for independent inventors, en-
trepreneurs, and incumbent firms. While the exclusion rights associated with patents are
national in scope, the opening of these patent libraries in a period before the Internet
yielded regional variation in the costs to access the technical information disclosed in
patent documents.
By comparing the number of patents around patent libraries to their number around
control libraries before and after the opening, we can thus identify the impact of disclosure
on follow-on innovation. As control group, we use regions around Federal Depository
Libraries (FDLs). As the missions of patent libraries and FDLs are similar, namely to
provide the public with official documents, almost all patent libraries are also Federal
Depository Libraries. Therefore, these libraries are a natural comparison group to patent
libraries.
We find that after a patent library opens the number of patents around the library in-
creases by around two patents per year on average or 18% relative to the pre-opening
mean. In line with increased access to patents driving this effect, we find that young and
small companies increase patenting more. These inventors plausibly face larger barriers
to access than large companies. In additional analyses, we also find that the structure of
patents changes after a patent library opens: the distance to cited patents increases for
new applications by inventors close to a patent library. Inventors therefore start to work
on problems that are less local, rendering the geography of innovation more dispersed.
This study is the first to show that access to technical information disclosed in patents can
increase innovation. Disclosure is often taken as one justification for the monopoly rights
attached to patents. Yet, critics often question its usefulness (e.g., Roin, 2005; Gam-
bardella et al., 2011). Our study adds to the literature in showing that access to technical
information provided by patent libraries increases patenting for small and young com-
panies. More generally, our study contributes to the literature on research enhancing
institutions (e.g., Furman and Stern, 2011). These institutions lower the costs of access
to useful knowledge and thus help to foster geographical and intertemporal spillovers, ul-
timately fueling economic growth (Mokyr, 2002). We contribute by showing that patent
4
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libraries increased innovation across U.S. states by improving access to technical informa-
tion.
The second part of the dissertation turns to the productivity of knowledge workers. These
professions, which perform non-routine, non-manual tasks and require high cognitive
skills, became much more important in developed economies in the past decades (e.g.,
Neef, 1998; Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Autor, 2014).2 For example, since the 1960s, the
number of workers in science and engineering has grown substantially faster than the total
workforce in the United States (National Science Board, 2016). In the business literature,
raising knowledge workers’ productivity has even been called the “most important con-
tribution of management in the 21st century” (Drucker, 1999, p. 79). For economists,
interesting aspects about knowledge workers are the abstract nature and unspecific goal
of their tasks, the difficulty of monitoring effort, and the importance of other knowledge
workers for their productivity (e.g., Manso, 2011; Catalini, forthcoming). Also, knowl-
edge workers may be different from the general population in terms of job preferences.
For jobs in teaching or science, intrinsic motivation and occupational selection may be
more important for productivity than for blue-collar workers (e.g., Stern, 2004; Besley
and Ghatak, 2005). Therefore, empirically studying determinants of knowledge workers’
productivity is an important endeavor of economic research. To study these determinants,
this dissertation turns to occupations which are fundamental for knowledge production:
scientists and teachers. The two chapters emphasize the importance of the geographic
and the sectoral allocation of talent for knowledge workers’ productivity.
The third chapter asks whether labor mobility is an important determinant of inventors’
productivity. One crucial input in the ideas production function are the ideas of other
scientists (e.g., Weitzman, 1998). Local access to ideas may therefore be an important
driver of individual productivity. After all, as Glaeser et al. (1992) write, “intellectual
breakthroughs must cross hallways and streets more easily than oceans and continents”
(p.1127). This is increasingly important for scientists, given the relevance of recombination
for truly novel academic ideas (e.g., Uzzi et al., 2013) and the growing importance of teams
2Note that while the demand for cognitive skills has apparently slowed during the 2000s, the reasons
for this are still unclear (Autor, 2015; Beaudry et al., 2016; Deming, forthcoming).
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in the production of new knowledge (e.g., Wuchty et al., 2007; Jones, 2009; Stephan, 2012).
In the innovation literature, geography is therefore regarded as a “key factor in explaining
the determinants of innovation and technological change” (cf. Audretsch and Feldman,
2004, p.2715).
We analyze the impact of scientists’ mobility on their academic output. Mobility is often
mentioned as a way how to improve access to localized knowledge spillovers. Yet, little
is known about what its effects really are. The econometric challenge when estimating
impacts of mobility is that scientists self-select into moving. In particular, scientists likely
move to places where they are more productive. Any observed correlation between labor
mobility and scientific productivity might therefore be due to other factors influencing
both.
To circumvent this identification problem, we exploit an institutional feature of the Ger-
man university system: hiring committees are required to create a short list of suitable
candidates for each appointment.3 We have access to these lists for the years 1950-2005
from one large university in Germany that offers a wide range of fields. In this chapter,
we use non-moving candidates on these ranked lists as counterfactuals for the moving
scientist. This setup provides two main advantages: on the one hand, it circumvents the
problem of selection into moving as all scientists on the list showed interest in moving
to the destination university. On the other hand, candidates on the appointment list are
qualitatively comparable for institutional reasons. Therefore, non-moving scientists on
the same appointment list provide a credible estimate of what would have happened had
the moving scientist not been appointed.
We find that after a move, a scientist’s productivity as measured by quality-weighted pub-
lications increases by around 13% relative to the control group of non-moving scientists.
In contrast, there is no difference in academic output between movers and non-movers
before the move or between higher- and lower-ranked non-movers. The results are entirely
driven by scientists in the natural sciences and by those from lists with an above-average
number of citations to pre-move work. We provide evidence suggesting that an alterna-
tive explanation of the effects as returns to lab ownership or increased funding is unlikely.




Overall, we think the estimates are consistent with the idea that access to local knowledge
and possibilities of recombination increase in response to the move.
Economists have long attempted to understand the driving factors behind the productivity
of scientists (e.g., Arrow, 1962). This study is one of the first to rigorously estimate the
impact of labor mobility for the productivity of (academic) researchers. Little is known
about this impact even though most science systems in the world incorporate features
which increase labor mobility. The previous literature has relied on matching strategies
and debatable instruments. In contrast, our setup of scientists applying for the same
position at the same university provides a credible counterfactual for movers. What is
more, this is the first analysis to assess the heterogeneity of impacts of labor mobility on
innovation across high- and low-impact scientists and across different fields. Our results
suggest that labor mobility may indeed be a fruitful way to increase academic productivity
for scientists.
The final chapter, which is based on joint work with Marc Piopiunik and Martin West
(Nagler et al., 2015), focuses on the sectoral allocation of talent. More specifically, we
analyze to which extent the selection of talent into careers is affected by the relative com-
pensation in a profession. Changes in the selection into sectors have long been recognized
as important for productivity and growth (e.g., Murphy et al., 1991). In recent years, a
vibrant literature has documented impacts of macroeconomic conditions on workers who
started their careers during times of crises (Kahn, 2010; Oreopoulos et al., 2012). The
counterpart to these “scarring effects” is the improvement in the average ability of individ-
uals entering some lower-paying or higher-risk occupations during recessions (e.g., Oyer,
2008; Boehm and Watzinger, 2015; Shu, 2012). This literature has so far analyzed impacts
on small groups in the labor market, such as academic economists or MBA students.
We focus on teachers, who are a prime example of knowledge workers and make up
around three percent of all U.S. full-time workers. The importance of teachers for the
creation of human capital has been widely recognized in the economics literature (e.g.,
Hanushek, 2011; Hanushek and Rivkin, 2012; Chetty et al., 2014a,b). Their “output”,
higher human capital among students, explains large parts of income differences between
and within countries (e.g., Mankiw et al., 1992; Hanushek and Woessmann, 2008; Jones,
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2016; Hanushek et al., forthcoming). Yet, the average salary of teachers is relatively low
compared to their required qualifications in many countries around the world, which has
often been cited as a key reason why higher-skilled individuals do not want to become
teachers (e.g., Dolton and Marcenaro-Gutierrez, 2011). Existing research investigating
this link has focused on regional differences in relative pay or on long-run changes in
labor market opportunities (e.g., Bacolod, 2007; Britton and Propper, 2016). However, it
suffers from two key limitations. First, relative regional pay may be endogenous to teacher
effectiveness. Second, widely used observable measures such as academic credentials are
poor predictors of actual classroom impact (cf. Jackson et al., 2014).
We exploit macroeconomic conditions at career start as a source of exogenous variation
in the outside labor-market options of potential teachers. The idea is that teaching is a
relatively stable occupation over the business cycle. In our Roy-style framework (Roy,
1951), more high-ability individuals choose teaching over other professions during reces-
sions because of lower (expected) earnings in those alternative occupations. To measure
teacher quality, we construct estimates of teachers’ value-added to student test scores, a
widely used measure of teacher effectiveness (e.g., Jackson et al., 2014). These estimates
are based on administrative data on around 33’000 teachers and their students in the
Florida public school system in the school years 2000-01 through 2008-09.
Our results show that teachers who entered the profession during recessions are roughly
0.10 standard deviations more effective in raising math test scores than teachers who
entered the profession during non-recessionary periods. As business cycle conditions at
career start are exogenous to teacher quality, we interpret our reduced-form estimates
as causal effects. We provide evidence that our results reflect changes in the supply
of potential teachers rather than demand changes by school districts. Our results have
far-reaching consequences: based on figures from Chetty et al. (2014b), the difference in
average math teaching effectiveness between recession and non-recession entrants implies
a difference in students’ discounted life-time earnings of around $13’000 per classroom
taught each year. Through a back-of-the-envelope calculation, we argue that it would be
economically beneficial to increase teacher pay in Florida.
Magnitudes aside, our findings suggest that policymakers would be able to attract more
8
Preface
effective individuals into the teaching profession by raising the economic benefits of be-
coming a teacher. This is not a trivial result. If intrinsic motivation positively affects
teachers’ effectiveness, then increasing teacher pay may at the margin attract less effective
individuals into the teaching profession. Since we find the opposite, intrinsic motivation
seems to be of second-order importance relative to the effects of increasing teacher pay
on selection when hiring more effective teachers. More generally, recessions may provide
a window of opportunity for the public sector to hire more able applicants.
Our study is the first to document a causal effect of outside labor-market options on
the effectiveness of entering teachers in raising student test scores. In comparison to the
previous literature, we advance by using exogenous changes in the relative compensation
of teachers, by using a direct and validated measure of teacher quality, and by isolating
the selection into teaching as opposed to effects of pay on effort or retention.
In summary, this dissertation offers new insights into driving forces behind the deter-
minants of cumulative innovation and the productivity of knowledge workers. These
microeconometric perspectives on the knowledge economy may hopefully contribute to
designing economic policies that account for the increasing importance of ideas, technol-
ogy, and human capital for economic prosperity.
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Chapter 1
Antitrust, Patents, and Cumulative
Innovation: Bell Labs and the 1956
Consent Decree
1.1 Introduction
Innovation is a key driver of economic growth. One of the main instruments governments
use to foster innovation is the patent system. A patent gives the right to exclude others
from using the patented inventions in order to stimulate innovation. However, there
is a growing concern that dominant companies might use patents strategically to deny
potential entrants, often small technology-oriented start-ups, access to key technologies
in an attempt to foreclose the market.1 As start-ups are thought to generate more radical
innovations than incumbents, market foreclosure may harm technological progress and
economic growth (Baker, 2012).2 To address this problem many critics call for antitrust
This chapter is based on joint work with Martin Watzinger, Thomas Fackler, and Monika Schnitzer
(Watzinger et al., 2017a).
1Derek Thompson, “America’s Monopoly Problem”, The Atlantic, October 2016; Robert B. Reich,
“Big Tech Has Become Way Too Powerful,” The New York Times, September 18, 2015, p. SR3; Michael
Katz and Carl Shapiro “Breaking up Big Tech Would Harm Consumer,” The New York Times, Septem-
ber 28, 2015, p. A24; Thomas Catan “When Patent, Antitrust Worlds Collide,” Wall Street Journal,
November 14, 2011.
2For example, Akcigit and Kerr (forthcoming) show that start-ups do more explorative research and
Foster et al. (2006) show that in the retail sector the fast pace of entry and exit is associated with
productivity-enhancing creative destruction
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policies as a remedy (Wu, 2012; Waller and Sag, 2014). Yet, up to now there are no
empirical studies showing that antitrust enforcement can effectively promote innovation.
In this chapter we investigate whether patents held by a dominant firm are harmful for
follow-on innovation, and if so, whether antitrust enforcement in the form of compul-
sory licensing of patents provides an effective remedy. We advance on these questions
by analyzing the effects of one of the most important antitrust rulings in U.S. history:
The 1956 consent decree against the Bell System. This decree settled a seven-year old
antitrust lawsuit that sought to break up the Bell System, the dominant provider of
telecommunications services in the U.S., because it allegedly monopolized “the manufac-
ture, distribution, and sale of telephones, telephone apparatus and equipment” (Antitrust
Subcommittee, 1958, p.1668). Bell was charged with having foreclosed competitors from
the market for telecommunications equipment because its operating companies had ex-
clusive supply contracts with its manufacturing subsidiary Western Electric and because
it used exclusionary practices such as the refusal to license its patents.
The consent decree contained two main remedies. The Bell System was obligated to
license all its patents royalty-free and it was barred from entering any industry other
than telecommunications. As a consequence, 7’820 patents or 1.3% of all unexpired U.S.
patents in a wide range of fields became freely available in 1956. Most of these patents
covered technologies from the Bell Laboratories (Bell Labs), the research subsidiary of
the Bell System, arguably the most innovative industrial laboratory in the world at the
time. The Bell Labs produced path-breaking innovations in telecommunications such as
the cellular telephone technology or the first transatlantic telephone cable. But more than
half of its patents were outside the field of telecommunications because of Bell’s part in
the war effort in World War II and its commitment to basic science. Researchers at Bell
Labs are credited for the invention of the transistor, the solar cell, and the laser, among
other things.
The Bell case is uniquely suited to investigate the effects of compulsory licensing as an
antitrust measure for two reasons: First, it allows to study the effects of compulsory li-
censing without any confounding changes in the market structure. In compulsory licensing
cases, antitrust authorities usually impose structural remedies such as divestitures, which
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makes it difficult to separate the innovation effects from changes in the market structure
from the innovation effects from changes in the licensing regime. Yet, in the case of Bell
no structural remedies were imposed, despite the original intent of the Department of
Justice. This was due to the intense lobbying of the Department of Defense as Bell was
considered vital for national defense purposes.
Second, Bell’s broad patent portfolio enables us to measure the effect of compulsory
licensing on follow-on innovation in different competitive settings. 42% of Bell’s patents
were related to the telecommunications industry. In this industry, Bell was a vertically
integrated monopolist who allegedly foreclosed rivals. The remaining 58% of Bell’s patent
portfolio had its main application outside of telecommunications. In these industries, Bell
was not an active market participant. By looking at the differential effects of compulsory
licensing inside and outside of the telecommunications industry we can distinguish the
effects of potential foreclosure of patents and of potential bargaining failures that are
inherent in the patent system.
Our analysis shows that compulsory licensing increased follow-on innovation that builds on
Bell patents. This effect is driven mainly by young and small companies. But the positive
effects of compulsory licensing were restricted to industries other than the telecommuni-
cations equipment industry. This suggests that Bell continued to foreclose the telecom-
munications market even after the consent decree took effect. Thus, compulsory licensing
without structural remedies appears to be an ineffective remedy for market foreclosure.
The increase of follow-on innovation by small and young companies is in line with the
hypothesis that patents held by a dominant firm are harmful for innovation because
they can act as a barrier to entry for small and young companies who are less able to
strike licensing deals than large firms (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004; Galasso, 2012).
Compulsory licensing removed this barrier in markets outside the telecommunications
industry, arguably unintentionally so. This fostered follow-on innovation by young and
small companies and contributed to the long run technological progress in the U.S.
Looking at the results in more detail, we first consider the effect of compulsory licensing on
innovations that build on Bell patents. We measure follow-on innovation by the number
of patent citations Bell Labs patents received from other companies that patent in the
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U.S. We find that in the first five years follow-on innovation increased by 17% or a total
of around 1’000 citations. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that the additional
patents other companies filed as a direct result of the consent decree had a value of
up to $5.7 billion in today’s dollars. More than two-thirds of the increase is driven
by young and small companies and individual inventors unrelated to Bell. Start-ups
and individual inventors increase follow-on innovation by 32% while for large and old
companies the increase is only around 6%. Robustness checks show that the increase in
follow-on innovation is not driven by simultaneous contemporary shocks to technologies
in which Bell was active or by citation substitution.
The increase in follow-on innovation by other companies is accompanied by a decrease in
follow-on innovation by Bell, but this negative effect is not large enough to dominate the
positive effect on patenting by others. The limited negative response by Bell is most likely
due to the fact that at the time of the consent decree, Bell was a regulated monopolist
subject to rate of return regulation. Yet, the consent decree changed the direction of
Bell’s research. Bell shifted its research program to focus more on telecommunications
research, the only business Bell was allowed to be active in.
In a second step we split the increase in follow-on innovation by industry. We do not find
any increase in innovation in the telecommunications industry, the aim of the regulatory
intervention. Compulsory licensing fostered innovation only outside of the telecommuni-
cations industry. This pattern is consistent with historical records that Bell continued to
use exclusionary practices after the consent decree took effect and that these exclusionary
practices impeded innovation (Wu, 2012). As no structural remedies were imposed, Bell
continued to control not only the production of telephone equipment but was - in the form
of the Bell operating companies - also its own customer. This made competing with Bell
in the telecommunications equipment market unattractive even after compulsory licensing
facilitated access to Bell’s technology. For example, the Bell operating companies refused
to connect any telephone that was not produced by Western Electric, the manufacturing
subsidary of the Bell System (Temin and Galambos, 1987, p.222). In other industries,
compulsory licensing was effective to foster innovation by young and small companies since
Bell as the supplier of technology did not control the product markets through vertical
integration or via exclusive contracts.
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Although the 1956 consent decree was not effective in ending market foreclosure, it per-
manently increased the scale of U.S. innovation. In the first five years alone, the number
of patents increased by 25% in fields with compulsorily licensed patents compared to tech-
nologically similar fields without; and it continued to increase thereafter. This increase
is again driven by small and new companies outside the telecommunications industry.
We find only a small increase in patents related to the production of telecommunica-
tions equipment. This indicates that market foreclosure may slow down technological
progress and suggests that antitrust enforcement can have an impact on the long-run rate
of technological change.
We contribute to the literature by being the first to empirically investigate the effect
of antitrust enforcement on innovation. Our results suggest that foreclosure impedes
innovation and that compulsory licensing without structural remedies is not sufficient to
overcome foreclosure. Access to technology through compulsory licensing alone does not
stimulate market entry and innovation unless there is sufficient access to the product
market as well. These insights are relevant not only for antitrust cases about abuse of
a dominant market position, such as the Bell case, but also for merger and acquisition
cases where compulsory licensing is often used as a remedy when mergers are approved.
Our empirical findings support theoretical arguments in the antitrust literature suggesting
that to increase innovation, antitrust measures should focus on exclusionary practices and
the protection of start-ups (Segal and Whinston, 2007; Baker, 2012; Wu, 2012).
We also contribute to the literature on intellectual property by providing robust causal
evidence for the negative effects of patents on follow-on innovation of small and young
companies. Our estimate of an increase in follow-on innovation by 17% is significantly
smaller than the increase reported by Galasso and Schankerman (2015). They study the
innovation effect of litigated and invalidated patents and find an increase of 50%.3 While
our study looks mainly at patents in the electronics and computer industry, Sampat and
Williams (2015) consider gene patents and find no effect on follow-on research. The size
of our measured effects is consistent with that reported by other studies such as Murray
and Stern (2007) and Moser and Voena (2012). They study various measures of follow-on
3Litigated patents are selected by importance and by the virtue of having a challenger in court. Thus,
the blocking effects of these particular patents might be larger than the average effect for the broad
cross-section of patents.
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innovation and report an overall impact of a patent removal of about 10-20% in biotech and
chemistry. Our finding of entry of companies as the main mechanism driving the positive
innovation effects of compulsory licensing is consistent with Galasso and Schankerman
(2015). They show that the increase in citations can be attributed to small companies
citing invalidated patents of large companies.
Finally, this study contributes to our understanding of innovation and growth in the
United States in the twentieth century. By providing free state-of-the-art technology to all
U.S. companies, compulsory licensing increased U.S. innovation because it opened up new
markets for a large number of entrants. This interpretation is consistent with theoretical
concepts and historical accounts. Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012) show theoretically that
compulsory licensing can foster innovation because it enables more companies to compete
for becoming the leader in an industry.4 In line with this idea, Gordon Moore, the co-
founder of Intel, stated that “One of the most important developments for the commercial
semiconductor industry (...) was the antitrust suit filed against [the Bell System] in 1949
(...) which allowed the merchant semiconductor industry “to really get started” in the
United States (...) [T]here is a direct connection between the liberal licensing policies of
Bell Labs and people such as Gordon Teal leaving Bell Labs to start Texas Instruments and
William Shockley doing the same thing to start, with the support of Beckman Instruments,
Shockley Semiconductor in Palo Alto. This (...) started the growth of Silicon Valley”
(Wessner et al., 2001, p. 86). Similarly, Peter Grindley and David Teece opined that
“[AT&T’s licensing policy shaped by antitrust policy] remains one of the most unheralded
contributions to economic development – possibly far exceeding the Marshall plan in terms
of wealth generation it established abroad and in the United States“ (Grindley and Teece,
1997).
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the antitrust
lawsuit against Bell and the consent decree. In Section 1.3, we describe the data and the
empirical strategy. In Section 1.4, we show that compulsory licensing increased follow-on
4In the model of Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012), compulsory licensing also makes innovation less prof-
itable because leaders are replaced more quickly. In the case of Bell, compulsory licensing was selectively
applied to only one company which was not active in the newly created industries. This suggests that
there was no disincentive effect and that our empirical set-up cleanly measures the effects of an increase
in competition on innovation.
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innovation and conduct robustness checks. In Section 1.5, we examine the effectiveness
of compulsory licensing as an antitrust measure against foreclosure in the market for
telecommunications equipment. In section 1.6, we present the long run effects of the
consent decree on U.S. patenting. Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 The Bell System and the Antitrust Lawsuit
In this section we describe the Bell System and the antitrust lawsuit against Bell. We
then discuss the unique features of the case that make it ideally suited for our empirical
analysis.
1.2.1 The Bell System was a Vertically Integrated Monopolist
In 1956, American Telephone & Telegraph (AT&T) was the dominant provider of telecom-
munications services in the U.S. Through its operating companies, it owned or controlled
98% of all the facilities providing long distance telephone services and 85% of all facil-
ities providing short distance telephone services. These operating companies bought all
of their equipment from Western Electric, the manufacturing subsidiary of AT&T. As
a consequence, Western Electric had a market share in excess of 90% in the produc-
tion of telecommunications equipment. Western Electric produced telecommunications
equipment based on the research done by the Bell Laboratories, the research subsidiary
of AT&T and Western Electric. All these companies together were known as the Bell
System, stressing its complete vertical integration (Figure 1.1). In terms of assets, AT&T
was by far the largest private corporation in the world in 1956, employing 598’000 people
with an operating revenue of $ 2.9 billion or 1% of the U.S. GDP at the time (Antitrust
Subcommittee, 1959, p.31).
The Bell System held patents on many key technologies in telecommunications, as well
as a large number of patents in many other fields. Between 1940 and 1970, Bell filed on
average ∼543 patents or 1% of all U.S. patents each year. More than 70% of the patents
protected inventions of the Bell Laboratories (Bell Labs), arguably the most innovative
industrial laboratories in the world at the time.
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The Bell Labs were unique in their commitment to basic research. When the Bell Labs
were founded in 1925, no one knew which part of science might yield insights for the
problems of electric communication (Rosenberg, 1990; Nelson, 1962, p.31). As a result,
the Bell System decided that - besides supporting the day-to-day need of the System - the
Bell Labs would engage in basic science, assuming it would eventually yield products for
some part of the large Bell System (Gertner, 2012; Nelson, 1959; Arora et al., forthcoming,
p. 31).5
The Bell Labs produced path-breaking basic and applied research. Scientists at Bell are
credited for the development of radio astronomy (1932), the transistor (1947), cellular tele-
phone technology (1947), information theory (1948), solar cells (1954), the laser (1957),
and the Unix operating system (1969). The 1950 staff of Bell Labs alone included four
future Nobel Laureates in physics, one Turing Award winner, five future U.S. National
Medals of Science recipients and 10 future IEEE Medals of Honor recipients. In 1950,
Bell Labs employed 6’000 people, one third of whom were professional scientists and engi-
neers (Nelson, 1962; Temin and Galambos, 1987). This was 1% of the entire science and
5According to the first head of basic and applied research at Bell Labs, Harold Arnold, his department
would include “the field of physical and organical chemistry, of metallurgy, of magnetism, of electrical
conduction, of radiation, of electronics, of acoustics, of phonetics, of optics, of mathematics, of mechanics,
and even of physiology, of psychology and meteorology”. This broad focus led to major advances in basic
science, but also to a large number of unused patents. For example, an investigation of the FCC in 1934
reported that Bell owned or controlled 9,255 patents but actively used only 4,225 covered inventions
(Antitrust Subcommittee, 1958, p.3842).
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engineering workforce in the U.S. at the time.6
1.2.2 The Antitrust Lawsuit
On January 14, 1949 the United States Government filed an antitrust lawsuit with the
aim to split AT&T from Western Electric.7 The complaint charged that Western Electric
and AT&T had been engaged in the monopolization of the manufacture, distribution and
sale of telecommunications equipment in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890
(Antitrust Subcommittee, 1959, p.46). According to the complaint, Bell was closing the
market to all other buyers and sellers of telecommunications equipment by exclusionary
practices including exclusive contracts and the refusal to license patents.8
To correct this, the government sought three main remedies. First, Western Electric was
to be separated from AT&T, split into three competing companies, and to transfer all
of its shares of the research subsidiary Bell Laboratories to AT&T. Second, AT&T was
to buy telephone equipment only under competitive bidding and all exclusive contracts
between AT&T and Western were to be prohibited. Third, the Bell System was to be
forced to license all its patents for reasonable and non-discriminatory royalties (Antitrust
Subcommittee, 1959, p.33).9 Yet, none of this would happen.
The case ended with a consent decree on January 24, 1956, containing two remedies:
First, the Bell System had to license all its patents issued prior to the decree royalty free
to any applicant, with the exception of RCA, General Electric and Westinghouse who
6According to the National Science Foundation, the number of workers in S&E occupations was 182’000
in the U.S. in 1950. Source: https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind12/c3/c3h.htm - last accessed August
30, 2016.
7This account of facts follows largely the final report to the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House on
the Bell Consent Decree Program (Antitrust Subcommittee, 1959).
8For example, Bell allegedly forced competitors “engaged in the rendition of telephone service to
acquire AT&T patent license under threat of (...) patent infringement suits,” or refused “to issue patent
licenses except on condition” to be able to control the telephone manufacturer or by “refusing to authorize
the manufacture (...) of telephones (...) under patents controlled by (...) the Bell System” or by “refusing
to make available to the telegraphy industry the basic patents on the vacuum tube” that are essential
for telegraphy to compete with telephone or by refusing to purchase equipment “under patents which are
not controlled by Western or AT&T, which are known to be superior” (Antitrust Subcommittee, 1958,
p.3838).
9There were two minor remedies: First, AT&T was not to be allowed to direct the Bell operating com-
panies which equipment to purchase and second, all contracts that eliminated or restrained competition
were to be ceased.
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already had cross licensing agreements with Bell (the so called B-2 agreements). All sub-
sequently published patents had to be licensed for reasonable royalties. As a consequence
of the consent decree, 7’820 patents in 266 USPC technology classes and 35 technology
subcategories or 1.3% of all unexpired U.S. patents became freely available. Second, the
Bell System was barred from engaging in any business other than telecommunications.
The decree was hailed by antitrust officials as a “major victory”, but already in 1957
the Antitrust Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives
started to investigate whether the decree of AT&T was in the public interest. The final
report issued in 1959 pulled the decree to pieces: “the consent decree entered in the A.T. &
T. case stands revealed as devoid of merit and ineffective as an instrument to accomplish
the purposes of the antitrust laws. The decree not only permits continued control by A.T.
& T. of Western, it fails to limit Western’s role as the exclusive supplier of equipment to
the Bell System, thereby continuing monopoly in the telephone equipment manufacturing
industry.”
The hearings of the Senate subcommittee uncovered a timeline of cozy back and forth
negotiations and intense lobbying by the Department of Defense (DoD). The DoD in-
tervened on behalf of Bell because it relied on the research of the Bell Labs. In World
War II, the Bell Labs had been instrumental in inventing the superior radar systems of
the Allies. They also engaged in around a thousand different projects, from tank radio
communications to enciphering machines for scrambling secret messages (Gertner, 2012,
p.59 ff.).10 In the following years, Bell Labs continued to work for the DoD, for example
by operating the Sandia National Laboratories, one of the main development facilities for
nuclear weapons.
After the complaint was filed in January 1949, Bell sought and obtained a freeze of the
antitrust lawsuit in early 1952 with support of the the DoD, on the grounds that Bell
was necessary for the war effort in Korea. In January 1953, after Dwight D. Eisenhower
took office, Bell began to lobby for the final dismissal of the case. The argument was that
the Bell System was too important for national defense and thus should be kept intact.
The government followed this argument and the Attorney General Herbert Brownell Jr.
10To highlight the engagement of Bell, we show in Figure A.2 in Appendix A the patenting activity of
Bell in radar and cryptography during World War II.
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asked Bell to submit concessions “with no real injury” that would be acceptable in order
to settle (Antitrust Subcommittee, 1959, p.55)
In May 1954, AT&T presented and in June 1954 submitted to the Department of Justice
a checklist of concessions that would be an acceptable basis for a consent decree. The
only suggested major remedy was the compulsory licensing of all Bell patents for reason-
able royalties. To support its position, Charles Erwin Wilson, the Secretary of Defense,
wrote Herbert Brownell Jr., the Attorney General, a memorandum to the effect that the
severance of Western Electric from Bell would be “contrary to the vital interests of our
nation” (Antitrust Subcommittee, 1959, p. 56). In December 1955, the Department of
Justice communicated with AT&T that it was ready to consider a decree of the “gen-
eral character suggested [by A. T. & T.] in its memorandum (...) dated June 4, 1954”
(Antitrust Subcommittee, 1959, p.92). Bell agreed.
1.2.3 Advantages of the Bell Case for the Empirical Set-up
The Bell case has two characteristics that make it ideally suited to measure the innovation
effects of compulsory licensing as an antitrust remedy.
First, the consent decree did not impose any structural remedies for the telecommuni-
cations market. This allows us to isolate the innovation effect of compulsory licensing
without any confounding changes in market structure. The reason why the Department
of Justice did not impose any structural remedies is unclear. The final conclusion of the
Antitrust Subcommittee blamed the lack of intent of the Attorney General to pursue Bell
and the intense lobbying of the Department of Defense for the fact that no structural
remedies were imposed (Antitrust Subcommittee, 1959, p.292). In contrast, the presiding
judge Stanley N. Barnes stated that in his opinion it was enough to confine Bell to the
regulated telecommunications market in order to prevent excessive prices and to end the
exclusion of other suppliers (Antitrust Subcommittee, 1959, p.317).
Second, due to Bell Labs’ commitment to basic science and its role in the war effort, Bell
held a large number of patents unrelated to telecommunications, in industries in which
it was not an active market participant. This gives us the opportunity to measure how
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the innovation effect of compulsory licensing depends on the market structure. In the
telecommunications industry, Bell was vertically integrated. Hence Bell was not only a
dominant player in the production of the technology used for telephone equipment, but it
also controlled the production of telephone equipment (Western Electric), as well as the
product market for telephone equipment through its operating companies. In all other
industries, Bell was a supplier of technology, but was not active in production. Even
more, the consent decree explicitly banned Bell from ever entering into these businesses
which meant that it effectively preserved the market structure inside and outside of the
telecommunications industry.
To visualize the broad patent portfolio of Bell we use the data of Kerr (2008) to assign
the most likely 4-digit SIC industry group to each USPC class (Figure 1.2). Around 42%
of all Bell’s patents have their most likely application in Bell’s core business of producing
telephones and telegraphs (SIC 3661). The remainder is spread across a large number of
fields with an emphasis on electronics and industrial commercial machinery and computer
equipment.11
1.3 Data and Empirical Strategy
For our estimation, we use comprehensive patent data for the U.S. from the Worldwide
Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) of the European Patent Office. In this data, we
identify all compulsorily licensed patents of the Bell System with a list of patent numbers
published in the “Hearings before the Antitrust Subcommittee” of the U.S. Congress on
the consent decree of Bell in May 1958 (Antitrust Subcommittee, 1958).12
In an ideal world, we would compare the number of realized follow-on innovations building
on Bell patents with and without the consent decree. The problem is, however, that this
is not possible: First, a census of follow-on innovations does not exist and second, we
11In Figure A.1 in Appendix A we show the compulsorily licensed patents split by technology subcat-
egories following Hall et al. (2001). Only 31% of all Bell patents are in the field of telecommunications
and the remaining patents are spread over 34 other subcategories.
12The list is the complete list of all patents owned by the Bell System in January 1956. It also includes
patents of Typesetter Corp. which were explicitly excluded from compulsory licensing in Section X of
the consent decree. We assume that these patents are unaffected.
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3661 Telephones and Telegraphs
3651 Audio and Video Equipment
3711 Motor Vehicles
Industries with <50 patents
3829 Measuring and Controlling







3357 Insulation Nonferrous Wire
3399 Primary Metal Products
8071 Medical Laboratories




2281 Yarn Spinning Mills
3599 Industrial Machinery
Notes: The pie chart shows the distribution of compulsorily licensed patents by most likely industry. We
assign patents to the most likely 4-digit SIC industry using the data of Kerr (2008). The data are from
the Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) of the European Patent Office.
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can only observe the state of the world in which the compulsory licensing of Bell patents
happened but not the counterfactual situation without the consent decree.
To measure follow-on innovations we use patent citations. Bell patents could be freely
licensed after the consent decree, but patents that built on licensed Bell patents still had
to cite them. Thus, we can use patent citations as a measure for follow-on innovations
even though patents had lost their power to exclude competitors (Williams, 2015). The
advantage of this measure is that, in contrast to most alternative measures such as new
products or R&D spending, citations are consistently available from 1947 onward.13 Ci-
tations have the additional advantage that they have a high frequency which allows a
precise measurement of effects. The caveat is that some citations might have been added
by the patent examiner, which adds noise to the measure (Alcacer and Gittelman, 2006;
Alcacer et al., 2009).
To construct a counterfactual for the compulsorily licensed Bell patents, as control group
we use all other patents that are published in the same year, that have the same total
number of citations as the Bell patents in the five years prior to 1949, and that are
in the same USPC technology class. By conditioning on the publication year and prior
citations we control for the fact that, on average, young and high quality patents are cited
more often. By conditioning on the same technology class we control for the number of
companies that are active in the same field (i.e., for the number of potential follow-on
inventors) and for technology-specific citation trends.
We can interpret our results causally under the assumption that in the absence of the
consent decree, the Bell patents would have received the same number of citations as
the control patents did (parallel trend assumption). More specifically, the identifying
assumption is that conditioning on the control variables removes any systematic difference
in follow-on citations between Bell and the control patents that is not due to compulsory
licensing.
One potential concern about this identification strategy might be that the antitrust au-
13In 1947 the USPTO started to publish citations of prior art on the front page of the patent (Alcacer
et al., 2009).The first patent to include prior art was issued on February 4, 1947. Yet, inventions were
evaluated against the prior art already since the passage of the Patent Act of 1836. Prior to 1947, however,
the prior art was available only from the “file history” of the issued patent, which is not contained in
Patstat.
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thorities chose to compulsorily license Bell patents for a reason related to the potential
of follow-on research of these patents. According to the complaint and historical records,
compulsory licensing was imposed because Bell used patents to block competitors in the
field of telecommunications equipment. Therefore, if blocking patents are also patents
that in the absence of compulsory licensing would have experienced particularly strong
follow-on innovation, we might overestimate the effect of the consent decree.
Yet, this does not appear to be likely. In the absence of compulsory licensing, Bell’s
telecommunication patents would have continued to block competitors because the con-
sent decree did not contain any other remedies aimed at restoring competition. Conse-
quently, it seems fair to assume that blocking patents would have continued to receive the
same number of citations as the control patents that have the same number of citations
in the five years prior to 1949.
Furthermore, this concern obviously does not apply to the 58% of patents Bell held outside
the field of telecommunications. These patents were included in the compulsory licensing
regime of the consent decree not because they were blocking, but purely due to their
association with the Bell System. Hence, there is no reason to expect any confounding
effects.
To strengthen the point that the parallel trend assumption is plausible, we show in Section
1.4.1 that the number of citations of Bell and control patents was the same before the
terms of the consent decree became known. In Section 1.4.3 we also show that companies
that did not benefit from compulsory licensing did not start to cite Bell patents more after
the consent decree. Thus, the control patents are a plausible counterfactual for patents
both inside and outside of telecommunications.
Another concern might be that Bell’s patenting strategy may have changed after the
complaint became known. This is why we focus on patents published by 1949, the year
the lawsuit against Bell started. The consent decree stated that only patents published
before 1956 were to be compulsorily licensed. As a consequence of this cut-off date, more
than 98% of the patents affected by the consent decree were filed before 1953, and more
than 82% earlier than 1949. This implies that the characteristics of the majority of the
affected patents were fixed before the Department of Justice filed its initial complaint.
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To be on the safe side, we only use patents granted before 1949, but the results do not
change when we use all patents affected by the consent decree.
Out of the 7’820 Bell patents affected by the Consent decree, 4’731 patents were published
before 1949. For 4’533 of these patents (i.e., for 95.8%) we find in total 70’180 control
patents that fulfill the criteria specified above. In our empirical analysis, we use the
weights of Iacus et al. (2009) to account for the potentially different number of control
patents per Bell patent.14
Table 1.1 shows summary statistics. In column (1) we report the summary statistics for all
patents published between 1939 to 1956. In column (2) we report the summary statistics
of all Bell patents that were published between 1939 and 1956 and hence were affected
by the compulsory licensing rule. Patents published before 1939 had lost their patent
protection by 1956 and were therefore not affected by the consent decree. In column (3)
we report the summary statistics of the Bell patents published between 1939 and 1948.
These are the patents that we use in our baseline regression.15 They are affected by
the consent decree but published before the lawsuit started and hence unaffected by a
potential patenting policy change the lawsuit may have triggered.
The summary statistics of Bell patents differ from those of non-Bell patents. The average
non-Bell patent in our data set receives 3.3 citations per patent and 6.1% of these citations
are self-citations.16 Bell System patents published in the same time period on average
receive 5.2 citations and 13.4% of these citations are self-citations.17 The numbers for the
subsample of Bell patents published until 1949 are very similar. They receive on average
4.9 citations of which around 14.2% are self-citations.
14Iacus et al. (2009) proposes to use a weight of 1 for the treatment variable and a weight of
NTreatment,Strata/NControl,Strata ·NControl/NTreatment where NControl is the number of control patents
in the sample, NControl,Strata is the number of control patents in a strata defined by the publication year,
the USPC primary class and the number of citations up to 1949. NTreatment and NTreatment,Strata are
defined analogously. Using these weights we arrive at an estimate for the average treatment effect on the
treated.
15To make the statistics comparable for affected and not affected patents, we only consider technology
classes in which Bell is active.
16In the main part of this chapter we only use citations by U.S. patents. In Appendix A, we run one
regression with citations of patents filed in foreign jurisdictions.
17Except when explicitly mentioned in the text we correct for self-citations in all our regressions because
we are mainly interested to which extent other companies built on Bell Labs patents.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3)
None-Bell System Bell System Bell System
Affected Baseline Sample
mean mean mean
Filing Year 1944.5 1943.6 1940.6
Publication Year 1947.6 1946.5 1943.1
# Years in patent protection after 1956 8.6 7.5 4.1
Total cites 3.3 5.2 4.9
Citations by other companies 3.1 4.5 4.3
Self Citations 0.2 0.7 0.7
Citations by other companies prior to 1949 0.3 0.9 1.4
Observations 293578 7820 4731
Notes: The table reports the average filing and publication year, the average number of years until patent ex-
piration and citation statistics for patents published between 1939 and 1956. Column (1) includes all patents
of non-Bell System companies in technologies where a Bell System company published at least one patent.
Column (2) includes all Bell patents published between 1939 and 1956. Column (3) includes all Bell patents
published between 1939 and 1949, the baseline sample of most of our regressions. A citation is identified as a
self-cite if the applicant of the cited and citing patent is the same or if both patents belong to the Bell System.
The data are from the Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) of the European Patent Office.
1.4 Results: Compulsory Licensing Increased
Follow-on Innovation
Prior to the consent decree, Bell licensed its patents to other companies at royalty rates
of 1% - 6% of the net sales price. Lower rates applied if a cross-license was agreed upon
(Antitrust Subcommittee, 1958, p. 2685). The consent decree lowered these rates to zero
and made licensing available without having to enter into a bargaining process with Bell.
In this section we estimate whether and if so by how much this compulsory licensing
increased follow-on innovations.
1.4.1 Timing: The Consent Decree Increased Citations of Other
Companies Starting in 1955
In this section, we estimate the impact of the compulsory licensing on citations looking at
the time period 1949-1970. We employ the following difference-in-differences specification:
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49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70
Filing year of citing patent
Notes: This graph shows the estimated number of yearly excess citations of patents affected by the
consent decree ("Bell patents") relative to patents with the same publication year, in the same three-digit
U. S. Patent Classification (USPC) primary class and with the same number of citations up to 1949. To
arrive at these estimates we regress the number of citations in each year on an indicator variable that
is equal to one if the patent under consideration is affected by the consent decree, and year fixed effects
(Equation 1). We correct for self-citations. The dashed line represents the 90% confidence bands for
the estimated coefficient. The sample under consideration contains 4’533 Bell patents and 70’180 control
patents. We cannot match 198 Bell patents to control patents. To adjust for the different number of
control patents per treatment patent in each stratum, we use the weights suggested by Iacus et al. (2009).
The data are from the Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) of the European Patent Office.
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#Citationsi,t = α + βt ·Belli + Y earFEt + εi,t (1.1)
where #Citationsi,t is the number of follow-on citations of other companies to patent i in
year t. Belli indicates whether the patent i is owned by the Bell System and is therefore
treated. We also include fixed effects for each year (Y earFEt).
Figure 1.3 shows per year the estimated number of excess citations of Bell patents that
were granted before 1949 relative to control patents, βt in equation 1.1. From 1949 to
1954, the average number of citations of treatment and control patents tracks each other
very closely, speaking in favor of parallel trends in citations to Bell patents and to the
control patents. In 1955, the average number of citations of other companies to Bell
patents starts to increase and it converges again in 1960; 1960 is the average expiration
date of the Bell patents in our sample.18 The yearly coefficients from 1955 to 1960 are
mostly significantly different from zero at the 10 % level.19
The increase in citations depicted in Figure 1.3 does not start in 1956, the year of the
consent decree, but in 1955. This is plausible because on May 28, 1954, Bell already
suggested a consent decree including the compulsory licensing of Bell System patents as
described in Section 1.2. Thus, both the Bell Laboratories and companies building on
Bell’s patents could have known that compulsory licensing was pending as early as May
1954 (Antitrust Subcommittee, 1959).20
This timeline is supported by the cumulative abnormal stock returns for AT&T stocks
shown in Figure 1.4. Up to the election of Dwight Eisenhower, cumulative abnormal
returns were centered around zero. At the beginning of 1954, cumulative abnormal returns
strongly increased to around 11%. The large uptick in March 1954 is exactly synchronized
with the date of a memorandum summarizing a meeting of the Attorney General and Bell
management about how to resolve the Bell case (Antitrust Subcommittee, 1958, p. 1956).
Shortly thereafter, in May 1954, Bell proposed compulsory licensing as an acceptable
remedy to settle the lawsuit. There is no more persistent positive or negative change in
18From 1861 to 1994, the term of the patent was 17 years from issuance.
19In the appendix to this chapter we graphically compare the average yearly number of citations to
Bell and to control patents and find the same results.
20The first media mentioning of the consent decree against Bell was on May 13, 1955 in the New York
Times. Public officials confirmed that top level negotiations are ongoing “looking towards a settlement
of the AT&T case.”
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Notes: This figure shows the cumulative abnormal stock return of AT&T compared to other companies
in the Dow Jones index, beginning in January 1948. The events marked in the graph are the beginning of
the antitrust lawsuit on January 14, 1949, the presidential election on November 4, 1952, Bell’s proposal
of compulsory licensing on June 4, 1954, and the consent decree on January 25, 1956. The data are from
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).
the cumulative abnormal return until 1959. In particular, the consent decree itself in 1956
did not seem to have had any more informational value.
We can also infer from Bell’s behavior that as early as the first half of 1955, compulsory
licensing was expected. According to the consent decree, all patents had to be licensed
for free if they were published before January 24, 1956. If they were published after this
cut-off date, they were licensed on a reasonable and non-discriminatory basis. So starting
from the date when Bell became aware of the clause it had an incentive to delay the
publication of its patents beyond the cut-off date.
According to the data, Bell indeed started to delay its patents at the patent office be-
ginning in the first half of 1955. To pin down the date, we compare the propensity of a
Bell patent to be published with the propensity that control patents are published for a
given filing year. In Figure 1.5, we show these hazard rates of publishing in a particular
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year for the filing years 1949 and 1953.21 For the filing year 1949, the publishing rates
per year are very similar for Bell patents and patents from other companies. If at all,
Bell patents were published a bit earlier. For the filing year 1953, this picture is reversed:
Starting in the first half of 1955, Bell patents had a significantly lower probability of being
published. This is consistent with Bell trying to delay the publications of its patents and
having credible information about the general outline of the consent decree in the first
half of 1955 at the latest.
1.4.2 Magnitude: The Consent Decree Increased Citations to
Bell Patents by 17%
We next present our baseline regression. To quantify the size of the effects of the con-
sent decree, we estimate the average yearly effect of the consent decree on citations of
other companies for the time period 1949-1960. We employ the following difference-in-
differences model:
#Citationsi,t = β1 ·Belli + β2 · I[1955− 1960] + β3 ·Belli · I[1955− 1960] + εi,t (1.2)
where I[1955 − 1960] is an indicator variable for the treatment period. We define the
treatment period as from 1955 to 1960 based on the yearly coefficients in Figure 1.3.
The results are reported in Table 1.2 column (1).22 In the treatment period, the consent
decree resulted in 0.020 additional citations. This implies that, on average, the consent
decree increased citations to Bell patents by other companies by 17% from 1955 to 1960.23
Considering only the 4’731 patents published before 1949, this implies a total increase of
568 citations. If we assume homogeneous effects for all 7’820 patents published up to 1956,
the total number of excess citations is 938. The effect is also positive and statistically
significant if we include all patents up to 1956, the year of the consent decree (column 2).
21Hazard rates for all other years are available from the authors upon request.
22Note that patents receive fewer citations post treatment because older patents in general receive
fewer citations than younger patents. See Figure A.3 in Appendix A.1.
23To determine the percentage increase, we first calculate the number of citations Bell patents would
have received in the absence of the treatment (counterfactual), using the coefficients in Table 1.2, column
(1). The counterfactual is 0.115 (= 0.183 - 0.004 - 0.064). We then divide the treatment effect, 0.02, by
the counterfactual (0.02/0.115 = 0.174).
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Figure 1.5: Hazard Rates for Publication of Patents by Filing Year



















































Notes: These figures show the hazard rates for publication of patents that were filed by Bell (solid
line) and others (dotted line). Subfigure (a) shows hazard rates for patent applications filed in 1949,
subfigure (b) for applications filed in 1953. The data are from the Worldwide Patent Statistical Database
(PATSTAT) of the European Patent Office.
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Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that the additional patents for other companies
directly induced by the consent decree had a total value of up to $5.7 billion. To calculate
this number we use estimates for the average dollar value derived from Kogan et al.
(2017) to weigh each citing patent.24 According to these estimates, each compulsorily
licensed patent created an additional value of $121’000 annually in the treatment period
(column 3). Assuming homogeneous effects for all 7’820 patents in the treatment group,
the consent decree led to around $5.7 billion in economic value over six years, between
1954 and 1960. These calculations represent an upper bound because they assume that
without the additional citations induced by the consent decree, the patent would not have
been invented (i.e., that the compulsorily licensed patent was strictly necessary for the
citing invention).
The effect is measurable across the quality distribution of patents. We split all patents
by the number of citations a patent received in the first five years after publication and
present results in columns (4) and (5) of Table 1.2. We define a high-quality patent as a
patent with at least one citation before 1949 and a low-quality patent as a patent with no
citations. The effect is stronger for high quality patents, but the effect is also statistically
significantly different from zero for low quality patents. The effect is also not exclusively
driven by the computer industry, which was just about to start in 1956. In column (6), we
report results when dropping all 491 Bell patents classified in the technology subcategories
“Computer Hardware and Software”, “Computer Peripherals” and “Information Storage”
or “Others” (Hall et al., 2001) and find a similar effect. The effect is also not driven by
the concurrent consent decrees of IBM in 1956 or RCA in 1958. IBM and RCA were
defendants in an antitrust case with compulsory licensing as the outcome. We drop all
citations from patents that also cite either the patents of RCA or the patents of IBM and
report the results in column (7).
24Kogan et al. (2017) measure the value of a patent using abnormal stock returns around the publishing
date of the patent. We use this data to calculate the average dollar value for a patent in each technology
class and publication year.
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1.4.3 Robustness Check: No Increase in Citations by Untreated
Companies
One concern for the estimation is that the effect of compulsory licensing on subsequent
citations might be driven by a shock that increased follow-on innovation to Bell patents
and was correlated with the consent decree. For example, the antitrust prosecutors might
have chosen to press for compulsory licensing because they expected that there would be
many follow-on innovations based on the high quality of Bell’s patents.
To see whether this might have been the case we analyze the citation patterns of unaffected
companies to Bell patents and to the control patents. The 1956 consent decree singled out
three companies that were explicitly excluded from the free compulsory licensing of Bell
patents: the General Electric Company, Radio Corporation of America, and Westinghouse
Electric Corporation. The reason was that these companies already had a general cross-
licensing agreement, the “B-2 agreements” dated July 1, 1932. A fourth company, the
International Telephone and Telegraph Company (ITT), was also not affected by the
decree as it had a patent pool with Bell.
We repeat our baseline analysis but use only the citations of the B-2 companies (including
ITT) as the dependent variable and report the results in Figure 1.6 and column (2) of
Table A.1 in Appendix A.1. We do not find any effect. This suggests that the consent
decree did not change the citation behavior of excluded companies and the measured
effects are not due to a common technology shock. As these companies in total make up
12% of all citations to Bell patents, this null effect is not due to a lack of measurability.25
A second concern might be that due to the free availability of Bell technology, companies
substituted away from other, potentially more expensive technologies. In Appendix A.1
we show the results of additional auxiliary analyses suggesting that the effects are not
driven by citation substitution.
25We repeat our analysis also for foreign companies, which could also use Bell patents for free but
which did not receive technical assistance, and report the results in Table A.1, column (3) in Appendix
A.1. Similarly, we repeat our analysis for companies that already had a licensing agreement in place and
compare them with companies without a licensing agreement (Table A.1, columns 4 and 5, Appendix
A.1). As expected, we find that the effects are smaller for firms that were less affected by the consent
decree.
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Figure 1.6: Effect of Compulsory Licensing on Subsequent Citations Among Companies
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Notes: This graph shows the estimated number of yearly excess citations by General Electric Company,
Radio Corporation of America and Westinghouse Electric Corporation, the three companies exempt from
the consent decree, and by International Telephone and Telegraph Company, which already had a patent
pool in place, of patents affected ("Bell patents") relative to patents with the same publication year, in
the same three-digit USPC primary class and with the same number of citations up to 1949. To arrive
at these estimates, we regress the number of citations by the unaffected companies in each year on an
indicator variable equal to one if the patent under consideration is affected by the consent decree and
year fixed effects. The dashed line represents the 90% confidence bands for the estimated coefficient.
To adjust for the different number of control patents per treatment patent in each stratum, we use the
weights suggested by Iacus et al. (2009). The data are from the Worldwide Patent Statistical Database
(PATSTAT) of the European Patent Office.
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Finally, in Appendix A.1 we vary the construction of control groups and show that our
results are not driven by the particular choice of matching variables.
1.4.4 Robustness Check: The Decrease in Bell’s Own Patenting
is Lower than the Increase in Patenting by Other Compa-
nies
We next examine how Bell reacted to the consent decree. Bell might have reduced its
innovation activities by more than other companies increased their innovation activities,
such that the net-effect of the consent decree would be negative. To see whether this is
the case, we measure whether Bell continued to produce follow-on innovations building
on its own patents.26 Results are reported in column (8) of Table 1.2. The number of
self-citations shows a decrease of 0.006 self-citations in the years between 1955 and 1960.
This decrease is statistically significant, but is not large enough to dominate the increase
in citations by other companies. In column (9) we present the effect on total citations,
i.e., citations by other companies and self-citations by Bell. We find that total citations
increased by 0.016. This speaks in favor of a net increase in innovation due to the consent
decree.
Bell’s innovation output in terms of number of patents continued to grow in line with
expectations in the years following the consent decree. To show this, we construct a
synthetic Bell and compare it with the actual patent output of the Bell System. To
construct a synthetic Bell, we first calculate the share of Bell’s patents of all patents in
each technology subcategory for the years 1946, 1947, and 1948. Then we assume that
Bell’s growth would have been in line with the growth of other companies that existed
before 1949 in these technology subcategories so that Bell would have held its share in
each subcategory constant for the following years. Results are presented in Figure 1.7a.
It shows that Bell’s patenting is on average smaller than the patenting of the synthetic
control, but not by much.27
26Self-citations are a measure for how much a company develops its own patents further (Akcigit and
Kerr, forthcoming; Galasso and Schankerman, forthcoming).
27In Figure A.5 in the Appendix A.1 we compare the patenting output of Bell with other control
companies and find that Bell’s patent growth is in line - but at the lower end - of similar companies.
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Figure 1.7: Innovation and R&D in the Bell System After the Consent Decree
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Notes: Subfigure (a) shows the total number of patents filed by the Bell System compared to a synthetic
Bell. To construct the synthetic Bell, we calculate the share Bell’s patents had in each 2-digit technology
subcategory relative to all patents of companies that had at least one patent before 1949. We then assume
that in the absence of the consent decree, Bell’s patenting would have grown in each subcategory at the
same pace as the patenting of all other companies. As a consequence, Bell’s share in each technology
subcategory is held constant. In a last step, we add the number of patents up to a yearly sum. Subfigure
(b) shows the ratio of R&D expenditures relative to total R&D of American Telephone & Telegraph.
The data are from the annual reports of AT&T. Subfigure (c) shows the share of patents related to
communication relative to all patents filed by Bell. We define a patent as related to communication if the
most likely application is in the production of telecommunications equipment (SIC 3661). In Appendix
A, we show the change in direction using NBER subcategories. The patent data are from the Worldwide
Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) of the European Patent Office.
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Bell’s continued investment in research was in line with the incentives the consent decree
and the regulators provided. The consent decree did not significantly alter the profitability
of new patents. The consent decree mandated that Bell could demand “reasonable”
licensing fees for all patents published after January 1956. The reasonable royalty rates
Bell charged were not much different compared to the pre-decree royalties (Antitrust
Subcommittee, 1959, p.111). The only difference was that Bell had to give a license to
any applicant.
Bell also had little incentive to reduce investment in R&D because the Bell System was
subject to a rate of return regulation following the Communications Act of 1934. Accord-
ing to annual reports, AT&T had a stable ratio of R&D to operating revenue of 0.5%
from 1949 to 1960 (Figure 1.7b).28 For the entire Bell System, the share of R&D to total
turnover stayed almost constant at 2%-3% from 1966 to 1982 (Noll, 1987). However,
the absolute level of R&D effort increased as the Bell System grew. Operating revenues
increased from $3.2 billion in 1950 to $5.3 billion in 1955, to $7.3 billion in 1960 and to
$11 billion in 1965, while the staff at Bell Labs grew from 6’000 in 1950, to 10’000 in 1955,
to 12’000 in 1960 and 15’000 in 1965 (Temin and Galambos, 1987).
But even if the consent decree offered no incentive for Bell to downsize, it offered incentives
for Bell to redirect its research budget towards applications in the telecommunications
field. Prior to the consent decree, Bell could expand to other businesses. Afterward, Bell’s
future was bound to common carrier telecommunications. The company correspondingly
refocused its research program on its core business and increased its share of patents in
fields related to the production of telecommunications equipment (Figure 1.7c).
These results are consistent with the study of Galasso and Schankerman (forthcoming) on
patent invalidations. They show that large companies on average do not reduce follow-on
innovations significantly if they lose a patent due to litigation. The only exception is if
the large company loses a patent outside of its core-fields. Then it reduces innovation in
the field of the patent under consideration and reacts by redirecting future innovation to
The only exception is the growth of General Electric which is much larger, highlighting the problem of
constructing a counterfactual for a single company.
28We do not know whether the consolidated balance sheet also includes the Bell Laboratories and
Western Electric. It seems that at least some parts of the Bell System are not consolidated in the annual
reports of AT&T.
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a different but related field.
1.4.5 Mechanism: Increase in Citations is Driven by Start-ups
We next examine which type of company increases innovation after the compulsory li-
censing and report the results in Table 1.3. We split citations by the type of the citing
assignee. An assignee is either a company or an individual inventor; an assignee is de-
fined as young and small if its first patent was filed less than 10 years before it cited the
Bell patent and if it had less than 10 patents before 1949.29 We first use the number of
citations from young and small assignees as the dependent variable and report the results
in column (2). We then use the citations of all other assignees that are not young and
small and report the results in column (3). In column (4) we look explicitly at small and
young assignees that are companies (“start-ups”), leaving out individual inventors.30
We find that the increase in follow-on innovation is predominantly driven by young and
small companies entering the market and by individual inventors. Young and small as-
signees increase their citations after 1955 by an average of 0.014 citations (32%) while
all others increase their citations by 0.006 (6%) on average. Around 70% of the overall
increase comes from young and small assignees, but they are responsible for only one-third
of all citations to Bell patents (columns 2 and 3 in Table 1.3).31 Among the small and
young assignees, start-ups experience a particularly strong increase: they account for 50%
of the total increase in citations although they are responsible for only 18% of all citations
(column 4).
29In Appendix A.1 we use different definitions for young and small companies and find that the effect
is mainly driven by companies that file their first patent.
30We identify companies as all assignees that are never inventors. Our results are robust to defining
companies as having Inc., Corp., Co. or similar abbreviations in their name.
31Young and small assignees are responsible for an increase of 0.014 citations (column 2). This is 70%
of the total increase of 0.02 (column 1). It is also an increase of around 32% relative to what we would
have expected without a consent decree. According to the estimates a Bell patent should have received
0.044 citations (0.068 is the constant, the Bell effect is -0.008, and the average decrease in citations in the
post treatment period is -0.016) but did receive 0.058 citations (0.044 baseline effect + 0.014 treatment
effect).
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These results suggest that patents act as a barrier of entry for start-ups and prevent their
follow-on innovation. They provide support for the hypothesis that the consent decree
reduced potential bargaining failures. Several prior studies suggest that small firms might
not have large enough patent portfolios to resolve disputes or to strike cross-licensing
agreements (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004; Galasso, 2012; Galasso and Schankerman,
2015). As cross-licensing was a priority in the licensing strategy of Bell prior to the
consent decree, a small patent portfolio might have been a significant handicap for small
inventors seeking a license from Bell (Antitrust Subcommittee, 1958, p. 2685).
One potential concern might be that the observed increase of citations by young and
small companies was not driven by the consent decree itself but by other changes at Bell
Laboratories. Historical accounts suggest that there was an exodus of important Bell
researchers around the time of the consent decree. For example, in 1953 Gordon Teal,
inventor of a method to improve transistor performance, joined the then small Texas
Instruments Inc. Similarly, William Shockley, one of the inventors of the transistor, left
Bell in 1956 to found Shockley Semiconductors Laboratory.
To show that this is not the case, we separately look at patent citations by people who were
at some point associated with Bell, but later patented for a different company, including
their co-inventors, and compare with citations by all remaining unrelated inventors. In
our data, there are 4’477 former Bell employees with 28’569 patents. These people have
in total 12’068 co-inventors who were never active at Bell and who filed 87’148 patents in
total. The results are reported in columns (5) and (6) of Table 1.3. We find a positive effect
on the citations of unrelated inventors and a negative effect on the citations of related
inventors.32 This pattern does not suggest that the increase in follow-on innovation was
driven by former Bell employees. However, the results do suggest that Bell’s inventors
had preferential access to Bell technology prior to the consent decree and that there was
a strong increase from unrelated inventors afterwards.
32The estimated yearly coefficients for excess citations of former Bell inventors and of unrelated inven-
tors are available from the authors upon request.
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1.5 Compulsory Licensing did not End Foreclosure in
the Market for Telecommunications Equipment
The aim of the consent decree was to end foreclosure in the market for telecommunications
equipment. According to the antitrust lawsuit, Bell was closing the market to all other
buyers and sellers of telecommunications equipment by using exclusive contracts between
Western Electric and the Bell operating companies and by refusing to license patents to
competitors. In markets outside of the telecommunications industry, Bell was active only
as a supplier of technology but was not an active market participant.
Market foreclosure is thought to have a negative effect on the innovation activities of the
companies that are foreclosed (Baker, 2012; Wu, 2012). The argument is that foreclosed
companies cannot earn profits by selling their improved products directly to consumers.
The only option they have is to sell their innovations to other companies.33 Thus, fore-
closed companies have lower incentives for innovation than companies with access to a
customer base.
In this section, we compare the innovation effects of compulsory licensing inside and out-
side of the telecommunications industry to infer whether market foreclosure is harmful for
innovation and whether compulsory licensing is effective in ending it. If compulsory li-
censing increases innovation in the same way in all industries, then any difference between
the two competitive settings must be due to market foreclosure in the telecommunications
industry. If market foreclosure reduces innovation as argued above and if compulsory li-
censing was effective in ending it, we should see a stronger increase in follow-on innovations
in the telecommunications industry than in other industries. In contrast, if compulsory
licensing was ineffective in ending market foreclosure, we should find a smaller effect.
If market foreclosure has no effect on innovation, we should find similar effects in all
industries.
To compare the innovation effects within telecommunications and outside we first need
to characterize each citing patent by its closeness to the market for telecommunications
33Such a market for ideas exists only in special circumstances (Gans et al., 2002; Gans and Stern, 2003;
Gans et al., 2008).
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Figure 1.8: Excess Citations by Patents with Varying Likelihood of Being Used in Pro-
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Notes: This figure shows results from a difference-in-differences estimation of the impact of the consent
decree on follow-on patent citations with 1949-1954 as the pre-treatment period and 1955-1960 as the
treatment period, controlling for year fixed effects. We estimate Equation 1.2 and report β3 separately,
using as dependent variables citations from patents with a different relevance for the production of
telecommunication equipment (SIC 3661 - “Telephone and Telegraph Apparatus”). Relevance is measured
by the likelihood that a patent is used in industry SIC 3661 using the data of Kerr (2008). The size of the
circle signifies the number of Bell patents in a technology and a solid circle implies that the coefficient is
significant at the 10% level. The data are from the Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT)
of the European Patent Office.
43
Antitrust, Patents, and Cumulative Innovation
equipment. To do this, we use the concordance of Kerr (2008) that gives us the probability
for each USPC technology class that a patent in this technology class is used in the
production of telecommunications equipment (SIC 3661). We interpret this probability
as a measure of closeness to telecommunications. We then assign this probability to each
citing patent according to its technology class and sum up the citations for each level
of likelihood to construct a different dependent variable for each level of closeness, 26
altogether. In a last step, we repeat our main regression for each level of closeness. We
can thus estimate how much the consent decree increased citations in markets that are
close to the production of telecommunications equipment and in markets unrelated to it.
In Figure 1.8 we show the average treatment effects estimated with our baseline model in
equation 1.2 for different levels of closeness to the production of telecommunications equip-
ment. We find a strong negative relation between the closeness to telecommunications
and excess citations. Almost all excess citations come from patents that have nothing to
do with telecommunications. We conclude that follow-on innovation in telecommunica-
tions was not influenced by compulsory licensing. Under the assumption that compulsory
licensing affects innovation similarly in all industries this result supports the argument
that market foreclosure has a chilling effect on innovation and indicates that compulsory
licensing was ineffective in solving it.
Next, we use Kerr’s data to assign each citing patent to the industry in which it is most
likely used and repeat the baseline regression with citations from patents in different
industries. The results are shown in Figure 1.9. Almost all additional citations are
from patents with the most likely application outside of the industry “Telephones and
Telegraphs” (SIC 3661). A large part of the effect is driven by unrelated industries such
as “Measuring and Controlling,” “Audio and Video Equipment” or “Motor Vehicles”.34
These results support the notion that market foreclosure is harmful for innovation and
that compulsory licensing is ineffective as a remedy.35
34In the Appendix A.2 we repeat the analysis using NBER technology subcategories to classify the
citing patent. The results are the same.
35Another explanation for our null result in the telecommunications market would be that there was
a lack of innovation potential in the telecommunication sector after 1956. To rule out this hypothetical
possibility we compare the development of patents in the telecommunications sector. Results are reported
in Figure A.9 in Appendix A.2 They show that the number of citations to Bell’s telecommunications
patents had a similar trend as patents outside of telecommunications and that the number of Bell’s newly
filed telecommunications patents shows no signs of abating after the consent decree.
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Figure 1.9: Excess Citations by Patents According to the Most Likely SIC Industry
Classification
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Notes: This figure shows results from a difference-in-differences estimation of the impact of the consent
decree on follow-on innovation with 1949-1954 as the pre-treatment period and 1955-1960 as the treatment
period, controlling for year fixed effects. As the dependent variable, we use all citations by companies
other than the filing companies classified by the most likely SIC classification of the citing patent. As
control patents, we use all patents that were published in the U.S. matched by publication year, primary
USPC technology class, and the number of citations up to 1949. To classify a patent by its most likely
industry, we use the data of Kerr (2008). We assign to each USPC class the most likely four-digit SIC
industry in which it is used. A solid circle indicates that a coefficient is significant at the 10% level. The
data are from the Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) of the European Patent Office.
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Foreclosure seems to be particular harmful for start-up innovation. In columns (7) and
(8) of Table 1.3 we show that small and young companies increased their citations only
outside the field of telecommunications, but not inside.36 As a large part of the effect in
the full sample was driven by small and young companies, this suggests that also start-ups
react strongly to market foreclosure. In fields outside of telecommunications, compulsory
licensing fostered innovation by small and young companies since Bell as the supplier of
technology did not control product markets through vertical integration or via exclusive
contracts.
Our results suggest that market foreclosure stifles innovation and that compulsory licens-
ing is not sufficient to foster innovation without supporting structural remedies. This
confirms the general perception at the time of the lawsuit. Both the public and antitrust
officials were aware that because of Bell’s persistent monopoly, compulsory licensing would
only help companies outside the telecommunications field. A witness in the Congressional
hearings put it succinctly: “while patents are made available to independent equipment
manufacturers, no market for telephone equipment is supplied (...). It is rather a use-
less thing to be permitted to manufacture under patent if there is no market in which
you can sell the product on which the patent is based.” The Antitrust Subcommittee
concluded that “[t]he patent and technical information requirement have efficacy only
so far as they permit independent manufacturers to avail themselves of patents in fields
that are unrelated to the common carrier communication business carried on by the Bell
System companies, and nothing more.” On May 4, 1954, presiding Judge Stanley N.
Barnes suggested that compulsory licensing policy for reasonable rates is “only good win-
dow dressing” but would do no good because Western Electric had already “achieved an
exclusive position (...) and liberal licensing would not permit competitors to catch up” in
the telecommunications business (Antitrust Subcommittee, 1959, pp. 108).
In the years after the consent decree, the Bell System faced repeated allegations of ex-
clusionary behavior. By the 1960s and 1970s, a range of new firms were eager to enter
the telecommunications market but Bell implemented measures to make it expensive or
impossible (Wu, 2012). This led to a number of regulatory actions, for example forcing
interconnections of Bell’s telephone system to the entering competitors MCI in 1971 which
36We use the most likely SIC code to determine the field of the citing patent.
46
Antitrust, Patents, and Cumulative Innovation
provided long distance services using microwave towers (Temin and Galambos, 1987; Gert-
ner, 2012, p. 272). Eventually, the continued monopolization of the telecommunications
market by Bell resulted in the 1974 antitrust lawsuits. The lawsuit mirrored almost scene
by scene the case of 1949. Again, Bell was charged with excluding competitors from the
market of telecommunications equipment. And again, the Department of Defense inter-
vened on the grounds of national defense. But the Reagan administration was not as
accommodating as the Eisenhower administration had been and the Department of Jus-
tice was keen on going after Bell. The case ended with the break-up of the Bell System
in 1983, opening up the market for telecommunications equipment for competition.
1.6 The Consent Decree Increased U.S. Innovation
in the Long Run
The historical set-up of the Bell case gives us the opportunity to look also at the long-run
innovation effects of a consent decree. In the previous section, we showed that the increase
in follow-on citations is measurable for the first five years. This raises the question how
lasting the impact of a large-scale intervention in patent rights really is. To answer this
question, we study the long-run impact of the case against Bell on the patent activities of
firms patenting in the U.S. More specifically, we examine the increase in the total number
of patents in a USPC technology subclass with a compulsorily licensed Bell patent relative
to a subclass without. We employ the following empirical model
#Patentss,t = βt · I(Bell > 0)s + Controls+ εs,t (1.3)
where the outcome variable is the total number of patents in a technology subclass s
(Moser and Voena, 2012; Moser et al., 2014). The treatment variable equals one if there
is at least one compulsorily licensed patent in the technology subclass. As controls, we use
USPC class-year fixed effects.37 Our sample consists of 235 classes with 6’276 subclasses
37To follow the literature we use USPC technology classes here and not SIC classes.
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of which 1’209 are treated.38
In Figure 1.10a we plot the number of excess patents for all patent classes. We leave out
patents by Bell to focus on patenting of other companies. Starting in 1953, the number
of patents in technology classes where Bell patents were compulsorily licensed increased
relative to subclasses without Bell patents, and it continued to do so beyond 1960, when
the last Bell patents affected by the consent decree expired. This suggests that the consent
decree increased U.S. innovation in the long run.
To quantify the effect, we next estimate the average yearly effect of the consent decree on
the total number of patent applications for the time period 1949-1960. We employ the
following difference-in-differences model:
#Patentss,t = β1 · I(Bell > 0)s+β2 · I(Bell > 0)s · I[1955−1960]+Controls+εs,t (1.4)
where I(Bell > 0)s is 1 if Bell has a patent in the subcategory s. As controls we use
class-year fixed effects.
The coefficients are reported in Table 1.4. In the first five years alone, patent applications
increased by 2.5 patent applications in treated classes (column 1). This is an increase of
around 24.5%.39 Furthermore, patent applications by new companies entering the market
increased relatively more than patent applications by other companies (columns 2 and
3).40
The increase appears to be stronger outside of telecommunications technologies (column
4 and 5). In Figure 1.10b we plot the average treatment effects estimated with Equation
1.4 for different levels of closeness to the production of telecommunications equipment.
Again the effects are weak for technologies closely related to the production of telecom-
38We exclude subclasses that did not have any patents at all before 1956 and we include only patent
classes that contain subclasses that were treated and subclasses that were not.
39Untreated subclasses have on average 2.17 patent applications in the the pre-treatment period. In
these subclasses the number of patent applications increase by 0.52 from the pre- to the post-treatment
period. Using the estimate for the difference between treated and untreated classes, 7.5, in column (1) of
1.4, we calculate the counterfactual number of applications in treated classes in the absence of compulsory
licensing which is equal to 10.19 (=7.5 + 2.17+0.52). The treatment effect is 2.5. Thus, the number of
patents increased relative to the counterfactual by 24.5% (=2.5/10.19).
40The number of patents of young and small increases by 38% while the number of patents of all other
companies increases by 18%.
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Figure 1.10: Impact of the Consent Decree in the Long Run
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Notes: The dependent variable is the number of patent applications per (aggregated) subclass per year.
A subclass is treated if it contains at least one Bell patent that was subject to compulsory licensing. Sub-
figure (a) shows annual treatment effects βt estimated with Equation 1.3 for all patent classes. Standard
errors are clustered at the class level. Subfigure (b) shows the average increase in the number of patents
β2 estimated with Equation 1.4 for patent classes with varying likelihood of being used in the production
of telecommunications equipment. To determine the likelihood that a patent is used in industry SIC 3661
we use the data of Kerr (2008). The size of the circle signifies the number of Bell patents in a technology
and a solid circle implies that the coefficient is significant on the 10% level. The data are from from the
Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) of the European Patent Office.
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munications equipment and strong for unrelated technologies. This again suggests that
the fields in which Bell continued to operate experienced slower technological progress
than markets where entry of start-ups was possible.41
Figure 1.10a shows that the increase in patenting begins in 1953, two years before the
increase in citations to Bell patents. In 1953, Bell’s most important invention, the tran-
sistor, became available for licensing, spurring the creation of the computer industry. To
make sure that the entire increase is not driven by this one exceptional invention, we
analyze computer and non-computer patents separately and report the results in columns
(6) and (7) of Table 1.4. The effect is stronger for the computer patents, but the increase
in patenting is also significant without any computer patent.
Thus, overall we find that the consent decree led to a long-lasting increase in the scale
of innovation mainly outside the telecommunications field. This is consistent with the
theoretical argument by Acemoglu and Akcigit who build on the the step-by-step inno-
vation model of Aghion et al. (2001) to analyze the effects of compulsory licensing on
innovation (Acemoglu and Akcigit, 2012). They consider the case where all current and
future patents in the economy are compulsorily licensed for a positive price and identify
two main effects. On the one hand, compulsory licensing helps technological laggards to
catch up and brings more industries to a state of intense competition. This “composition
effect” increases innovation, because companies in industries with intense competition
invest more in R&D in order to become the industry leader. On the other hand, com-
pulsory licensing reduces the time a technology leader keeps its profitable position. This
“disincentive effect” reduces innovation and growth in the economy.
In our case, compulsory licensing was selectively applied to one company that did not
participate in any market other than the telecommunications market. This enabled many
new companies to enter markets with state-of-the art technology and to compete for the
industry leadership with full patent protection of future inventions intact (Holbrook et al.,
2000).
41In unreported regressions we use citation-weighted patents instead of the absolute number of patents
and find the same results. Results are available from the authors upon request.
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Thus, in all industries but the telecommunications industry we measure the pure com-
position effect without the counteracting disincentive effect. The interpretation that the
consent decree helped to open up new markets and enabled new start-ups to compete is
consistent with historical accounts on the growth of electronics and computers industry
in the 1950s and 1960s (Grindley and Teece, 1997).
1.7 Case Study: The Diffusion of the Transistor
Technology
In this section, we examine the diffusion of the transistor technology because it is a
particularly insightful case study for the mechanisms illustrated in the previous sections
for three reasons: First, in response to the antitrust lawsuit Bell already started in 1952 to
license the transistor technology via standardized non-discriminatory licensing contracts.
This creates an interesting variation in the timing of licensing. Second, transistor patents
were expected to be particularly important, hence we can estimate how the amount of
follow-on innovation varies with patent quality. And finally, under the impression of the
antitrust lawsuit Bell was very careful not to engage in exclusionary practices with its
transistor patents. Thus, in 1956 the only change for the transistor technology was that
the patents were now royalty free. This allows us to examine the isolated impact of a
decrease in royalties.
The transistor is arguably the most important invention of Bell Labs. As the most basic
element of modern computers, the transistor has been instrumental in the creation of
entire industries and its invention heralded the beginning of the information age. The
invention of the transistor earned John Bardeen, Walter Brattain, and William Shockley
the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1956. They filed patents in June 1948 and announced the
invention on July 1 of the same year. The patents were published in 1950 and 1951. Bell,
the military, and the research community at large immediately understood the importance
and value of the transistor.
Due to the ongoing antitrust lawsuit, Bell’s management was reluctant to draw attention
to its market power by charging high prices for transistor components or for licenses
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(Mowery, 2011). To appease the regulator, Bell’s top managers agreed to share and license
the transistor device with standardized non-discriminatory licensing contracts (Gertner,
2012, p.111). In addition, Bell decided to actively promote the transistor by organizing
conferences to explain the technology. In April 1952, over 100 representatives from 40
companies gathered for a nine-day Transistor Technology Symposium, including a visit to
Western Electric’s transistor manufacturing plant in Allentown, PA. After the conference,
30 companies decided to license the transistor technology for a non-refundable advance
payment of $25’000 (∼ $220’000 in today’s dollars) that was credited against future royalty
payments (Antitrust Subcommittee, 1958, p.2957). Royalty rates amounted to 5% of the
net selling price of the transistor in 1950, which were reduced to 2% in 1953 (Antitrust
Subcommittee, 1959, p. 117).
To be able to separately analyze the transistor we identify among the patents affected by
the consent decree all patents related to the original transistor inventor team. There are
two main transistor patents: Patent # 2,524,035 with the title "Three-Electrode Circuit
Element Utilizing Semiconductive Materials" granted in 1950 to John Bardeen and Walter
Brattain and Patent # 2,569,347 with the title "Circuit Element Utilizing Semiconductive
Material" issued to William Shockley in 1951. To these two patents, we add all the patents
of all researchers who actively worked towards the development of the transistor at Bell
Labs.42 Then we add all patents from all co-authors. We identify 329 “transistor” patents
affected by the consent decree (i.e., held by Bell Labs). This sample is most likely a
super-set of all transistor patents. For example, it also includes patent # 2,402,662 with
the title “Light Sensitive Device” granted to Russell Ohl, the original patent of the solar
cell. The median publication year of the patents in the transistor subsample is 1947; and
168 of these patents are also included in our baseline sample.
To be able to repeat our regressions in this subsample of transistor patents we extend our
baseline sample to patents published up to 1951. As control group, we now use patents
with the same number of pre-citations up to 1951 while all other criteria stay the same.
Figure 1.11 shows the yearly excess citations of transistor patents relative to control group
42Researchers whom we classify to have actively contributed to the transistor at Bell Labs were in
alphabetical order Bardeen, Bown, Brattain, Fletcher, Gardner Pfann, Gibney, Pearson, Morgan, Ohl,
Scaff, Shockley, Sparks, Teal and Theurer (e.g. Nelson, 1962).
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Notes: This graph shows the estimated number of yearly excess citations of transistor-related patents
affected by the consent decree ("Bell patents") relative to patents with the same publication year, in the
same three-digit USPC primary class and with the same number of citations up to 1951. We define Bell
patents as transistor-related if they are either one of the two main transistor patents (Patent # 2,524,035
or Patent # 2,569,347) or were filed by inventors associated with these patents or their co-inventors. To
arrive at these estimates, we regress the number of citations in each year on an indicator variable that
is equal to one if the patent under consideration is affected by the consent decree and year fixed effects.
The dashed lines represent the 90% confidence bands for the estimated coefficient. To adjust for the
different number of control patents per treatment patent in each stratum, we use the weights suggested
by Iacus et al. (2009). The data are from the Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) of the
European Patent Office.
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patents. The coefficient of 1952, which is not matched and is close to zero, speaks in favor
of parallel trends. The impact of licensing is measurable starting in 1953, and lasts for
at least 15 years. This suggests that standardized licensing had a positive impact on
follow-on innovation. The fact that the impact does not strongly increase in 1956 when
the consent decree reduced licensing fees to zero suggests instead that the price effect of
compulsory licensing had little further impact.
Table 1.5: The Transistor Subsample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Publication year <1952 Publication year<1949
Subsample Baseline Transistor No transistor Baseline Transistor No transistor
Start treatment 1955 1953 1955 1955 1953 1955
Bell -0.3 -1.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.9 -0.4
(0.3) (1.2) (0.3) (0.5) (2.1) (0.5)
I(53/55-60) -5.7*** -6.3** -5.6*** -6.4*** -7.4*** -6.4***
(0.7) (2.7) (0.7) (0.6) (2.2) (0.6)
Bell x I(53/55-60) 1.9*** 8.0** 1.8*** 2.0*** 4.4* 2.0***
(0.5) (3.7) (0.5) (0.6) (2.3) (0.6)
Constant 19.0*** 23.0*** 18.8*** 18.3*** 22.3*** 18.1***
(1.4) (3.2) (1.4) (1.2) (2.9) (1.2)
# treated 5758 204 5554 4533 168 4365
Clusters 239 65 237 225 58 223
Obs. 1035421 64891 1021733 896556 56664 886044
Notes: This table shows the results from a difference-in-differences estimation. As the dependent variable we
use all citations by companies other than the filing company. For the regression with the transistor patents, we
define the treatment period as starting in 1953; for the non-transistor patents we define the treatment period
as starting in 1955, as in our main regression in equation (2). Bell is an indicator variable equal to one if a
patent is published by a Bell System company before 1949 and is therefore affected by the consent decree. As
control patents, we use all patents that were published in the U.S. matched by publication year, primary USPC
technology class, and the number of citations. We define patents as transistor patents if they were filed by a
member of the original transistor team or one of their co-authors. In the regressions for columns (1) to (3), we
use all patents with a publication year before 1952 and we match all citations up to and including 1951. Cor-
respondingly, in the regressions for columns (4) to (6) we use patents and citations up to 1949. The data are
from the Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) of the European Patent Office. All coefficients
are multiplied by 100 for better readability. Standard errors are clustered on the primary three-digit USPC
technology class level and *, **, *** denote statistical significance on 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Table 1.5 reports the results from repeating our baseline regression in this subsample. We
find that citations to the transistor patents increase by 52% (column 2). They experi-
ence around a four times higher increase in follow-on citations than other consent decree
patents. The magnitude of the effect is consistent with the presumption that patents on
more important inventions experience a larger increase after compulsory licensing.
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Despite the large effects, the transistor patents do not drive the effect in our main sample.
To rule out this possibility we analyze our original sample up to 1949 with and without
transistor patents. Results are shown in columns (5) and (6). We find large but barely
significant effects for the transistor sample and virtually the same effect without transistors
as in the baseline regression that includes transistor patents (column 4).43
Transistors are the classical example of a general purpose technology that has the potential
of having a large scale impact on the economy (Helpman, 1998). If it had not been for the
antitrust lawsuit against Bell, odds are that Bell’s licensing policy would have been less
accommodating and the follow on-innovations stimulated by the transistors less dramatic
than they were.
1.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we show that antitrust enforcement can increase innovation. The 1956
consent decree that settled the antitrust lawsuit against Bell increased innovation, mostly
by small and young companies building on Bell’s established technologies. We conclude
that antitrust enforcement can play an important role in increasing innovation by facili-
tating market entry.
Several antitrust scholars have argued that antitrust enforcement should pay special at-
tention to exclusionary practices because of their negative influence on innovation (Baker,
2012; Wu, 2012). Our study seconds this view. We show that foreclosure has a negative
impact on innovation and that compulsory licensing may not be an effective remedy to end
market foreclosure and to overcome its stifling effect on innovation unless accompanied
by structural remedies.
43The large magnitude of the effect should not be taken at face value. The identifying assumption of
this regression is that the control patents would have had the same number of citations as the transistor
patents. In our regression this is true for 1953, but given the exceptional nature of the invention of
the transistor, it is fair to assume that this trend might have diverged in later years. Furthermore, it
is not absolutely clear from the historical records why Bell decided to license the transistor patents. If
the licensing decision was taken because of the expectation of important follow-on research, our estimate
might give an upper bound on the effect. For example, Jack Morton, the leader of Bell Labs effort to
produce transistors at scale, advocated the sharing of the transistor to benefit from advances made else-
where. Source: http://www.computerhistory.org/siliconengine/bell-labs-licenses-transistor-technology/
(last accessed September 09, 2016).
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Compulsory licensing is often imposed in merger cases where the market structure changes
endogenously (Delrahim, 2004; Sturiale, 2011). We would expect that if the newly merged
company is able to foreclose the product market, compulsory licensing is not an effective
remedy. More empirical studies are needed to assess whether the negative effect of market
foreclosure on innovation is a first order concern for merger and acquisition cases.
We estimate the negative effects of patents on follow-on innovations by other companies,
but we cannot determine how large the incentive effect of patents for the company holding
the patent is. In our case, compulsory licensing does not appear to have had a strong
negative effect on Bell’s patenting activities. It would be surprising if this was the norm
(Williams, 2015). But it is consistent with Galasso and Schankerman (forthcoming) who
show that large companies do not reduce their innovation activity when their patents
are invalidated in court, but do change the direction of their research and development
activities.
We analyze a very important antitrust lawsuit from the 1950s. Using a historical setting
has the advantage that we can draw on a large number of detailed historical accounts and
that we can conduct a long run evaluation many years after the case. At the same time it
is unclear whether the size of the effects of compulsory licensing would be similar today.
Jaffe and Lerner (2011) suggest that many negative effects of the patent system discussed
today are related to regulatory changes surrounding the establishment of the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982. The reforms led to a significant broadening and
strengthening of the rights of patent holders and consequently to a surge in the number





Innovation: Evidence from the
Patent Depository Library Program
2.1 Introduction
How does information disclosure through patents affect innovation? Disclosure of techni-
cal information is often invoked as one of the patent systems’ key economic justifications
(e.g., Scotchmer and Green, 1990). Courts and intellectual property lawyers also em-
phasize the importance of disclosure for innovation while academic observers doubt the
effectiveness of the requirement (Roin, 2005). In practice, in patent laws around the
world inadequate disclosure of underlying technical information can invalidate patent
rights (Hall and Harhoff, 2012). So far, there is little empirical evidence on the actual
impact of disclosure on follow-on innovation.
The reason is that while the question is central in the study of cumulative innovation, it
is particularly challenging to analyze empirically (Graham and Hegde, 2015; Hegde and
Luo, 2017; Williams, 2017). Since the patent system gives the right to exclude competitors
only conditional on the disclosure of technical information, there is little variation that
would enable researchers to identify the "enablement effect" of disclosure, i.e., the value of
This chapter is based on joint work with Jeffrey Furman and Martin Watzinger (Furman et al., 2017).
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information provision on subsequent innovation, separately from the effects of exclusion.
In this chapter, we take advantage of the expansion of the USPTO Patent and Trademark
Depository Library (PTDL or patent libraries) system from 1977 to 1997 to investigate the
effect of disclosure of patent information on innovation in the regions around the newly-
created patent libraries. While the exclusion rights associated with patents are national in
scope, the opening of these patent libraries in a period before the Internet yielded regional
variation in the cost to access the technical information disclosed in patent documents.
This patent library system was created in the 1800s to provide patents and innovation-
related resources for independent inventors, entrepreneurs, and incumbent firms. By 1977,
22 libraries had been established, primarily in New England and West of the Mississippi.
Beginning in 1977 and continuing until 1997, the USPTO embarked on an effort to open
at least one patent library in each of the U.S. states. These libraries provided information
on granted patents, including search tools, which were otherwise not available to inventors
or attorneys outside of the PTO headquarters location in Washington, DC, or in other
patent libraries.
Whereas the location of libraries prior to 1977 had been chosen by the PTO, libraries in
the 1977 to 1997 period were granted with some degree of randomness within each state
and in its time of opening, as they were typically given to the first qualified library in a
state to request them. While some major cities in a state (e.g., Boston, MA) were more
likely to have the capacity and demand for such institutions than smaller cities or towns
(e.g., Springfield, MA or Worcester, MA), it is not clear whether innovation trends are
more likely to have driven requests for such libraries in cities of similar sizes within states
(e.g., Kansas City, MO vs. St. Louis, MO). We leverage this dimension of randomness in
location and timing to estimate the impact of disclosure on subsequent innovation.
In our main specification, we compare the number of patents in the close vicinity around
the patent library with the change in the number of patents around Federal Depository
Libraries (FDLs). The 1’252 Federal Depository Libraries make government documents
such as laws and Acts of Congress freely available to the public. As the missions of patent
libraries and FDLs are similar - provide the public with official documents - almost all
patent libraries are also Federal Depository Libraries. Patent libraries are usually first an
59
Disclosure and Cumulative Innovation
FDL and only later become patent libraries. The reason is that according to one librarian,
“a factor that would influence a library in becoming a patent library is whether they had
been involved with government documents in another capacity”. For each patent library,
we use all Federal Depository Libraries that are located in the same state and within 250
km as a control group.
We find that after a patent library opens the number of patents within 25 km increases
by on average around two patents per year or 18% relative to the pre-opening mean. This
effect is localized and becomes insignificant at more than 25 km. In line with increased
access to patents driving this effect, we find that young and small companies which plau-
sibly face larger barriers to access than large companies increase patenting more. The
increase in patenting is most pronounced if the patent library is also a university library.
This result suggests that there is a complementarity between access to patent knowledge
and technical education for the production of innovation.
We show that it is unlikely that concurrent shocks drive these effects. In the years before
the opening, the number of patents around the control libraries are identical compared to
the soon to be designated patent libraries. This speaks in favor of parallel trends. There
is also no differential trend between control libraries suggesting that the libraries not only
relocate innovative activities from close-by regions. Our results are robust to the use of a
closer or a looser control group.
In additional analyses, we also find that the structure of patents changes after a patent
library opens: In particular, the distance to patents cited by inventors living close to a
patent library increases. Apparently, after a patent library opens inventors start to work
on problems that are less local and the geography of innovation becomes more dispersed.
We do not find substantial evidence that patents start to cite different technological fields
or that the patents filed after the patent library opened are of higher quality. Thus, access
to prior art facilitates the construction of an ‘invisible college’ of like-minded inventors
building on each others’ ideas rather than induce inventors to work on different sorts of
problems.
This study is the first to show that access to technical information disclosed in patents
can increase innovation. Disclosure is thought to be one of the key functions of the
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patent system. For example, Machlup (1958) argues that a patent “serves to disseminate
technological information, and that this accelerates the growth of productivity in the
economy”. Yet, critics argue that the usefulness of disclosure is limited and several inventor
surveys find no or only modest benefits from reading patents (Cohen et al., 2002; Arora
et al., 2008; Gambardella et al., 2011; Hall and Harhoff, 2012).1 Newer studies on the
American Inventor Protection Act find that many inventors voluntarily disclose their
invention, leading to earlier licensing deals (Graham and Hegde, 2015; Hegde and Luo,
2017). Our study adds to this literature by showing that increased access to technical
information provided by patent libraries increases patenting for the subsample of small
and young companies.
More generally, our study enhances our understanding of the role of research enhancing
institutions by showing that investment in patent libraries helped to fuel regional inno-
vation. Research enhancing institutions lower the costs of access to useful knowledge and
thus help to foster geographical and intertemporal spillovers on which economic growth
is based (Mokyr, 2002). In related work, Biasi and Moser (2016) find that reducing the
access costs to science books during World War I increased scientific output in particular
in regions with libraries buying these books. Close to our work, Furman and Stern (2011)
show that a biological resource center, a library of living organisms, helps to foster follow-
on innovation because it provides input for the research process. Our findings contribute
to earlier research by showing that patent libraries increased innovation across U.S. states
by improving access to technical information.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the U.S.
Patent Depository Library Program and the U.S. Federal Depository Library Program.
In Section 2.3 we describe the data and the empirical strategy. In Section 2.4 we show
that opening a patent library increased innovation in its close vicinity, we examine the
heterogeneity of the effects for different firm types, and we present auxiliary results and
robustness checks. Section 2.5 looks at the changing citation behavior of inventors and
shows that inventors start to cite more distant work. Section 2.6 concludes.
1Inventions that are hard to reverse engineer are more effectively protected by secrecy and thus not
disclosed. In addition, patents are often willfully opaque and there is a legal risk in the U.S. from using
patents as source of information because it increases the likelihood of being found to infringe on the
patent.
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2.2 The U.S. Patent Depository Library Program
The nationwide network of Patent and Trademark Depository Libraries (PTDLs) traces
its beginning to the year 1871 when the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO), then known as The Patent Office, first started distributing copies of patents
to a small number of libraries.2 Until then, patent documents were housed at only one
location, at The Patent Office, in Washington, DC.3
It took an act of congress, 35 U.S.C. 13, to enable the Patent Office to start dissemi-
nating patent information to the public. Libraries were given the option of serving as a
patent depository, and eight libraries received patent documents in 1871: The New York
State Library, the Boston Public Library, The Public Library of Cincinnati and Hamilton
County, the Science and Engineering Library at Ohio State University, the Detroit Public
Library, the Los Angeles Public Library, the New York Public Library, and The St. Louis
Public Library. By 1977, the number of patent libraries had grown to 22 of which 14
became patent libraries in the 19th century. Most of the original libraries were very large
public libraries located in the industrial midwest and eastern seaboard and most were
east of the Mississippi River. They received unbound paper patents on a weekly basis
along with the Official Gazette of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and two search
indices.
After 100 years of relative inactivity, the year 1977 marked the start of a substantial
expansion of the patent library system with the aim to increase the number of patent
libraries by at least three each year and to put at least one patent library in each state.4
The goal to put a patent library in every state was achieved twenty years later in 1997.
The map in Figure 2.1a shows the 22 libraries that were designated before 1977 and figure
2.1b shows all 84 patent libraries which opened until 2017 in the continental U.S. Table
B.1 and Table B.2 in appendix B list patent libraries up to 2002. Currently, about half
2This section follows the description in Sneed (1998) and Jenda (2005).
3When the publication of the Official Gazette, a weekly publication of the USPTO that lists patent
abstracts and a representative drawing of the invention, started in 1872, this title was added to the list
of documents that were distributed to libraries.
4The reason was USPTO assistant commissioner William I. Merkin who started to evaluate the patent
library system in 1974 and led its overhaul with a series of conferences beginning in April 1977.
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of the membership consists of academic libraries with nearly as many public libraries.5
After 1997, the patent library system adopted a new goal of controlled growth in areas
of high population combined with high patent and trademark activity which warrant the
resources invested by the USPTO (Sneed, 2000).
Starting in 1977, the patent library system was not only expanded but also reorganized:
Libraries could apply to become patent libraries if they fulfilled a number of requirements.
First, they had to acquire a collection of all U.S. utility patents issued 20 years prior to
the date of designation. Second, each patent library had to have trained staff to assist the
public in the search for prior art. To ensure adequate training each patent library must
have a representative at every annual PTDL Training Seminar in Washington, DC. Third,
they had to provide free public access and a collection of search tools for the public.
Several librarians that we contacted stated that it is necessary to be a large library
in order to be able to fulfill the resource intensive requirements to become a Patent
Depository Library. This includes the space to host the patent documents, the availability
of qualified staff and resources to meet the start-up, and ongoing costs. In later years,
the space requirement became less a concern after the introduction of microfilm. Indeed
the conversion from paper to microfilm distribution has been cited as a reason why many
libraries joined the program after 1982.
Usually a patent library already had a history of handling government documents as
Federal Depository Library, according to the interviewed librarians. In our sample, 86%
of patent libraries are part of the Federal Depository Library Program. Federal Depository
Libraries make U.S. federal government publications available to the public at no cost.
As of 2008, there were 1’252 Federal Depository Libraries, at least two in each of the 435
Congressional Districts. There are two ways in which a library may qualify for FDL status:
First, each member of Congress may delegate two qualified libraries or a library may be
designated. Second, libraries at land-grant colleges and universities, libraries of federal
agencies, the highest appellate court of a state, or accredited law schools automatically
qualify for the status of Federal Depository Library. Because of this structure and the
attached requirements to serve as a library in either program, Federal Depository Libraries
5Since 1871, six PTDLs have withdrawn for various reasons, including library closing, no funding for
the back file, and a change in institutional priority creating a lack of ability to perform the service.
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Figure 2.1: Location of all Patent Libraries in the U.S.
(a) Up to 1977
(b) Until 2017
Notes: The green circles indicate patent libraries in the continental United States opened before the
major expansion in 1977. The red diamonds show the location of patent libraries opened in or after 1977
until 2017.
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Figure 2.2: Patent Libraries and Control Libraries
Notes: The red dots show the locations of patent libraries in our main sample. The blue hollow dots
show the locations of corresponding control libraries.
are a natural control group for Patent Depository Libraries.
2.3 Data and Empirical Setup
For our empirical analysis, we assemble a dataset of all patent and federal depository
libraries in the U.S. The data on the opening dates of each patent library is taken from
Jenda (2005) and the complete list of Federal Depository Libraries is from the online
Federal Depository Library Directory.6 We geolocate all patents by city and state and
merge it with population data from the U.S. census.
We combine the data on libraries with patent data from the Harvard project on patent
inventor disambiguation as described in Li et al. (2014). This data covers the time period
between 1975 and 2010 and is based on data from the USPTO and the NBER. The dataset
includes patent information and information on inventors. For each patent, we compute
backward and forward citations along with measures for the generality and originality of
cited and citing patents (Hall et al., 2001).
As outcome, we use the number of patents within 25 km of the new library to measure
6The Federal Depository Library Directory is available on https://catalog.gpo.gov/fdlpdir/FDLPdir.jsp
(last accessed 2017-07-30).
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the effect of the opening of a patent library on innovation in the area. We normalize
the number of patents by the population in the area to adjust for different city sizes.
Using patents as a measure for innovative output is standard but not uncontroversial.
In our particular case, patent libraries could also increase patenting without increasing
innovation because they might make it easier to file a patent or because the librarians may
give advice on how to structure a patent. Yet, this seems unlikely because a U.S. patent
application can be mailed from any post office and the employees of patent libraries are
only allowed to help with the search for prior art but not with the preparation of a patent
filing. Additionally, because we want to measure real innovation, we delete those patents
which are never cited.
To construct a counterfactual for the patent libraries, we use as control group Federal De-
pository Libraries in the same state and within 250 km (but not within 25km) in our main
specification. Federal Depository Libraries provide access to governmental information to
each citizen. As of 2017, there are 1’251 Federal Depository Libraries in the U.S., with
at least two in each Congressional District. Most patent libraries are Federal Depository
Libraries that chose to become Patent Depository Libraries. 84% of all patent libraries
are Federal Depository Libraries and 96% of them are classified as “medium” or “large
libraries”. To make use of this setup, we assign to each patent library that is also an FDL,
all other medium or large FDLs within the same state and 250 km as control group.
We finally drop all patent libraries without a control library, the patent libraries in Hawaii,
Puerto Rico and all other U.S. overseas territory, and all patent libraries that opened
before our data started.7 In our main sample, we also drop the libaries of Rochester
in the state of New York and Burlington in Vermont. The reason is that both have an
extremely high patent per capita ratio because they host Kodak, Xerox, and Bausch &
Lomb in case of Rochester and IBM in case of Burlington. As a consequence we cannot
find a valid control group for these two libraries. Thus we arrive at 38 patent libraries
that opened after 1979 along with 415 control libraries.8 Figure 2.2 shows the position of
7Our required five year pre-opening period in fact implies that we drop libraries which opened until
1979. This is mainly due to our current patent data source which starts in 1975. This dataset however has
the benefit of disambiguated and geographically localized inventors. In future work, we aim at expanding
our data set to openings before 1979.
8Table B.3 in Appendix B details which sample restrictions account for how many dropped libraries.
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all patent libraries and all Federal Depository Libraries in our sample in the continental
United States.
Table 2.1 shows summary statistics for patent libraries and matched Federal Depository
Libraries in the year before the opening of the patent library. The number of patents per
capita, of young, and of small firms are very similar prior to the opening of the patent
library. The only difference is that within 25km of the library, the population size is
significantly larger for control than for patent libraries, with 1.8 million on average. The
reason is that every large city has a Federal Depository Library and thus New York City is
included in this subsample. If we compare the median population sizes, cities with patent
libraries are with 654 thousand approximately as large as cities with Federal Depository
Libraries with a median population of 689 thousand.
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics in the Year Before Opening
Patent Libraries Control Libraries Diff P-Value
# Patents/100k 10.03 9.42 -0.61 0.65
# Patents 77.22 95.52 18.30 0.25
# Pat. small firms/100k 5.19 4.44 -0.75 0.31
# Pat. big firms/100k 4.84 4.98 0.14 0.87
# Pat. young firms/100k 3.99 3.04 -0.95 0.11
# Patents old firms/100k 6.04 6.38 0.34 0.73
Population in 100k 8.58 18.33 9.76 0.00
Uni Library 0.68 0.63 -0.05 0.49
Notes: This table shows the averages of the data for patent and control libraries. The last two columns
shows differences with the associated significance levels. A firm is defined as young if its first patent was
filed less than five years before the opening of the patent library. Otherwise it is old. A firm is defined as
small if it has no more than 5 patents before the opening of the patent library. Otherwise it is big. The
p-values result from a t-test with unequal variances.
In our empirical analysis, we estimate the effect of opening up a patent library on in-
novation within 25 km around the new library. We can interpret our estimates causally
if in the absence of the opening of the patent library the number of patents per capita
around the patent library would have had the same trend as the number of patents around
the control libraries. One potential concern about this identification assumption might
be that a library applied to become Patent Depository Library because its librarians ex-
pected that innovative activities in their region would pick up in the future. In contrast,
the librarians who did not apply might have had the expectation that patenting might
stagnate in their region.
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This is possible but does not seem likely. We are looking at the expansion of the patent
library program in 1977 that had the aim to open up a library in every state. This
program was motivated by equitable access and thus potentially less endogenous to local
economic conditions. We also interviewed several librarians and the reasons to become
a patent library seemed idiosyncratic: one librarian argued that status considerations
between libraries played a role, another said that the librarian in charge wanted to take
part in the seminars in Washington DC, and some cited public service considerations.
To show that the assumptions underlying our identification strategy are reasonable, we
conduct several plausibility checks after presenting our main results. First, we show that
before the patent library was opened, the number of patents filed per capita was the same
around the soon to be designated patent library and the control libraries. This speaks in
favor of parallel trends. Second, we find little effect if we assign pseudo treatments to the
closest control library. This speaks in favor of the SUTVA assumption. Third, we use a
host of different specification for the control group and show that our results are robust.
2.4 Results
The opening of a patent library reduced the costs of searching for prior art for inventors
in close proximity. In this section we first estimate the overall effect of the opening of
patent libraries on the local number of patents. We also show the heterogeneity of these
effects along inventor and library types. Subsequently, we analyze how patent libraries
change the structure and content of patents in the same region.
2.4.1 Patent Libraries Increase Local Innovation
We start by investigating whether opening a patent library has any impact on patenting
within 25 km around the new library. In Figure 2.3, we plot the yearly average treatment
effect on the treated of opening up a patent library on the number of patents around
patent libraries and around control libraries over time. The time is measured relative to
the opening date of the patent library and by the filing year of the patent.
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Year relative to opening
Notes: This figure shows the yearly average treatment effects on the treated of opening up a patent
library on the average number of patents within 25 km of patent libraries relative to the average number
of patents around matched federal depository libraries. The 90% confidence intervals are based on
bootstrapped standard errors. We assign each patent library and all Federal Depository Library within
the same state and within 250 km as control group. Data taken from Li et al. (2014). We exclude the
patent libraries of Burlington and Rochester.
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We find that in the year after the opening, the number of patents around the patent library
increases significantly relative to the number of patents around the control libraries. The
increase starts in the year after opening and is stable in the following five years. The
difference in the number of patents is mostly significantly different from zero on the 10%
level. Prior to the opening of the patent library, the number of patents per capita is
very similar for treatment and control patents. This speaks in favor of the parallel trends
assumption and for a causal interpretation of the estimated effects.
To quantify the size of the effect, we estimate the following difference-in-differences spec-
ification where PatentLibi is an indicator if the library i is a patent library and Postt is
an indicator for the five years after the opening of the patent library:
#Patentsit
Population
= αt + γi + β1 · Postt + β2 · PatLibi · Postt + εit (2.1)
where γi are library and αt are year fixed effects. The coefficient of interest is β2 and
measures the average number of excess patents within 25 km around patent libraries per
year in the five years after the patent library was opened. In specifying the standard
errors, we allow for clustering at the patent library level (Bertrand et al., 2004).
We report the results for estimating Equation 2.1 in Table 2.2. In column (1) we report
our baseline specification where we match to each patent library all Federal Depository
Libraries in the same state and within 250 km. We find that on average the number
of patents per capita in close vicinity of the patent library increased by 1.8 relative to
the control group. This is an increase of over 18% relative to the average patenting
around patent libraries before the opening. Around 75% of this increase is driven by
small companies (column 2). We define a company as small if it has less than five patents
before the opening of the patent library. The effect for large companies in column (3) is
smaller and insignificant although they make up more than 50% of all patenting.
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If we split the sample by the age of assignee, we find statistically significant effects only
for young assignees. We define an assignee as young if its first patent was filed less than
5 years ago. In columns (6) and (7) we separately analyze patents from individual and
corporate inventors. The effect is mainly driven by the latter. This might seem puzzling
at first, given that we would expect that individual inventors in particular would have
problems to access prior art. However, note that young and small companies would also
qualify as corporate inventors.
In columns (8) to (11), we first split the sample into patent libraries that are associated
with a university and into regions which are above and below the median of patents per
capita, five years before the opening of the library. The effects are significantly different
from zero for university libraries. This is plausible as university students that currently
have little access to prior art might have a high potential to innovate. This points to
complementarities between access to prior art and technical education. We do not find
differential effects for regions with a high or a low patenting rate.
Overall, our results suggest that in particular young and small companies react to the
opening of a patent library. This is what we would expect if access to patents increases
local innovation. We will return to this when analyzing the structure of patents of new
and of incumbent inventors.
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2.4.2 Plausibility and Robustness Checks Confirm the Results
The main concern for our estimation strategy is that libraries chose to become patent
libraries in regions where more innovation was expected in the future. Then, the increase
in patenting might have happened independent of the actual opening of the library.
Both the timing and the localization of the increase in patenting make it unlikely that this
is the case. First, Figure 2.3 shows that in the five years before the opening of the patent
library, there are no systematic differences in patenting between patent libraries and
Federal Depository Libraries. In addition, the increase exactly coincides with the opening
up of the patent library. This suggests that there are no observeables trends in innovation
on which librarians could base their decision and that the expected increase must have
exactly coincided with the designation of the patent library. This seems unlikely.
In column (2) of Table 2.3 we also show that the increase is localized in a small area around
the patent library. In this regression, we use the number of patents between 25 and 50
km around the treatment and the control library as outcome and do not find any effect.
This is also true for wider circles around libraries (Figure 2.4). This implies that the
number of patents only increases around the patent library but not in the wider area. As
a consequence, if expectations were to explain the increase in patenting, the librarian must
have had correct expectation about both, the timing and the area of expected increases
in innovation. Again, this seems unlikely.
Another concern might be that we overestimate the effect because opening up a patent
library potentially causes inventors to move in space. Then, we might just measure a
redistribution of innovative effort in space and not an increase in innovative activity of
incumbent potential inventors. Technically, our estimation would then violate the no
interference assumption (SUTVA). To show that this is not the case, we drop all patent
libraries and assign a fake treatment indicator to the closest Federal Depository Library
and re-estimate the effect in column (3). If inventors move towards the library it is
reasonable to assume that they would move most from the closest comparable city. Yet,
we do not find any effect. This suggests that there is no differential trend between closer
control libraries and libraries that are further away and that interference is a second order
concern.
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Notes: This figure shows difference-in-differences estimates of opening up a patent library on the average
number of patents along different distances to patent libraries relative to the average number of patents in
the same distance around matched federal depository libraries. Error bars show 90% confidence intervals
with standard errors which allow for clustering at the patent depository library level. We assign each
patent library and all Federal Depository Library within the same state and within 250 km as control
group. Data taken from Li et al. (2014). We exclude the patent libraries of Burlington and Rochester.
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Our estimation strategy is based on the assumption that Federal Depository Libraries in
the same state and within 250 km are a suitable control group for patent libraries. In
columns (4) to (8) we use different control groups to show that our results are robust.
In columns (4) and (5) we use a closer control group. In column (4) we only match
Federal Depository Libraries that are in city that is less than three times larger in terms
of population than the city of the patent library. In column (5) we only use Federal
Depository Libraries that have less than 50% more patents per capita as the patent library
in the year before the opening of the patent library. In both cases, the effect is similar. In
columns (6) and (7) we use broader control groups. In column (6) we include all Federal
Depository Libraries within 500 km and in column (7) all Federal Depository Libraries
within the state. The coefficients are in both cases of similar size, yet the estimated
coefficient with all control libraries in the state is insignificant. In column (8) we only use
other patent libraries as control observations and leverage differential opening dates. The
coefficient is around the same size and statistically different from zero.
Lastly, we use a different estimation sample. In our main sample we drop the libraries
of Rochester in the state of New York and Burlington in Vermont. The reason is that
both have an extremely high patent per capita ratio because they host Kodak, Xerox, and
Bausch & Lomb in case of Rochester and IBM in case of Burlington. As a consequence,
the control group is too dissimilar. In column (9) we include these two libraries and repeat
our main analysis. The effect is much larger but insignificant.
2.5 Patent Libraries Change the Structure of Patents
In this section, we analyze the impact of Patent Depository Libraries on the structure
and quality of patents. If improved access to prior art drives our results, we would expect
changes along both of these margins. In the following we first show that the geographic
distance of cited prior art increases. In a second step, we show that patents around new
established patent libraries are cited from patents whose assignees are further away. This
suggests that Patent Libraries facilitate access to more distant prior art and increase
opportunities for cumulative innovation.
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Table 2.4: Impact of Patent Libraries: Backward Citations
Backward Citations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. Var.: # Citations Distance Originality Cross-Tech
Full Small
Patent library -1.1*** -159.8*** -118.7*** -2.1** 1.7*
(0.3) (35.8) (31.9) (1.0) (0.9)
Post x Patent library -1.2** 72.2* 95.5** -0.5 -0.0
(0.5) (43.5) (39.6) (1.2) (1.1)
Constant 14.3*** 1539.0*** 1567.9*** 47.1*** 26.0***
(0.0) (2.7) (2.3) (0.1) (0.1)
Clusters 22843 22665 21681 22843 22843
Obs. 850546 786898 378142 850546 850546
Notes: This table shows the results from a difference-in-differences estimation with five years before
opening as pre-period and five years after opening as post-period. As controls we use fixed effects on
the patent library-technology-application year level. In all columns, we use patents by inventors around
Federal Depository Libraries (FDLs) within 250 km as controls. Column (1) uses the number of backward
citations as the dependent variable. In columns (2) and (3) we use the average distance to the cited
patents as the dependent variable. The distance measure is only defined for the subset of citing and
cited patents from U.S. inventors. In column (2), we do so for all inventors in the sample. In column (3)
we only use small inventors, defined as those assignees who have less than five patents in their portfolio
before the library opens. In column (4), we use the mean originality of the patent as defined in Hall
et al. (2001) as the dependent variable. In column (5), we use the likelihood of the patents’ backward
technology class citations relative to its classes’ general citation pattern as the dependent variable. This
captures “unusual” cross-technology citations. In all regressions, we use the weights suggested by Iacus
et al. (2012) to identify the average treatment effect on the treated. Standard errors are clustered on
the level of the fixed effects. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
2.5.1 Patents Cite Geographically More Distant Prior Art
If better access to prior art is driving our results, the type of patents that local innova-
tions build on should change. We would expect local inventors to cite more patents from
distant locations and patents from other fields. To test this hypothesis, we construct a
sample of all patents around patent libraries and match these to control patents with the
same technology class, the same filing year and with inventor located around a Federal
Depository Library. As the dependent variable, we use the total number of backward ci-
tations, the average geographic distance to the inventor of the cited patent, the originality
of the citing patent, and the average number of cross-technology backward citations.9 We
cluster standard errors at the patent library-technology-application year level.
9The distance measure is only defined for the subset of patents from U.S. inventors. To define origi-
nality of a patent, we follow Hall et al. (2001).
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Table 2.4 shows the result from a difference-in-differences specification on the patent
level. Column (1) shows that the average number of backward citations decreases after a
patent library opened by one citation on average. The estimated coefficient is significantly
different from zero at the five percent level. Columns (2) and (3) use the geographic
distance between citing and cited inventor as dependent variable. Both columns show
an increase in the average distance between citing and cited patents, in line with the
interpretation that access to previously less available prior art is driving our effects. The
effect size corresponds to an increase of around 26% in distance.
Column (3) shows that this effect is again substantially larger for small assignees, reinforc-
ing our interpretation that access to previously unattainable information is driving effects.
Columns (4) and (5) show that in terms of originality and non-standard cross-technology
citations, there are no significant effects of patent library openings on the structure of
patents.
2.5.2 Patents are Cited by Geographically More Distant Inven-
tors
Did opening up a patent library change the quality of new patents in the region? Again,
we compare patents with the same technology class and same application year around
patent libraries and around a Federal Depository Library before and after the patent
library opened. Table 2.5 shows the results of a difference-in-differences specification on
the patent level. Column (1) shows that the average number of forward citations does not
increase significantly. Column (2) uses the geographic distance of forward citations as the
dependent variable. The average distance between patents around depository libraries and
the patents which cite them increases, but is only measured imprecisely. The coefficient
is not significantly different from zero on the conventional levels but with a p-value of
0.11 is close to the 10% significance level. The effect size corresponds to an increase of
around 5% in distance, relative to the baseline. In combination with the results from
the previous subsection, this points towards patent libraries fostering the integration of
and exchange between geographically distant inventors working in related fields. In line
with this, columns (3) and (4) again show that the average generality of a patent and
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Table 2.5: Impact of Patent Libraries: Forward Citations
Forward Citations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var.: # Citations Distance Generality Cross-Tech
Patent library -2.6** -150.7*** -2.1*** 1.5***
(1.1) (44.5) (0.6) (0.5)
Post x Patent library 0.2 81.1 1.0 -0.1
(1.5) (50.9) (0.7) (0.7)
Constant 49.3*** 1599.7*** 59.7*** 19.2***
(0.1) (3.2) (0.0) (0.0)
Clusters 22846 22741 22846 22846
Obs. 858093 769438 858093 858093
Notes: This table shows the results from a difference-in-differences estimation with five years before
opening as pre-period and five years after opening as post-period. As controls we use fixed effects on
the patent library-technology-application year level. In all columns, we use patents by inventors around
Federal Depository Libraries (FDLs) within 250 km as controls. Column (1) uses the number of forward
citations as the dependent variable. In column (2) we use the average distance to the citing patents
as the dependent variable. The distance measure is only defined for the subset of citing patents from
U.S. inventors. In column (3), we use the generality of the patent as defined in Hall et al. (2001) as the
dependent variable. In column (4), we use the likelihood of the patents’ forward technology class citations
relative to its classes’ general citation pattern as the dependent variable. This captures “unusual” cross-
technology citations. In all regressions, we use the weights suggested by Iacus et al. (2012) to identify the
average treatment effect on the treated. Standard errors are clustered on the level of the fixed effects. *,
**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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the likelihood of non-standard technology class citations do not increase in response to a
library opening.10
Overall, these results show that in response to patent depository library openings, the
geographic distance between patents around the libraries and both their backward and
their forward citations increases. This points towards patent libraries facilitating access
to distant prior art and increasing opportunities for cumulative innovation.
2.6 Conclusion
The ‘grand bargain’ in the patent system is that inventors disclose their ideas in exchange
for exclusive rights to market their invention for a limited period. Many legal scholars
think that disclosure is a significant benefit of the patent system as it helps inventors to
avoid duplication and gives them new ideas to recombine with their own. There is however
very little evidence whether or not the disclosure resulting from the patent system affects
innovation.
This chapter shows that opening up patent libraries increased innovation in the region
and helped to disperse innovative activity across the U.S. The results are largely driven
by young and small companies, in line with access barriers as the underlying mechanism.
We also show that patent libraries were helping co-located inventors to build on prior
inventions by improving their access to distant patented knowledge. We thus measure
the “enablement effect” resulting from the disclosure of valuable knowledge contained in
patents.
Our estimates most likely provide a lower bound for the effect of patents on cumulative
innovation through disclosure. First, in many public libraries, the titles and sometimes
abstracts of patents were available in technical journals and books. Thus, even without a
patent library, there might have been some awareness about inventions made elsewhere.
Second, large companies often had their own patent library. Thus we cannot measure the
effect of disclosure on the innovation of large businesses.
10To define the generality of a patent, we follow Hall et al. (2001).
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Chapter 3
Labor Mobility and the Productivity
of Scientists
3.1 Introduction
Labor mobility of scientists is ubiquitous in science systems around the world. In the pro-
duction of new knowledge, labor mobility may be especially important in researchers’ quest
to find new ideas (Kortum, 1997; Weitzman, 1998), complementary co-authors (Wuchty
et al., 2007; Jones, 2009; Catalini, forthcoming; Boudreau et al., forthcoming), or a better
research environment (Agrawal et al., 2017). However, because of lacking market mecha-
nisms on academic labor markets, it is unclear whether the existing spatial allocation of
talent and the current rate of scientist mobility are efficient. As moving is costly, mea-
suring the extent to which labor mobility affects academic productivity is crucial when
designing policies for academic labor markets such as the rate and timing of required job
mobility. Yet, little is known about the impact labor mobility has on movers’ academic
productivity.
The econometric challenge when analyzing this question is that scientists self-select into
moving. The problem is analogous to general models of self-selection and migration (Roy,
1951; Borjas, 1987; McKenzie et al., 2010): Only those who benefit from moving will incur
the substantial personal costs of doing so. Azoulay et al. (2017) study the determinants
of scientist mobility using a sample of elite scientists in the life sciences. They find that
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movers are more productive than their non-moving counterparts. Academically, mobility
is determined by the number and quality of local collaborators, but personal costs are
also important. Ganguli (2015a,b) focuses on the international mobility of scientists from
Russia after the end of the USSR. She finds that mobile scientists were more likely to
be men, young, and more productive than their non-mobile colleagues. This illustrates
that comparing movers to non-movers could easily produce spurious impacts of scientist
mobility on academic productivity.
In this chapter, we make use of the German system for senior hires at universities to
circumvent this problem.1 German universities always consider at least two candidates for
each position. By law, the hiring committee of the university is required to create a ranked
list of suitable candidates. Offers are then made in the order of candidates. We use all
scientists on this list as counterfactual for the moving scientists. This setup provides two
main advantages: On the one hand, it circumvents the problem of selection into moving
as all researchers on the list showed interest in moving to the destination university. On
the other hand, candidates on the appointment list are qualitatively comparable. The
reason for this is that the hiring committee has strong incentives to weed out unsuitable
candidates: professors are appointed for life and it is difficult to predict who will accept
an offer. Thus, even a low-ranked candidate might receive and accept an offer and stay
until retirement. Lastly, hiring no one has an option value because the total number
of positions is limited and fixed. Supporting the assumption that researchers are of
comparable academic quality at the time of appointment, researchers on the lists in our
sample have the same number of citations to pre-move publications in the data on average
(Watzinger et al., 2017b).
Our empirical setup uses data on 1’609 lists with 3’850 researchers from one German
university between 1950 and 2005. It covers all fields and all appointed professors in
this period. In Watzinger et al. (2017b), we link the researchers on these lists with
data on their publications between 1965 and 2005. As measure of scientific productivity,
in this chapter we use yearly author- and citation-weighted publications of scientists to
account for scientific quality and quantity. We then employ an event-study approach
1The setup and identification strategy of this paper closely follows the companion paper (Watzinger
et al., 2017b).
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in combination with difference-in-differences estimations to uncover the causal impact of
scientist mobility on academic productivity.
We find that after a move, a researcher’s productivity as measured by citation-weighted
publications increases by around 13% relative to the control group of non-moving scien-
tists. This translates to 0.5 citation-weighted publications per year. The impact seems
to increase over time and is statistically significantly different from zero starting around
three years after the move. While the average number of citations to publications does
not increase for moving researchers, publications in the upper and the bottom third of
the citation distribution increase, relative to publications in the medium third. This is
in line with an increase in more explorative and less exploitative research. Note that the
results reflect estimates of the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT, see Angrist
and Pischke, 2008) as all these researchers showed interest in moving to this university.
This may explain the rather large estimates. Estimating the ATT of moving on academic
productivity is however policy relevant: It gives an estimate of how much less productive
a moving scientist would have been had she not been appointed.
Our results uncover important effect heterogeneity with respect to academic field, aca-
demic influence, and type of position. The estimates are entirely driven by researchers in
the natural sciences, but do not depend on any single field within this group. In other
fields, we do not find any effects of scientist mobility on productivity. With respect to
the scientific influence of researchers (“quality”), the increase in academic productivity
completely stems from researchers from lists with an above-average number of citations to
pre-move work. The effect is driven by researchers who applied for non-chaired positions,
and is neither driven by publications where the researcher is the last-named author, nor
by publications where she is the first-named author. This suggests that an alternative
explanation of the effects as returns to lab ownership is not driving the results.
We provide evidence that the identification assumption of parallel trends in productivity
between movers and non-movers in the absence of the move holds. First, we make use
of our event-study approach and find that the estimated impact of moving on academic
publications is not significantly different from zero in the pre-move period. The impact of
moving on academic productivity is only significantly different from zero starting around
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three years after the move. Second, when assigning the treatment dummy to the highest
ranked non-mover, we do not find any effect of mobility on subsequent productivity. This
speaks against an interpretation where higher rank simply reflects higher expected future
productivity.
The main alternative channel through which these results could emerge is larger access to
capital generated through negotiations with the new university. While we cannot exclude
this factor as the driving force of our results, we do not think this explanation is likely:
In the subsample of lists where the highest ranked researcher did not accept the offer and
a lower ranked researcher moved to the university, this alternative interpretation would
predict that the effect size should be smaller. After all, researchers who decline mostly
do so after negotiations with their home (or other) universities which increases access to
capital. Our results show that the effect is actually larger in this subsample. This result
also shows that our estimates are not driven by star researchers moving to this university,
further corroborating the parallel trends assumption. Finally, using publicly available
partial data on lists of rejected offers, we also show that the effect is not restricted to this
one university.
The small literature trying to assess the impact of scientists’ mobility on their academic
productivity has been struggling to find plausible identification strategies and data which
meets the stringent requirements to answer this question. This is especially true in light
of findings in the migration literature that movers are different from non-movers not only
along observable, but also along unobservable characteristics (McKenzie et al., 2010).
Hoisl (2007) finds that an inventor’s move increases her productivity. She uses the regional
characteristics of the invention as an instrument for mobility. However, the exclusion
restriction seems unlikely to hold as the selection into patenting likely differs between
rural and urban areas.2 Franzoni et al. (2014) use a survey of active researchers and
2Trajtenberg (2005) finds that moves increase the value of patents at the new place of the inventor.
He reports that movers are selected on a number of characteristics, such as the importance and originality
of their inventions. Hoisl (2009) uses survey data on German inventors and finds that after an inventor
moved, her number and quality of patents increases relative to a control group of non-moving researchers.
This control group matches inventors on their age, their educational background, and their main technical
area. Because movements are endogenous, this still leaves the possibility that only those researchers who
benefit from the move are mobile. Baeker (2015) studies the mobility of post-doctoral researchers in
Germany. Using matching techniques, she finds that changing affiliation decreases the productivity of
researchers in the short run.
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instrument (international) researcher mobility by having migrated as a child. They find
that international mobility increases academic productivity. However, the validity of the
exclusion restriction is unclear. It is also unclear how to interpret these local average
treatment effects. Finally, Ganguli (2015a) makes use of the collapse of the Soviet Union
to assess whether international labor mobility of scientists affects their productivity. She
employs individual fixed effects combined with difference-in-differences regressions and
finds that after a move, scientists produce around 0.5 more publications per year. In her
setup, movers and non-movers differ on a variety of observable characteristics, a fact that
does not disappear even in coarsened matched samples. This caveat, in combination with
the manifold changes in the former Soviet Union after its collapse, make it unclear how
the results translate to labor mobility of scientists more generally. Therefore, there is still
little rigorous evidence on the productivity impacts of scientist mobility.
This chapter contributes to this literature in three important ways. First and most im-
portantly, the German university system provides a credible setup to circumvent inherent
identification problems. All researchers on the appointment lists specifically applied for
the position. This accounts for the problem that scientists self-select into moving. Be-
cause of the inherent incentives in the hiring process, researchers on the appointment
lists are furthermore similar in academic quality. However, this setup comes at the cost
of providing estimates among a group with likely large average treatment effects, rela-
tive to the population of scientists. This is mitigated by the German university system
which provides ample incentives to move. The selection of movers in German academia
is therefore not substantially different from the general population of scientists. Also, if
runners-up move to other universities in response to not being appointed at this university,
this should work against finding any effect (similar to substitution bias in the program
evaluation literature, see e.g. Heckman et al., 2000). In summary, runners-up provide
a credible counterfactual for movers with unclear implications for scientists who did not
show interest in the positions.
Second, this is one of the first analyses to assess the heterogeneity of impacts of labor mo-
bility on innovation across different fields and across differentially influential researchers.
While scientist mobility seems to be important for the natural sciences, we find no effect
for other fields. The impact of mobility on productivity is driven by researchers from
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Figure 3.1: Procedure for Appointing a Professor in Germany
appointment lists with above-median academic impact. This stands in contrast with find-
ings by Ganguli (2015a). Because the literature has so far focused on patenting inventors
who mostly work in the natural sciences, the heterogeneity of estimates provides new
insights into which scientists benefit from labor mobility.
Third, this is one of the first studies to rigorously estimate the impact of labor mobility for
the productivity of academic researchers. Research on the impact of mobility on inventive
activity has hitherto mostly focused on patenting inventors. However, because academic
labor markets mostly lack market mechanisms, the labor mobility of scientists is especially
prone to inefficiencies in the spatial allocation of researchers. While most science systems
in the world incorporate mechanisms to increase academic mobility, little is known about
the impact this has on the movers’ scientific productivity.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, we present the
institutional setup and the dataset. In section 3.3, we discuss the identification strategy.
In section 3.4, we present results, robustness checks, and evidence for the validity of the
identification assumption. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 The German System for Hiring Researchers Pro-
vides a Natural Experiment
In Germany, almost all university professors are civil servants and thus are hired in a
highly regulated multi-step process (Figure 3.1).3 The procedure is designed to give every
qualified applicant equal access to jobs in the public service independent of personal con-
3This section is adjusted from the companion paper, (Watzinger et al., 2017b).
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nections. To implement equal access, every open position must be advertised in a national
newspaper. The advertisement must contain a list of criteria by which the candidates are
compared in the remainder of the process. These criteria for example usually include
publications in refereed journals or experience in raising third-party funding. Using these
criteria, the hiring committee creates a long list of five to ten candidates who are invited
for fly-outs. After the fly-outs, the hiring committee creates a ranked short-list of two to
four candidates. All candidates on the short-list are reviewed by at least two external ref-
erees who suggest their own independent ranking of the candidates. The ranked short list
and the reference letters are submitted to the university senate for review. If the ranked
short list is approved by the senate, offers are made to the candidates on the short-list in
order of the rank. The first candidate to accept is then appointed.
The hiring process contains several mechanisms to make the process objective and fair.
First, internal candidates are usually not eligible to apply for tenured positions, so almost
all new professors are external hires from other university. Internal promotions are in
theory possible, but must follow much more stringent rules than external hires.4 Second,
the composition of the hiring committee is fixed and contains external members. The
hiring committee has at least one professor in the same field but from another univer-
sity, one member of the university senate from another field, a women’s representative, a
representative of non-tenured scientific employees, and one undergraduate student repre-
sentative. Third, the whole process is subject to court review: if one of the non-appointed
candidates suspects that the university did not follow due process, the candidate can sue
for non-appointment of the chosen candidate, compensation and invalidation of the list
(“Konkurrentenklage”).
According to the Gemeinsame Wissenschaftskonferenz, a joint institute of all German
universities and the German government, every open professorship attracted on average
41.8 applications in Germany in 2013 (Wissenschaftskonferenz, 2014). Around 10% of
these candidates were considered suitable for the short list, which implies that the average
list had four candidates. Of all candidates, 45% received an offer for the position at one
4The rules are so stringent that for all practical purposes this is perceived (and labeled) as forbidden
(Ban of internal promotions - “Hausberufungsverbot”). This rule prevents nepotism because it requires
researchers to move at least once in their academic career to get a tenured position. In this chapter, we
exclude all internal promotions.
87
Labor Mobility and the Productivity of Scientists
point in time. If a candidate received an offer, the probability that she accepted was
around 50%.5
Other Researchers on Appointment Lists Serve as Counterfactu-
als for the Mover
Due to the incentives inherent in the legal set-up of academic appointments in Germany
the candidates on the short-list are not only acceptable, but also similar in academic
“quality”. This provides the opportunity to use all other candidates on the list as a
counterfactual for the moving candidate.
The main reason is that the hiring committee has strong incentives to weed out unsuitable
candidates. In Germany, all professors are appointed for life and for the hiring committee
it is very difficult to predict who will accept an offer. Candidates can receive competing
offers during the selection process and thus might have received better offers once the
process is complete. What is more, receiving an offer from a different university opens
the door to renegotiation at the current university. Even a low-ranked candidate might
therefore receive and accept an offer and stay until retirement, as appointment to civil
service is for life. As a consequence, the hiring committee has incentives to only put
acceptable candidates on the list. Even more, hiring no one has an option value because
the number of professorships is restricted. Therefore, if there is a suitable candidate in
the following year, the university might not be able to hire her, because all positions are
filled. As a consequence, the hiring committee might choose to hire no one.
A second reason why researchers on the list are similar is that in all but rare cases,
only candidates who applied to the position are put on the list and the possible salary
and teaching obligations are fixed in a pre-determined range. Only researchers who are
interested to work at this university for the offered conditions thus apply. Each position
in Germany is associated with a category determining the possible salary range, the
5The data is not exact as open professorships are counted in a two year interval. According to the
data 1’612 professors were appointed in Germany in 2013. The universities received 67’117 applications
for these positions. 6’954 researchers made it on the ranked list and 3’175 received an offer.
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pension benefits and the status of a professor.6 Even more, at the time of this study,
there was salary cap: No professor could earn more than category B10 which corresponds
to the category of a General or an Admiral in the German military. Taken together, these
restrictions lead to a self-selection of applicants ensuring a more homogeneous applicant
pool.
Movers are Similar to the General Population of Researchers
In the traditional German university system, there is no internal promotion to tenure. The
only way to receive a tenured position is to accept an offer from another university. As a
result, all junior researchers in Germany move between universities at least once. Also, a
senior researcher who wants a higher salary or more access to research funds must have
at least one outside offer to be able to renegotiate her current contract. As universities
often do not renegotiate or the hiring university has more funding, many outside offers are
taken. Many researchers move three or four times in their career as a result. Note that
if the runners-up in our data also move to other places after not being appointed at this
university, this works against finding any effect of moving on subsequent productivity.
These legal restrictions imply that the selection of movers is not very different from
non-movers as moves are the norm rather than the exception. Because in other settings,
moving researchers differ markedly from non-movers, our setup provides a clear advantage
over existing research (e.g., Ganguli, 2015a).
Data
For this study, we have access to all short lists of candidates of one German university
from 1950 to 2005. The university under consideration offers a wide range of subjects from
6For example, the highest remunerated professorship today is the W3 professor which is comparable
to a tenured full professorship at a public doctoral institutions in the U.S. A W3 professor is usually
expected to lead a research group. The associated salary usually ranges between Euro 60’000 and Euro
110’000 depending on the federal state and seniority level. An overview of salaries for different salary
category can be found here: http://www.w-besoldung.net/.
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humanities to natural sciences and medicine. In total we have access to 1’609 ranked lists
for professorships containing 3’850 researchers (2.4 per list). We match all researchers
on the lists with their academic publications from Scopus and the year of their move to
the university from historical course catalogs.7 In our data, over 80% of publications are
journal articles. Around 6% of publications are conference proceedings, another 7% are
reviews or surveys, and around 1% of publications are books or book chapters. We do not
discriminate between different publication formats as these may reflect different publishing
standards across fields. The main dependent variable is the author- and citation-weighted
yearly number of publications.8 For all publications, we therefore collect all citations by
other publications. As citations are at the moment only available from 1980s onwards,
this leaves us with 1’012 short lists with 2’760 scientists.
However, there is a number of observations which cannot be used for inference. We
delete lists on which there are no movers or on which there is only one person (leaving
2’218 researchers). We also delete all lists with researchers who did not have registered
publications in Scopus in the ten years before or after the move because this indicates
either different publication standards in a field or (more likely) matching errors between
the Scopus data and the names on the appointment lists (leaving 1’416 researchers).
Subsequently, we delete those lists which include scientists who are assigned to more than
one appointment list (leaving 1’176 researchers). We also refrain from using eight lists
where the discrepancy between mover and non-mover productivity is very large before
the move, five researchers who are outliers in terms of pre-move citations, and 6 lists
which are incomplete (leaving 1’141 researchers).9 Finally, we also delete lists with a
“Sperrvermerk” which means that the list is sent back to the department after a certain
candidate declined.
These data restrictions leave 1’000 researchers on 317 lists in the sample (3.15 per list).
While the restrictions are stringent and leave not even half of the original sample in the
data, the strong identification assumption detailed below makes a rigorous treatment of
7More details on the matching process and the construction of the dataset are provided in Appendix
C.1.
8Author-weighting means that if there are N authors who jointly publish a publication in any year,
each researcher gets assigned 1/N publications in this year.
9Results are similar when not excluding these lists and researchers.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics - Author Level
Mean SD Min Max
Ln(Pub.+1) 0.60 0.42 0.00 2.16
Ln(Wgt. Pub.+1) 2.08 1.46 0.00 5.94
Ln(Cit. per paper+1) 2.68 1.09 0.00 5.34
No. Authors 1.52 0.51 0.69 5.71
Science 0.68 0.47 0.00 1.00
High Qual. 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00
Mover 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00
Observations 1000
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics on the author-level for researchers in our sample. Publi-
cations are author-weighted. Weighted publications are author- and citation-weighted. The values for
all time-varying variables are averages across the five years before and five years after the move. The
data stems from all appointment lists of one large university in Germany. Publication data stems from
Scopus.
the data necessary.10
Because Scopus provides comprehensive data on scientific publications covering all main
outlets such as articles, books, conference proceedings, and handbook articles, we infer
from missing author-year combinations in the publication data that the author has not
produced a scientific publication in this year. We therefore extend our data to a balanced
sample covering the 1’000 researchers in our sample over ten years before and ten years
after the move.
The author-level descriptive statistics of the sample are shown in Table 3.1. The summary
statistics relate to the five years before and after the move as this will be the sample we
use for our difference-in-differences strategy. The average researcher in the sample has
around 0.6 yearly author-weighted publications, around 4.7 yearly author- and citation-
weighted publications and produces publications which are cited around 6.3 times on
average. The average number of authors per publication is 5.6. Two-thirds of the sample
are researchers in the natural sciences, slightly more than half of all researchers are on
lists with above-median pre-move impact as measured by forward citations, and around
36% of researchers in the final sample moved to the destination university.
To assess whether our results are restricted to this university, we also use data from the
10There are some professors who are appointed from other universities and institutes close to this
destination university. When deleting these lists from the sample, results are qualitatively robust (not
shown).
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magazine “Forschung und Lehre” which regularly reports appointment offers and whether
they were accepted or not. We make use of repeated reports on the same position (rejected
offers) to construct partial appointment lists. After deleting eight lists which are outliers,
we are left with 147 lists providing information on 340 scientists in this sample.
3.3 Empirical Strategy
The main identification problem is that researchers do not move randomly. In particular,
because of the heavy costs of moving (Azoulay et al., 2017), only those who benefit from
the move will decide to incur these. For example, these might be researchers whose
research focus is a superior fit at the destination university. Also, only scientists who are
particularly productive researchers might be offered positions. These factors likely lead
to overestimation of productivity effects when only comparing moving to non-moving
scientists.
To answer the question whether scientist mobility affects academic productivity, an ideal
experiment would randomly make some researchers move while keeping others at their
current affiliation. In this case, a simple comparison of the academic productivity between
movers and non-movers would return the causal effect of scientist mobility on academic
productivity. While this ideal is impossible to reach, the setup in this chapter circumvents
many of the usual problems when answering this question and allows estimates which are
directly policy relevant.
We use runners-up for the position of the appointed professor to construct a close control
group for the moving researcher. All candidate researchers applied for the position, were
extensively vetted, and were accepted by the university for the short list. Therefore, all
of them might have been appointed. Thus, we are able to control for the endogenous
selection of researchers to jobs as the runners-up provide a counterfactual for how much
the moving researcher would have published in the absence of the move.
In the main specification, we use an event study design combined with a difference-in-
differences strategy with the moving professors as treatment group and the researchers
who are runners-up as control group. The event study framework has the advantage that
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it permits visual inspection of pre-existing trends. Because at points in time further away
from the move, the likelihood of confounding factors increases, we only use the five years
before and after the move for our preferred estimates. For the annual treatment effects,
we use the ten years before and after the move to allow for closer examination of pre-
trends. As dependent variable, we use scientific publications of movers and non-movers
to measure academic productivity. To adjust for differences in productivity which are
solely due to larger research teams in some fields or different collaboration patterns, all
publication counts are weighted by the number of authors on a publication.
Publication counts do not account for the underlying quality of research. The setup of
hiring researchers in Germany leads to appointment lists with researchers who are sim-
ilar in academic quality, not necessarily in the absolute number of publications written.
Therefore, our preferred measure of academic productivity is a quality-adjusted publica-
tion count. To measure quality, we weight publications by the number of their subsequent
citations. Using alternative measures such as journal rankings is difficult because across
different fields, the main format of academic publications differ. While there certainly
are differences in citation standards between fields, citation-weighted publications are
still more interpretable and reflect academic publications weighted by their subsequent
knowledge flows to other researchers. What is more, this is the preferred measure in the
literature using academic publications as the outcome of interest (e.g., Stephan, 1996).
Because publications, especially quality-weighted publications, and citations are highly
skewed in the data, we take natural logarithms of all dependent variables adding one to
all observations to account for years in which researchers did not publish.11
The validity of the approach depends on the assumption that in the absence of the move,
the (quality-weighted) publications of movers and non-movers would have followed the
same trend. Note that the identification condition in this chapter therefore differs from
Watzinger et al. (2017b). In Watzinger et al. (2017b), the validity of the approach hinges
on the assumption that in the absence of the move, citations to the pre-move work of
all ranked candidates would have followed the same trend. Here, our assumption does
11This non-linear transformation of the dependent variable may in principle lead to biased estimates
(e.g., Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). Results are robust to estimating the specification in levels and to
using alternative estimation methods for count data such as fixed effects Poisson regressions (Hausman
et al., 1984; Wooldridge, 1999; Azoulay et al., 2010). See Table C.1 in Appendix C.2.
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not only relate to the quality of pre-move publications, but encompasses that researchers
would have followed the same future academic productivity in the absence of the move
and is therefore substantially stronger.
This assumption is by definition untestable. In the latter part of the chapter, we provide
a series of robustness checks to show that the assumption is plausible. For example, we
show that all non-movers have the same trend and thus rank does not predict increases
in productivity per se. What is more, we apply more stringent restrictions on our dataset
than in Watzinger et al. (2017b) to ensure that candidates are not only similar with
respect to the citation potential to their pre-move work, but also similar in terms of their
expected future productivity.
3.4 Results: Moving Researchers Become More Pro-
ductive
Labor mobility may be important for the productivity of researchers because it could
allow access to new ideas (Kortum, 1997; Weitzman, 1998), to complementary co-authors
(Jones, 2009; Catalini, forthcoming), or to a better research environment (Agrawal et al.,
2017). In this section, we estimate whether scientist mobility indeed increases academic
productivity. To measure academic productivity, we rely on researchers’ yearly publication
output, the main goal of academic research. We adjust publications for the number of
authors in all specifications and for their future citation count in our preferred estimates.
3.4.1 Publications Increase in Response to the Move
In this subsection, we use regression models with time-varying coefficients to estimate the
impact of moving on the number and quality of academic publications, the main output
of academic research.
To analyze the change in academic productivity in response to the move, we estimate the
following econometric model:
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Log(Publicationsi,t,l + 1) = α ·Movei + βt6=0 ·Movei + δt + γl + i,t,l (3.1)
where the dependent variable Log(Publicationsi,t,l + 1) is the natural logarithm of ei-
ther the author-weighted or the author-and-citation-weighted number of publications of
researcher i in year t (relative to the move) on list l. This specification therefore uses
an event-study approach, with the move being the event of interest. The coefficients of
interest are the βt which capture the average yearly difference in the dependent variable
between the mover and the other researchers on the same appointment list.12 The spec-
ification controls for list fixed effects γl, such that all differences across lists which are
constant over time are differenced out. Therefore, this specification essentially compares
movers and non-movers on the same appointment list. We also control for period fixed
effects δt which control for changes in productivity around the appointment which are
common to all researchers in our sample. Finally, the error terms i,t,l allow for cluster-
ing at the appointment list level, which in this setup nests adjustments for clustering at
the researcher level and therefore produces rather conservative estimates of the standard
errors (Bertrand et al., 2004).
In Figure 3.2, we show estimates for all βt where the dependent variable is the number of
author-weighted publications of a researcher. Prior to the move, the publications of movers
and non-movers are not systematically different in any single year. After the move, the
number of publications of the movers increases significantly relative to the control group.
The effect becomes significant in year three after the move and is increasing over time.
With respect to the timing of the impact, one should keep in mind that the effect is
primarily driven by researchers in the natural sciences where the publication process is
substantially faster than in other fields, such as economics (cf. Stephan, 1996). Therefore,
it is unlikely that this effect merely reflects a strong “pipeline” of pre-move research results
which led to the appointment in the first place.
Because raw publication numbers do not reveal anything about the underlying qual-
ity of publications, in Figure 3.3 we use author- and citation-weighted publications as
the dependent variable. The coefficients reveal a similar pattern: While the number
12We use the year of appointment as the baseline year. Results are robust to using other periods as
reference.
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Notes: This graph shows the estimated number of yearly log excess publications by moving researchers,
relative to the year of the move. Publications are weighted by the number of authors. To arrive at these
estimates, we regress the yearly log number (plus one) of author-weighted publications by researchers on
the appointment lists on an indicator variable equal to one if the researcher moved (interacted with time
dummies), year fixed effects, and appointment list fixed effects. The dark blue line represents the 90%
confidence bands for the estimated coefficients. Standard errors allow for clustering at the appointment
list level. The data stems from the universe of appointment lists of one large university in Germany
between 1950 and 2005. Publication data stems from Scopus.
of citation-weighted publications does not significantly differ between movers and non-
movers before the move, it is higher for movers in response to the move. The coefficient
estimates are consistently significantly different from zero from year four after the move.
Taken together, these estimates suggest that mobility of scientists does increase academic
productivity.
Publications Increase by 13% in Response to the Move
The approach above provides graphical evidence that mobility increased academic pro-
ductivity, but has rather low statistical power due to the estimation of year-by-year co-
efficients. To quantify the absolute size of the impact shown in the previous subsection,
we therefore estimate the average change in productivity per year in response to a re-
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Notes: This graph shows the estimated number of yearly log excess publications by moving researchers,
relative to the year of the move. Publications are weighted by the number of authors and by the number
of follow-on citations. To arrive at these estimates, we regress the yearly log number (plus one) of author-
and citation-weighted publications by researchers on the appointment lists on an indicator variable equal
to one if the researcher moved (interacted with time dummies), year fixed effects, and appointment list
fixed effects. The dark blue line represents the 90% confidence bands for the estimated coefficients.
Standard errors allow for clustering at the appointment list level. The data stems from the universe of
appointment lists of one large university in Germany between 1950 and 2005. Publication data stems
from Scopus.
searcher’s move in a difference-in-differences model. As pre- and post-periods, we use the
five years before and after the move. We estimate the following specification:
Log(Publicationsi,t,l + 1) = α ·Movei + δ · Postt + β ·Movei · Postt + γl + i,t,l (3.2)
where Movei indicates whether the researcher at hand moved and Postt is an indicator
for the time period one to five after the move. Again, Log(Publicationsi,t,l + 1) refers
to the natural logarithm of author- (and citation-) weighted publications of researcher i
on list l in year t. The coefficient of interest is β, the average difference in post-move
log publications between movers and non-movers. As controls, we use list fixed effects
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γl, therefore only identifying from within-list changes in academic productivity after the
move. Note that the coefficient estimates for β in this specification are equivalent to
an estimation with individual fixed effects because the mover dummy accounts for mean
differences between movers and non-movers within lists.13 However, estimating this mean
difference explicitly allows for testing whether the difference in academic productivity
between movers and non-movers before the move is similar. These estimates shed light
on the plausibility of the identification assumption. Again, the error term i,t,l allows for
clustering at the appointment list level.
Table 3.2: Excess Publications of Moving Scientists
Dep. Var.: Ln(Pub.+1) Ln(Citation-Weighted Publications+1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mover 0.04∗ 0.07 0.11 -0.01 0.11 0.03
(0.02) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.07)
Post 0.00 -0.03 -0.10∗ 0.12∗∗ -0.16∗∗ 0.10∗∗
(0.01) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Post x Move 0.06∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.04 0.32∗∗∗ 0.06
(0.02) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07)
Constant 0.53∗∗∗ 1.87∗∗∗ 2.32∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗ 2.79∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03)
List FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Baseline Baseline Science Humanities High Qual. Low Qual.
Adj R2 0.34 0.45 0.36 0.40 0.24 0.33
Lists 317 317 214 103 156 161
Observations 10000 10000 6780 3220 5350 4650
Notes: This table shows fixed effects regressions on the author-by-year level. The data comprises the
five years before and five years after the appointment. The dependent variable is the yearly log number
(plus one) of author- (column 1) and author-and citation-weighted (columns 2-6) publications of authors
on the appointment list. In columns (3) and (4), we split the sample into researchers in the natural
sciences and all other fields. The natural sciences are comprised of Biology, Chemistry and Pharmacy,
Medicine, Physics, and Veterinary Medicine. In columns (5) and (6), we split the sample along the
median number of listwise average citations to pre-move publications of researchers on this appointment
list. Move is an indicator if the researcher was appointed, Post is an indicator for the post-move period
and the indicator of interest PostxMove is the interaction for the period after the move of treated authors.
In every regression we control for fixed effects for the appointment list under consideration. The constant
reflects the intercept that makes the prediction calculated at the means of the independent variables
equal to the mean of the dependent variable. Standard errors allowing for clustering on the appointment
list level are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively. The data stems from the universe of appointment lists of one large university in Germany
between 1950 and 2005. Publication data stems from Scopus.
13As such, controlling for (individual) covariates would not change the coefficient estimates for β but
would merely affect the standard errors. This implies that our estimates are robust to the inclusion of
list rank fixed effects or origin university fixed effects, for example. Results from these specifications are
available on request.
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The results of this specification are reported in Table 3.2, where the dependent variable
is the author-adjusted number of publications. Column (1) shows that after the move,
movers have 0.06 more log publications on average than non-movers. In comparison to the
baseline publication rate, this is an increase of around 30%. This seems very large, but
translates to around 0.1 more author-weighted publications per year. These results are
smaller, but similar to Ganguli (2015a), who finds around 0.2 more publications per year
for scientists who left the Soviet Union relative to those who stayed but could collaborate
with foreign researchers. Column (1) also reveals that movers have slightly more absolute
publications than non-movers prior to the move, an effect that is statistically significant
at the ten percent level. Column (2) shows the specification using the natural logarithm
of author- and citation-weighted publications as the dependent variable. Again, movers
are significantly more productive after the move. The effect is smaller, translating in
around 13% more citation-weighted publications per year relative to the baseline effect.
While this effect may still seem large, note that it reflects the ATT of moving among
researchers applying for a job at a different university (similar in spirit to leveraging
oversubscribed lotteries). Because researchers move for a reason, the ATT is likely larger
than the average treatment effect for scientists who are not interested in moving to the
university. The column also shows that the difference in the baseline rates of quality-
weighted publications between movers and non-movers is not significantly different from
zero. This is consistent with the identification assumption of parallel trends between
movers and non-movers in the absence of the move.
To assess the origin of these large effects, we analyze the impact of moving across fields
and academic impact. The results of this exercise are reported in columns (3) through
(6). Column (3) shows that the effect is entirely driven by the natural sciences, whereas
the impact of moving is insignificantly different from zero in other fields. This can also
be clearly seen in Figure 3.4, where we show time-varying coefficients as described before
for the natural sciences and for other fields. For the natural sciences, the impact is
significantly different from zero from year three after the move and is less noisy than in
the baseline estimates. In contrast, the estimated treatment effects for all other fields are
never significantly different from zero.
In columns (5) and (6), we split the sample along the median number of citations (by list)
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to pre-move work. The effect is entirely driven by and only statistically significant for
researchers on lists with high average academic influence before the move, measured as
being above median in the forward citation distribution. Therefore, especially high-impact
researchers seem to benefit from moving (to this university). This stands in contrast to
findings by Ganguli (2015a), who shows that among scientists leaving the Soviet Union
after its collapse, the move decreased the productivity of highly active researchers.
In summary, these results show that the productivity of moving researchers increases in
response to the move, relative to the control group of non-moving researchers on the same
appointment list. These effects are driven by the natural sciences and by researchers on
lists with above-average academic impact.
3.4.2 Quality and Collaboration
In this subsection, we analyze how moving impacts academic productivity along the qual-
ity distribution of publications and whether moving increases the size of research teams.
Column (1) of Table 3.3 shows the baseline estimates using citation- and author-weighted
publications as the dependent variable. The second column uses the average citations to
publications of active researchers and shows that these did not increase. This implies that
the average quality of articles did not increase.
However, note that more novel research displays higher variance in their citations (Wang
et al., 2017). That is, while they are more likely to be highly cited, they are also more likely
to receive a very low number of citations. Columns (3) to (5) therefore use publications in
the top third, medium third, and bottom third as the dependent variables, respectively. In
line with the idea that moving generates access to new ideas and increases the novelty of
new publications, these columns show that the impact of moving is statistically significant
for publications in the top and the bottom third of the citation distribution of articles of
researchers in our sample. The effect is smaller and only significantly different from zero
at the ten percent level for the medium third of publications. This is in line with the idea
that the increase in quality-weighted publications is driven by access to new ideas.
Finally, in column (6), we analyze whether the effect is driven by the average number of
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Table 3.3: Excess Publications of Moving Scientists: Heterogeneity of Effects along Pub-
lication Quality and on Team Size
Dep. Var.: Ln (Cit.- Ln Ln(1+Pub. with Citations in..) Ln(1+
Wgt.+1) (Cit.+1) Top Medium Bottom #Authors)
Third
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mover 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03∗∗ 0.01
(0.07) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Post -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01∗ -0.00 0.11∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Post x Move 0.19∗∗∗ 0.04 0.03∗∗ 0.02∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.04
(0.06) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 1.87∗∗∗ 2.77∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 1.51∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
List FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Baseline Active Baseline Baseline Baseline Active
Adj R2 0.45 0.45 0.38 0.22 0.25 0.54
Lists 317 312 317 317 317 312
Observations 10000 7263 10000 10000 10000 7263
Notes: This table shows fixed effects regressions on the author-by-year level. The data comprises the five
years before and five years after the appointment. The dependent variable the natural logarithm (plus
one) of author- and citation-weighted publications in the first column. It is the natural logarithm (plus
one) of the average number of follow-on citations in column (2). The dependent variable is the natural
logarithm (plus one) of publications with citations in the upper third (column 3), medium third (column
4), and bottom third (column 5) of the citation distribution of all publications of researchers in the sample
in the following columns, and the natural logarithm (plus one) of the average number of authors on a
publication in column (6). Move is an indicator if the researcher was appointed, Post is an indicator for
the post-move period and the indicator of interest PostxMove is the interaction for the period after the
move of treated authors. In every regression we control for fixed effects for the appointment list under
consideration. The constant reflects the intercept that makes the prediction calculated at the means of
the independent variables equal to the mean of the dependent variable. Standard errors allowing for
clustering on the appointment list level are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The data stems from the universe of appointment lists of one
large university in Germany between 1950 and 2005. Publication data stems from Scopus.
co-authors on publications of the moving researchers. This is not the case, casting doubt
on the alternative explanation that the effect is driven by researchers working in larger
academic teams.
3.4.3 Returns to Tenure?
Do these results reflect genuine increases in publication activity or do they reflect other
time-varying shocks? For example, the effects could be driven by the fact that as full
professors, researchers in the natural sciences typically lead a research group and their
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own “lab”. To answer this question, in Table 3.4 we analyze the heterogeneity of the
effect with respect to the type of position. Column (1) repeats the baseline specification,
using citation-weighted publications as the dependent variable. In columns (2) and (3),
we split the sample according to whether the position is a full chair (payment groups “C4”
or “W3”) or not (all other groups). Interestingly, the effect is not driven by researchers
who move to a fully chaired position. This speaks against an explanation that moving
researchers merely publish more because they get credit for heading their research group.
In columns (4) and (5), we split the dependent variable into whether the researcher was the
last author on the publication or not. In the natural sciences, being last author typically
reflects credit for being the leader of a research group and the most senior author on a
publication. We find that the effects are driven by an increase in publications where the
researcher is not the last author on the publication. This again speaks against seniority
as an explanation of the impact of moving on academic productivity. Finally, columns
(6) and (7) split the number of quality-weighted publications into those on which the
researcher is and those where she is not the first author. Being first author typically
reflects having done the main lab work in the natural sciences. Because researchers in the
sample apply to tenured positions, we would expect the effect of moving to be driven by
publications where the researchers is not the first author. This is what we find.
In summary, this table shows that the effect is not merely driven by researchers moving to
positions in which they hold the capital that the research is based on. It shows that the
effect is based on tenured but junior positions and researchers who are not the most senior,
but also not the most active researchers on their publications. Overall, it rather suggests
an interaction effect of moving with age (Jones, 2010; Jones and Weinberg, 2011) than
returns to seniority, which is in line with localized knowledge spillovers as the primary
mechanism. These effects therefore provide some credibility to the effects found earlier.
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Notes: These graphs show the estimated number of yearly log excess publications by moving researchers,
relative to the year of the move. Panel (a) limits the sample to researchers in the natural sciences, namely
researchers in Biology, Chemistry and Pharmacy, Medicine, Physics, and Veterinary Medicine. Panel (b)
limits the sample to researchers in all other fields, such as Business Administration, Philosophy, Theology,
or Social Sciences. Publications are weighted by the number of authors and by the number of follow-
on citations. To arrive at these estimates, we regress the yearly log number (plus one) of author- and
citation- weighted publications by researchers on the appointment lists on an indicator variable equal to
one if the researcher moved (interacted with time dummies), year fixed effects, and appointment list fixed
effects. The dark blue line represents the 90% confidence bands for the estimated coefficients. Standard
errors allow for clustering at the appointment list level. The data stems from the universe of appointment
lists of one large university in Germany between 1950 and 2005. Publication data stems from Scopus.
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3.4.4 Robustness Checks
The impact of moving on academic publications is identified if in the absence of the move,
the publication rates of movers and non-movers would have developed in parallel (parallel
trends assumption). While this assumption is inherently untestable, in this subsection we
provide evidence that it is plausible in the context of this study.
Figure 3.5 shows estimates for time-varying coefficients where instead of using the actual
treatment, we assign a treatment indicator to the highest ranked non-mover who is then
compared to all other non-movers on the same appointment list. The contrast to the
figures showing the actual treatment effects is striking: Besides one single uptick at the
end of the sample period, there is no difference in the yearly publication rates between
higher- and lower-ranked non-movers. This also speaks against the effect being driven
by a mere time trend that is different between higher- and lower-ranked researchers, e.g.,
due to being responsible for a research group at a certain time of a researcher’s career.
If this was the case, we should see increases in the academic productivity of higher- vs.
lower-ranked non-movers. This is not the case.
To quantify these estimates, in Table 3.5 we conduct placebo analyses in the difference-
in-differences framework specified above. In the first column, we repeat the baseline
estimates, again using citation-weighted publications as the dependent variable. Column
(2) then shows the placebo treatment. In line with the identification assumption, the
impact of “moving” is not significantly different from zero. In column (3), we use highest
rank instead of actual move as treatment indicator, essentially estimating an intent-to-
treat effect. While the coefficient estimate is positive, movers are not significantly more
productive than non-movers.14 Column (4) uses the subsample of lists for which the
highest-ranked candidate rejected the offer.15 The point estimate is even larger than
the baseline estimate and is significantly different from zero at the five percent level.
This again casts doubt on the alternative interpretation that first-ranked authors are
14To investigate this further, in Figure C.1 in the Appendix we show that while the time-varying
treatment effects are estimated with more error, the pattern of coefficients is similar to the baseline
pattern. However, the impact only arises around four years after the move, leading to a small coefficient
estimate in the difference-in-differences specification in the table which only relies on the five years before
and after the move.
15Therefore, the control group in this subsample includes the highest ranked candidate on each list.
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Notes: This graph shows the estimated number of yearly log excess publications by highest-ranked non-
moving researchers, relative to the year of the move. Publications are weighted by the number of authors
and by the number of follow-on citations. To arrive at these estimates, we regress the yearly log number
of weighted publications by researchers on the appointment lists (plus one) on an indicator variable equal
to one if the researcher is the highest-ranked non-moving researcher on the appointment list (interacted
with time dummies), year fixed effects, and appointment list fixed effects. The dark blue line represents
the 90% confidence bands for the estimated coefficients. Standard errors allow for clustering at the
appointment list level. The data stems from the universe of appointment lists of one large university in
Germany between 1950 and 2005. Publication data stems from Scopus.
just inherently more productive in expectations than the other researchers on the same
appointment list. It also casts doubt on the explanation that the effect merely stems from
increased access to research funds or higher wages: Usually, declining an offer results from
renegotiation with the origin university. As the highest ranked researcher is part of the
counterfactual in this subsample, this would work against finding an effect. Column (5)
shows that while researchers in medicine are an important and the largest single part of
the sample, the effect is still significantly different from zero when estimated using only
lists in fields other than medicine.
An important question is whether this effect is university-specific or whether it is gener-
ally present. While we cannot exclude that the effect is specific to this university, column
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(6) uses publicly available data from the German magazine “Forschung und Lehre” (FuL)
which regularly provides information on appointment offers and whether they were ac-
cepted or declined. Leveraging on rejected offers by analyzing repeated reports of the
same position, we can estimate the impact of mobility on productivity for a subset of
positions without restricting the sample to one university. The results show that the
effect is similar to our baseline estimates. However, (second-ranked) movers are signifi-
cantly less productive than the (first-ranked) non-movers in this sample, justifying our
stringent data restrictions and stressing the importance of the detailed information about
the appointment lists that make our setup unique.
Table 3.5: Robustness Analyses
Dep. Var.: Ln(Citation-Weighted Publications+1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mover 0.07 0.08 0.17∗∗ -0.17 0.03 -0.38∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.11) (0.07) (0.12) (0.09) (0.11)
Post -0.03 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.05 -0.38∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.07)
Post x Move 0.19∗∗∗ 0.01 0.09 0.30∗∗ 0.11∗ 0.16∗∗
(0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.12) (0.07) (0.07)
Constant 1.87∗∗∗ 1.80∗∗∗ 1.84∗∗∗ 2.00∗∗∗ 1.75∗∗∗ 2.82∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06)
List FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Baseline Non-Movers ITT Rejecters W/o Medicine FuL
Adj R2 0.45 0.48 0.45 0.51 0.50 0.41
Lists 317 317 317 56 196 147
Observations 10000 6440 10000 2070 6180 3400
Notes: This table shows fixed effects regressions on the author-by-year level. The data comprises the
5 years before and 5 years after the appointment. The dependent variable the natural logarithm (plus
one) of author- and citation-weighted publications of authors on the appointment list. In column (2),
we assign the move-indicator to the highest ranked non-mover on each appointment list. In column
(3), we assign the move-indicator to the highest ranked researcher on the sample, irrespective of the
actual move, thus estimating an intent-to-treat effect. In column (4), we use the subset of lists where
the highest ranked researcher did not accept the offer. In column (5), we use the subset of lists which
are not in the field of medicine. In column (6), we use rejected offers which were publicly announced in
the magazine “Forschung und Lehre” (FuL). Move is an indicator if the researcher was appointed (in all
columns but 2), Post is an indicator for the post-move period and the indicator of interest PostxMove
is the interaction for the period after the move of treated authors. In every regression we control for
fixed effects for the appointment list under consideration. Standard errors allowing for clustering on the
appointment list level are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively. The data stems from the universe of appointment lists of one large university in
Germany between 1950 and 2005 in columns (1) through (5) and from FuL in column (6). Publication
data stems from Scopus.
In summary, this table shows that the identification assumption of parallel trends in
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quality-weighted publications between movers and non-movers in the absence of the move
is plausible. It is also indicative that the alternative explanation of increased research
funds is unlikely to be driving the results and that the effect is not restricted to this
university. Overall, moving to a new university seems to increase the number of yearly
citation-weighted publications.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter provides novel results on the question whether labor mobility of scientists
increases their academic productivity. We use data on newly hired university scientists
and their runners-up for the same academic position at a large university in Germany
(Watzinger et al., 2017b). The setup provides important advantages over previous studies
of the same question: All scientists on the appointment lists applied for the same position,
were extensively vetted, and were found acceptable by the hiring committee. The setup
therefore circumvents the inherent problems of finding an appropriate control group in
the presence of self-selection of researchers into moving to other universities (Roy, 1951;
Azoulay et al., 2017; Ganguli, 2015a).
In response to the move, the scientific productivity of movers relative to non-movers on the
same appointment list increases by around 13% as measured by (citation-weighted) pub-
lications. This translates to around 0.5 more author- and citation-weighted publications
per year. The effect is driven by the natural sciences. In contrast to previous findings,
the effect stems from researchers on lists with above-median pre-move academic impact.
It is smaller for researchers applying for full chairs and is not driven by publications
on which the moving researcher is the last author. In line with Catalini (forthcoming)
and Boudreau et al. (forthcoming), the observed increase in productivity points towards
the existence of search costs in knowledge space. The effect is only present for articles
in the top and the bottom third of the citation distribution, not for “average” articles.
Therefore, experimentation costs seem to have decreased as well, similar to the findings
in Catalini (forthcoming) on the impacts of relocating offices at a Paris university.
In a variety of robustness checks, we show that the identification assumption of parallel
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trends in scientific productivity is plausible. For example, leveraging our event-study
approach, we show that there is no differential pre-trend for movers. What is more,
among non-movers, higher rank on the appointment list is unrelated to higher (post-
move) productivity. Finally, the treatment effect is similar (and even slightly larger) for
the subsample where the highest-ranked researcher declined the offer. This result also
speaks against an interpretation where the impact is only generated by increased access
to research funds. The reason is that scientists who decline offers mostly do so after
renegotiation with their home university, which should work against finding any effect.
However, a more thorough investigation into alternative potential mechanisms is still
necessary. The results in this chapter should therefore be regarded as preliminary.
Because researchers move for a reason, the ATT we estimate is likely larger than the
treatment effect for scientists who are not interested in moving to the university. A
more thorough investigation into the transferability of these results is necessary, but left
for future research. Thus, one should keep in mind that the size of our estimates does
not necessarily translate to an average treatment effect of moving among the general
population of scientists.
Yet, the results of this chapter show that scientist mobility may indeed have benefits over
and beyond generating spillovers for other researchers (Watzinger et al., 2017b). This
largely neglected impact of mobility on academic output seems important: The size of
the effects suggests that labor mobility may be a fruitful way to increase scientific pro-
ductivity for researchers. Our estimates are in line with recent findings on the benefits of
(international) scientist mobility for academic productivity (Franzoni et al., 2014; Gan-
guli, 2015a). Finally, these estimates also explain why researchers are willing to face the
substantial costs of moving, even in the absence of market mechanisms which internalize
the spillover effects of scientist mobility.
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Chapter 4
Weak Markets, Strong Teachers:
Recession at Career Start and
Teacher Effectiveness
4.1 Introduction
How do alternative job opportunities affect teacher quality? This is a crucial policy
question as teachers are a key input in the education production function (Hanushek
and Rivkin, 2012) who affect their students’ outcomes even in adulthood (Chetty et al.,
2014b). Despite their importance, individuals entering the teaching profession in the
United States tend to come from the lower part of the cognitive ability distribution of
college graduates (Hanushek and Pace, 1995). One frequently cited reason for not being
able to recruit higher-skilled individuals as teachers is low salaries compared to other
professions (e.g., Dolton and Marcenaro-Gutierrez, 2011; Hanushek et al., 2014).
Existing research provides evidence consistent with the argument that outside options
matter. A first strand of the literature has used regional variation in relative teacher
salaries, finding that pay is positively related to teachers’ academic quality (e.g., Figlio,
1997). A second strand has used long-run changes in the labor market – in particular,
the expansion of job opportunities for women – finding that the academic quality of new
This chapter is based on joint work with Marc Piopiunik and Martin West (Nagler et al., 2015).
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teachers is lower when job market alternatives are better (e.g., Bacolod, 2007). However,
both bodies of evidence suffer from key limitations. First, relative pay may be endogenous
to teacher quality. Second, measures of academic quality are poor predictors of teacher
effectiveness (cf. Jackson et al., 2014). This important policy question therefore remains
unresolved.
We exploit business cycle conditions at career start as a source of exogenous variation
in the outside labor-market options of potential teachers.1 Because the business cycle
conditions at career start are exogenous to teacher quality, our reduced-form estimates
reflect causal effects. In contrast to prior research, we directly measure teacher quality
with value-added measures (VAMs) of impacts on student test scores, a well-validated
measure of teacher effectiveness (e.g., Kane and Staiger 2008; Chetty et al. 2014a,b;
see Jackson et al. 2014 for a review). Combining our novel identification strategy with
VAMs for individual elementary school teachers from a large U.S. state, we provide causal
evidence on the importance of alternative job opportunities for teacher quality.
Our value-added measures are based on individual-level administrative data from the
Florida Department of Education on 33’000 4th- and 5th-grade teachers in Florida’s pub-
lic schools and their students. The data include Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test
(FCAT) math and reading scores for every 3rd-, 4th-, and 5th-grade student tested in
Florida in the 2000-01 through 2008-09 school years. The data also contain information
on teachers’ total experience in teaching (including experience in other states and private
schools), which is used to compute the year of entry into the profession (which is not
directly observed). Following Jackson and Bruegmann (2009), we regress students’ math
and reading test scores separately on their prior-year test scores, student, classroom, and
school characteristics, and grade-by-year fixed effects to estimate each teacher’s value-
added. We then relate the VAMs in math and reading to several business cycle indicators
from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics (BLS).
We find that teachers who entered the profession during recessions are roughly 0.10 stan-
1To our knowledge, the idea that outside labor-market options at career start matter for teacher quality
was first proposed by Murnane and Phillips (1981) in their classic paper on “vintage effects.” Zabalza
(1979) provides early evidence that starting salaries within teaching influence individual decisions to enter
the profession, while Dolton (1990) finds large impacts of teachers’ relative earnings and earnings growth.
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dard deviations (SD) more effective in raising math test scores than teachers who entered
the profession during non-recessionary periods. The effect is half as large for reading
value-added. Quantile regressions indicate that the difference in math value-added be-
tween recession and non-recession entrants is most pronounced at the upper end of the
effectiveness distribution. Based on figures from Chetty et al. (2014b), the difference in
average math effectiveness between recession and non-recession entrants implies a differ-
ence in students’ discounted life-time earnings of around $13’000 per classroom taught
each year.2 Under the more realistic assumption that only 10% of recession-cohort teach-
ers are pushed into teaching because of the recession, these recession-only teachers are
roughly one SD more effective in teaching math than the teachers they push out. Based
on the variation in teacher VAMs in our data, being assigned to such a teacher would
increase a student’s test scores by around 0.20 SD.
Placebo regressions show that neither business cycle conditions in the years before or
after teachers’ career starts, nor those at certain critical ages (e.g., when most students
enter or complete college), impact teacher effectiveness; only conditions at career start
matter. Nor are our results driven by differential attrition among recession and non-
recession cohorts. Although teachers entering during recessions are more likely to exit
the profession, the observed attrition pattern works against our finding and suggests that
our results understate the differences in effectiveness between recession and non-recession
cohorts at career start. The results are also not driven by any single recession cohort,
but appear for most recessions covered by our sample period. Using alternative business
cycle measures such as unemployment levels and changes yields very similar results. The
recession effect is not driven by differences in teacher race, gender, age at career start,
cohort sizes, or school characteristics. Our finding that the effect of recessions on teacher
effectiveness is twice as strong in math as in reading is consistent with evidence that
wage returns to numeracy skills are twice as large as those to literacy skills in the U.S.
labor market (Hanushek et al., 2015). These results are also consistent with the common
finding that students’ reading scores are more difficult to improve than their math scores
2Chetty et al. (2014b) estimate that students who are taught by a teacher with a 1 SD higher value-
added measure at age 12 earn on average 1.3% more at age 28. Assuming a permanent change in earnings
and discounting life-time earnings at 5%, this translates into increases in discounted life-time earnings of
$7’000 per student. We obtain our estimate by multiplying this number by our effect size and average
classroom size.
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(cf. Jackson et al., 2014).
To motivate our analysis, we present a stylized Roy model (Roy, 1951) in which more
high-skilled individuals choose teaching over other professions during recessions because
of lower (expected) earnings in those alternative occupations. The model’s main assump-
tion is that teaching is a relatively stable occupation over the business cycle. This seems
reasonable since teacher demand depends primarily on student enrollment and is typi-
cally unresponsive to short-run changes in macroeconomic conditions (e.g., Berman and
Pfleeger, 1997). We present evidence that supports our interpretation of these results
as supply effects, rather than demand effects or direct impacts of recessions on teacher
effectiveness.3
Consistent with this model, existing studies show that the supply of workers for public
sector jobs in the U.S. is higher during economic downturns (e.g., Krueger, 1988; Bor-
jas, 2002). Falch et al. (2009) document the same pattern for the teaching profession
in Norway. Teach For America, an organization that recruits academically talented col-
lege graduates into teaching, saw a marked decline in the number of qualified applicants
during the recent economic recovery (New York Times, 2015). Meanwhile, several U.S.
states have reported sharp declines in enrollment in university-based teacher preparation
programs as the job market has improved (National Public Radio, 2015).
Our results have important policy implications. First, they suggest that increasing the
economic benefits of becoming a teacher may be an effective strategy to increase the qual-
ity of the teaching workforce. In contrast to de Ree et al. (forthcoming), who find that
unconditional increases in teacher pay for incumbent teachers do not improve student
achievement, our results suggest that selection into teaching is affected by changes in eco-
nomic benefits. This is in line with field-experimental evidence from developing countries:
For example, Ashraf et al. (2016) find that selecting individuals who care about career
incentives rather than those who are intrinsically motivated leads to better outcomes in
3Figure 4.1 confirms that employment in the private sector is much more cyclical than employment in
(state and local) education. The major exception is the recession period of 1980-1982, but our results for
this recession differ from and work against our main findings. Kopelman and Rosen (2016) report higher
job security for public sector jobs (including teaching) than for jobs in the private sector. Consistently,
newspapers have reported that teaching is recession-proof. During the most recent recession, job security
for teachers did decline substantially (e.g., New York Times, 2010). This last downturn does not drive
our results.
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public service delivery. Second, our results also suggest that recessions may provide a
window of opportunity for the public sector to hire more able applicants. Finally, they
also suggest that recent improvements in cognitive skills among new teachers in the U.S.
documented by Goldhaber and Walch (2013) may be attributable to the 2008-09 financial
crisis, rather than an authentic reversal of long-term trends.
We extend previous research that has called attention to the potential importance of out-
side job options for teacher quality. Most recently, Britton and Propper (2016) exploit
centralized wage regulation that generates regional variation in teachers’ relative wages
in England to document positive effects of relative teacher pay on school productivity.4
However, their school-level data do not allow them to disentangle selection into the teach-
ing profession from the sorting of teachers into specific schools and potential differences in
teacher effort due to efficiency wage effects. Bacolod (2007) documents a decrease in the
academic quality (as measured by standardized test scores and undergraduate institution
selectivity) of female teachers in the U.S. over time that coincided with improvements in
women’s outside options.5 In comparison with her study, we use a more rigorous iden-
tification strategy and direct measures of teachers’ performance on the job. Our study
is therefore the first to document a causal effect of outside labor-market options on the
effectiveness of entering teachers in raising student test scores.
Business cycle fluctuations have previously been exploited as a strategy to identify se-
lection effects in the labor market. Oyer (2008), for example, studies the impact of the
business cycle on the likelihood that MBA graduates enter the banking sector.6 Boehm
and Watzinger (2015) show that PhD economists graduating during recessions are more
productive in academia, a finding best explained by a Roy-style model. While these stud-
ies enhance the plausibility of our findings, they relate to rather small groups in the labor
market with highly specialized skills. Teachers, in contrast, make up roughly 3 percent
of full-time workers in the U.S. and play a critical role in developing the human capital
of future generations. Moreover, little is known about how to improve the quality of the
4Loeb and Page (2000) similarly relate regional variation in relative teacher wages and unemployment
rates to rates of educational attainment but also lack direct measures of teacher quality.
5Corcoran et al. (2004), Hoxby and Leigh (2004), and Lakdawalla (2006) provide additional evidence
of the importance of outside job options for the supply of American teachers.
6A small literature also documents persistent negative wage effects of completing college during a
recession (e.g., Kahn, 2010; Oreopoulos et al., 2012).
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teaching workforce. Thus, extending this identification strategy to teacher quality fills an
important gap in the literature.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 presents a simple model of occupational
choice. Section 4.3 briefly describes the teaching profession in Florida, introduces the
data, explains our value-added measures, and presents our empirical model. Section 4.4
reports results on the relationship between business cycle conditions at career start and
teacher effectiveness in math and reading and provides robustness checks. Section 4.5
discusses potential implications for policymakers. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 A Simple Model of Occupational Choice
To motivate our analysis, we present a simple Roy-style model of self-selection (Roy, 1951)
where individuals choose an occupation to maximize (expected) earnings.7 Specifically,
individuals can choose between working in the teaching sector (t) and working in the
business sector (b), which represents all outside labor-market options of potential teachers.
Earnings depend on average earnings in the respective sector, µ, and the individual’s
ability, v. Hence, earnings in the two sectors for any individual with ability v can be
written as follows:
wt = µt + ηtv
wb = µb + v − s
where wt and wb are earnings in the teaching and business sector, respectively; v is
the (uni-dimensional) ability of the individual, distributed with mean zero and standard
deviation σ2v ; and ηt denotes the relative returns to ability in teaching versus business. If
ability is valued both in business and teaching, but teaching has lower returns to ability,
then ηt ∈ (0, 1).8 If there are no returns to ability in teaching, then ηt = 0.9
7Individuals may, of course, be motivated by other concerns than earnings. One can therefore think
of earnings as a proxy for lifetime utility.
8Wages are more compressed in the government-dominated teaching profession than in the business
sector (cf. Hoxby and Leigh, 2004; Dolton, 2006).
9Since our model only uses one dimension of ability, we implicitly assume that the two abilities typically
used in Roy models are positively correlated (i.e., ηt ≥ 0). We make this assumption for expositional
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The term s (≥ 0) represents the reduction in (expected) earnings in the business sector
relative to the reduction in earnings in the teaching sector (which is normalized to zero)
during recessions. The model thus allows for recessions to affect earnings in the teaching
profession, but assumes that the impact is stronger in the business sector. Empirically,
employment in the teaching sector is less cyclical than employment in the business sector
(see Figure 4.1; see also Berman and Pfleeger 1997; Simpkins et al. 2012).
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indicated sector are seasonally adjusted. Semiannual frequency, indexed to 100 in second half of 2007,
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Individuals choose teaching if wt > wb, which is equivalent to v < µt−µb+s1−ηt . Hence, the
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where F (·) is the cumulative distribution function of individuals’ ability v, which is con-
clarity only, but note that it has empirical support. For example, Chingos and West (2012) show that,
among 35,000 teachers leaving Florida public schools for other industries, a 1 SD increase in teacher
value-added is associated with 6–8 percent higher earnings in non-teaching jobs.
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tinuously distributed over R. If 0 ≤ ηt < 1, recessions increase the supply and (average)
quality of potential teachers. When a recession hits the economy (increasing s), the share
of individuals seeking employment in the teaching sector increases because the earnings









1− ηt > 0.
The average ability of individuals seeking employment in teaching increases because in-





10 We expect our empirical analysis to be consistent with this prediction as
the underlying assumptions (i.e., ηt ∈ (0, 1) and s ≥ 0) have strong empirical support. If
ηt > 1, we would expect to find negative effects of recessions on teacher quality.
Empirically, we analyze the importance of outside labor-market options for teacher qual-
ity. In our model, changes in labor-market opportunities are modeled as changes in
expected earnings. Both employment probability and relative earnings likely change in
favor of the teaching profession during recessions, but we cannot discriminate between
these two channels in our empirical analysis. If the model’s assumptions hold, however,
our estimates shed light on whether increasing teacher pay would increase teacher quality.
While our simple model only addresses the supply of teachers, fluctuations in demand
could in theory also explain changes in teacher quality over the business cycle. Fluctua-
tions in demand would lead to higher quality of teachers entering during recessions if the
following two conditions hold. First, school authorities are able to assess the quality of
inexperienced applicants and accordingly hire the more able ones. Second, the number
of hired teachers is smaller during recessions than during booms. If either of these two
conditions does not hold, fluctuations in demand would not cause recession teachers to be
more effective than non-recession teachers. We return to this issue after presenting our
main results.
10Marginal individuals, indifferent between working in the teaching sector and working in the business
sector, are characterized by vmarg = µt−µb+s(1−ηt) .
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4.3 Setting, Data, and Empirical Strategy
First, we document the feasibility of a short-run response in teacher supply to fluctuations
in economic conditions by providing information on the pool of potential teachers nation-
ally and describing the requirements for entry into the teaching profession in Florida.
Second, we introduce the data and describe our empirical strategy. We use variation in
career start years to analyze the impact of outside labor-market opportunities on the se-
lection into teaching. We estimate the career start year by subtracting total experience in
teaching from the year in which we observe the teacher. Third, we describe our empirical
strategy, including the construction of our value-added measures of teacher effectiveness.
4.3.1 Supply of Potential Teachers in Florida
Nationally, the number of individuals completing teacher education programs each year
has been roughly double the number of newly hired teachers since at least 1987, when
the earliest comprehensive data are available (Cowan et al., 2016). This implies that, at
any point in time, there is a large pool of potential teachers nationally who are eligible to
obtain certification immediately, regardless of the rigidity of state certification regimes.
It also suggests that, for many potential teachers, the key decision about whether or not
to enter the profession occurs when they enter the labor market rather than when they
choose a degree program.
Contrary to the national data, the demand for new teachers in Florida has exceeded the
supply of new graduates from in-state preparation programs since at least the 1980s due to
growth in the student population and, since 2003, a statewide class-size reduction mandate
(Moe, 2006). In response to this pressure, state policymakers have consistently sought
to recruit teachers from outside Florida. For example, a 1983 law required the Florida
Department of Education to create a teacher referral and recruitment center to pursue
strategies such as advertising teaching positions in states with declining enrollments and
in major newspapers and establishing a national toll-free number to handle inquiries
from prospective teachers (Florida Department of Education, 1986). In the 1980s, the
state estimated that as many as 45 percent of new teachers in Florida had completed
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their preparation program in another state. Similarly, the U.S. Department of Education
(2013) indicates that 23 percent of individuals receiving their initial Florida teaching
credential in 2009 were prepared out-of-state. In our data, 19% of teachers report having
teaching experience in other states, providing a lower bound on the number who prepared
elsewhere. These statistics highlight the extent to which the pool of potential teachers for
Florida public schools is national in scope and therefore apt to be influenced by national
rather than state-specific economic conditions.
Temporary fluctuations in economic conditions are also more likely to influence selection
into teaching when certification regimes permit as many individuals as possible to enter
the profession without completing additional training. Traditionally, American states re-
quired potential teachers to complete an undergraduate or master’s degree teacher prepa-
ration program in order to be certified to teach. Although in practice individuals without
certification were often granted emergency credentials, these certification requirements
likely constrained any short-term supply response. In recent decades, however, shortages
of certified teachers in specific subject areas led many states to create alternative entry
routes that allow college graduates who have not completed a traditional preparation
program to begin teaching immediately while completing the remaining requirements for
professional certification. As of 2011, 45 states had approved an alternative certifica-
tion program and individuals completing these programs comprised roughly 20 percent of
all individuals completing teacher preparation programs nationwide (U.S. Department of
Education, 2013).
Florida’s certification regime is typical of those states that have created alternative entry
routes into teaching. The state initially awards professional teaching certificates only
to graduates of state-approved teacher preparation programs who have passed tests of
general knowledge, professional education, and the subject area in which they will teach.11
However, college graduates who have not completed a teacher preparation program are
eligible for a temporary certificate if they majored or completed a specified set of courses
in the relevant subject area. They may also become eligible for a temporary certificate by
passing a test of subject-matter knowledge. Individuals with a temporary certificate may
11Florida also recognizes professional certificates in comparable subject areas granted by other states
and by the National Board of Professional Teaching Standards.
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then teach for up to three years while completing 15 credit hours of education courses and
a school-based competency demonstration program. These arrangements allow any college
graduate to enter the teaching profession in Florida (at least temporarily) in response to
labor market conditions by passing a single exam.
Florida first authorized alternative certification for teachers in all grades and subject
areas in 1997 and, since the 2002-03 school year, has required that each school district in
the state offer its own alternative certification program (Moe, 2006). However, the state
permitted school districts to hire teachers on temporary certificates for up to two years
even before creating a formal alternative route and, until 1988, allowed the same individual
to receive a temporary certificate multiple times (Florida Department of Education, 1986).
The extent to which certification requirements may have constrained the supply response
to labor market conditions among college graduates in the state prior to that period is
therefore unclear.
4.3.2 Administrative Data from the State of Florida
Teacher value-added measures are based on administrative data from the Florida Depart-
ment of Education’s K–20 Education Data Warehouse (EDW). Our EDW data include
observations of every student in Florida who took the state test in the 2000–01 through
2008–09 school years, with each student linked to his or her courses (and corresponding
teachers). We focus on scores on the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test (FCAT),
the state accountability system’s “high-stakes” exam. Beginning in 2001, (only) students
in grades 3–10 were tested each year in math and reading. Thus annual gain scores can
be calculated for virtually all students in grades 4–10 starting in 2002. The data include
information on the demographic and educational characteristics of each student, including
gender, race, free or reduced price lunch eligibility, limited English proficiency status, and
special education status.
The EDW data also contain detailed information on individual teachers, including their
demographic characteristics and teaching experience. We use only 4th- and 5th-grade
teachers because these teachers typically teach all subjects, thus avoiding spillover effects
from other teachers. We construct a dataset that connects teachers and their students
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in each school year through course enrollment data. Our teacher experience variable
reflects the total number of years the teacher has spent in the profession, including both
public and private schools in Florida and other states. Because the experience variable
contains a few inconsistencies, we assume the latest observed experience value is correct,
and adjust all other values accordingly. Year of career start is defined as the calendar
year at the end of the school year a teacher is observed in the data minus total years of
teaching experience.12 Starting from the baseline dataset that contains all 4th- and 5th-
grade students with current and lagged test scores, we apply several restrictions to keep
only those teachers who can be confidently associated with students’ annual test score
gains. We only keep student-teacher pairs if the teacher accounts for at least 80% of the
student’s total instruction time (deleting 24.5% of students from the baseline dataset).
We exclude classrooms that have fewer than seven students with current and lagged
scores in the relevant subject and classrooms with more than 50 students (deleting 1.8%
of students). We also drop classrooms where more than 50% of students receive special
education (deleting 1.5% of students). We further exclude classrooms where more than
10% of students are coded as attending a different school than the majority of students
in the classroom (deleting 0.7%). Finally, we drop classrooms for which the teacher’s
experience is missing (deleting 1.8% of students). Our final dataset contains roughly
33’000 public school teachers with VAMs for math and reading.
Our main indicator for the U.S. business cycle is a dummy variable reflecting recessions as
defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). Recession start and end
dates are determined by NBER’s Business Cycle Dating Committee based on real GDP,
employment, and real income. The NBER does not use a stringent, quantitative definition
of a recession, but rather a qualitative one, defining a recession as “a period between a
peak and a trough” (see http://www.nber.org/cycles/recessions.html). For example, the
NBER dates the economic downturn of the early 1990s to have occurred between July
1990 (peak) and March 1991 (trough). We code our recession indicator variable to be one
in 1990 (the beginning of the recession), and zero in 1991. Accordingly, teachers starting
their careers in the 1990-91 school year are classified as having entered during a recession.
12We adjust career start dates for gaps in teaching observed after 2002, when we directly observe
whether a teacher is working in Florida public schools each year. Results are very similar when using the
original, uncorrected values.
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In robustness checks, we use alternative business cycle indicators such as unemployment
for college graduates (in levels and annual changes, nationwide and in Florida), overall
unemployment for specific industries, and GDP, which come from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics and the Bureau of Economic Analysis. NBER’s recession indicator is highly
correlated with unemployment rates (both levels and annual changes) and GDP.
4.3.3 Empirical Strategy
This section describes the estimation of teachers’ value-added and our strategy for
analyzing the relationship between business cycle conditions at career start and teacher
value-added.
Estimating Teacher Value-Added
Teacher value-added measures (VAMs) aim to gauge the impact of teachers on their stu-
dents’ test scores. We estimate VAMs for 4th- and 5th-grade teachers based on students’
test scores in math and reading from grades 3–5.13 To estimate the value-added for
each teacher, we regress students’ math and reading test scores separately on their prior-
year test scores, student, classroom, and school characteristics as well as grade-by-year
fixed effects. Student-level controls include dummy variables for race, gender, free- and
reduced-price lunch eligibility, limited English proficiency, and special-education status.
Classroom controls include all student-level controls aggregated to the class level and class
size. School-level controls include enrollment, urbanicity, and the school-specific shares of
students who are black, white, Hispanic, and free- and reduced-price lunch eligible.
To obtain an estimate of each teacher’s value-added, we add a dummy variable, θj, for
each teacher:
Aijgst = α̂Ai,t−1 + βXit + γCit + λSit + pigt + θj + ijgst
13Note that student testing in Florida starts in grade 3 only.
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where Aijgst is the test score of student i with teacher j in grade g in school s in year
t (standardized by grade and year to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of
one); Ai,t−1 contains the student’s prior-year test score in the same subject; Xit, Cit, and
Sit are student-, classroom-, and school-level characteristics; pigt are grade-by-year fixed
effects; and ijgst is a mean-zero error term. After estimating the teacher VAMs, θj, we
standardize them separately for math and reading to have a mean of zero and a standard
deviation of one.14
Since test scores suffer from measurement error, the coefficient on the lagged test score
variable, Ai,t−1, is likely downward biased, which would bias the coefficients on other
control variables correlated with lagged test scores. We therefore follow Jackson and
Bruegmann (2009) and use α̂, which is the coefficient on the lagged test scores from a
two-stage-least-squares model where the second lag of test scores is used as an instrument
for the lagged test scores (see the web appendix of Jackson and Bruegmann (2009) for
details). Because this procedure requires two lags of test scores, the estimation of α̂ is
based on 5th-grade students only (students were not tested in grade 2).
Although widely used by researchers, the reliability of value-added models of teacher
effectiveness based on observational data continues to be debated (see, e.g., Jackson et al.,
2014; Rothstein, 2017). The key issue is whether non-random sorting of students and
teachers both across and within schools biases the estimated teacher effectiveness. This
would be the case if there were systematic differences in the unobserved characteristics
of students assigned to different teachers that are not captured by the available control
variables.15
Value-added models have survived a variety of validity tests, however. Most importantly,
estimates of teacher effectiveness from observational data replicate VAMs obtained from
experiments where students within the same school were randomly assigned to teachers
14To simplify notation, we drop the subscripts j, g, and s for the lagged test score and for the student-,
classroom-, and school-level characteristics. We control for school characteristics rather than include
school fixed effects because the latter would eliminate any true variation in teacher effectiveness across
schools. However, we show below that our results are robust to the inclusion of both school and school-
by-year fixed effects (Table D.2 in appendix D). We include grade-by-year fixed effects because test scores
have been standardized using the full sample of students and because teachers are not observed in all
years.
15For a more general discussion on the assumptions behind value-added models, see Todd and Wolpin
(2003).
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(Kane and Staiger, 2008; Kane et al., 2013). Chetty et al. (2014a) and Bacher-Hicks et al.
(2014) exploit quasi-random variation from teachers switching schools to provide evidence
that VAMs accurately capture differences in the causal impacts of teachers across schools.
Using a different administrative data set, Rothstein (2017) argues that evidence on school
switchers does not rule out the possibility of bias.
Even if our VAMs were biased by non-random sorting of students and teachers, however,
it is unclear whether and, if so, in what direction this would bias our estimates of the
relationship between recessions at career start and teacher effectiveness.
Finally, some critics argue that value-added measures may reflect teaching to the test
rather than true improvements in knowledge. In a seminal study, Chetty et al. (2014b)
find that having been assigned to higher value-added teachers increases later earnings
and the likelihood of attending college and decreases the likelihood of teenage pregnancy
for girls. Of course, there may be other dimensions of teacher quality not captured by
VAMs (e.g., Jackson, 2012). The weight of the evidence, however, indicates that teacher
value-added measures do reflect important aspects of teacher quality.
Business Cycle Conditions at Career Start and Teacher Value-Added
To estimate the effect of business cycle conditions at career start on teacher effective-
ness, we relate the macroeconomic conditions in the U.S. during the career start year
to a teacher’s value-added in math and reading. Specifically, we estimate the following
reduced-form model:
θ̂j = α + γRecjs + βXj + uj
where θ̂j is the value-added of teacher j (either in math or in reading). Recjs is a bi-
nary indicator that equals 1 if teacher j started working in the teaching profession (in
year s) in a recessionary period and equals 0 otherwise. The vector Xj includes teacher
characteristics. Most importantly, it contains total experience in the teaching profession
(yearly dummies up to 30 years of experience), which is not accounted for in the VAM
computation but has been shown to influence teacher effectiveness (Papay and Kraft,
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2015).16 As experience differs between recession and non-recession teachers – due in part
to the idiosyncratic distance between recessions and the time period covered by our ad-
ministrative data – experience is a necessary control. Additional teacher characteristics
included in some specifications are year of birth, age at career start, educational degree,
gender, and race. Note that these teacher characteristics do not influence the business
cycle. The reduced-form estimate γ (controlling only for experience) therefore identifies a
causal effect. To the extent that the inclusion of additional controls changes the estimate
of γ, they represent mechanisms rather than confounders. Because the source of variation
is the yearly business cycle condition, we always adjust standard errors for clustering at
the level of the career start year.
Based on our Roy model, we expect to find a positive effect of recessions at career start
on teacher effectiveness since recessions negatively shock the outside options of potential
teachers. Due to this shock, both the number and the average quality of applicants
increases, leading to higher average value-added in recession cohorts. Since we do not
observe the intermediate steps (e.g., application rates or earnings), we estimate a reduced-
form relationship between teacher value-added and business cycle conditions at career
start.
Critics of this model might argue that teacher effectiveness is unrelated to productivity in
other occupations, but rather depends on intrinsic motivation. This should work against
any positive effect of recessions on teacher value-added. At the margin, recession-only
teachers should be less intrinsically motivated as they enter the teaching profession be-
cause of low outside options. Evidence of a positive effect would therefore also suggest
that intrinsic motivation is of second-order importance relative to the effects of economic
benefits through selection on ability (cf. Ashraf et al., 2016). Note also that because the
effectiveness of all teachers in our sample is estimated during the same period (2001-2009),
systematic differences in the effort levels of recession and non-recession teachers due to
differences in the (policy or economic) environment seem unlikely.
16Previous work has shown that teacher experience affects teacher value-added non-linearly (e.g., Rock-
off, 2004). Wiswall (2013) shows that non-parametric specifications yield the most convincing results.
Our results are robust to using teachers with above 20 or 25 years of experience as the omitted category.
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4.4 Business Cycle Conditions at Career Start and
Teacher Effectiveness
We start by documenting differences in math and reading effectiveness between recession
and non-recession teachers. Using kernel density plots and quantile regressions, we show
at which parts of the effectiveness distribution recession and non-recession teachers differ.
In placebo regressions, we show that teacher effectiveness is not associated with business
cycle conditions several years before and after career start or with business cycle conditions
at certain critical ages of teachers. We also show that our results are robust to using
alternative business cycle indicators or alternative value-added measures and are not
driven by any single recession. Finally, we provide evidence that our results are not
driven by differential attrition of recession and non-recession teachers.
4.4.1 Teachers from Recession Entry Cohorts are More Effective
in the Classroom
We first present summary statistics separately for recession teachers and the much larger
group of non-recession teachers (Table 4.1). The unemployment level of college graduates
was higher when recession teachers started their careers. Similarly, unemployment was ris-
ing for recession teachers, but slightly falling for non-recession teachers. These differences
are significant at the one percent level. The share of male teachers is approximately the
same in both samples. Among recession teachers, the share of teachers with a Master’s or
PhD degree is slightly larger and the share of white teachers somewhat smaller. Because
recession teachers started around three school years earlier than non-recession teachers
on average, recession teachers also have more teaching experience. The two groups teach
similar types of students as measured by the share of students who are black and by the
share of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch. Although none of the teacher
characteristics differ significantly, recession teachers have on average 0.08 SD higher math
value-added and 0.05 SD higher reading value-added than non-recession teachers.
After documenting the raw gap in math value-added between recession and non-recession
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics by Recession Status at Career Start
Recession Non-recession Diff. p-Value
Unemp. (college) 2.93 2.24 0.69 0.00
Unemp. change (college) 0.91 -0.12 1.03 0.00
Male 0.12 0.13 -0.01 0.46
Master’s or PhD 0.41 0.38 0.03 0.28
White 0.71 0.76 -0.05 0.39
Black 0.15 0.14 0.01 0.15
Hispanic 0.12 0.09 0.03 0.48
Experience 11.06 8.67 2.39 0.62
Career start 1993.98 1996.97 -2.99 0.54
Age at career start 31.26 31.47 -0.21 0.79
Year of birth 1962.72 1965.50 -2.78 0.51
% black (school) 0.25 0.24 0.01 0.55
% free/red. lunch (school) 0.57 0.55 0.02 0.44
VAM (math) 0.07 -0.01 0.08 0.05
VAM (reading) 0.04 -0.01 0.05 0.45
Obs. 5’188 27’946
Notes: Recession status at career start based on NBER business cycle dates. T-tests
adjust for clustering of observations by career start year. Unemployment rates of college
graduates only available after 1969 (5’176 and 27’414 observations, respectively); VAM
(math) only available for 5’172 and 27’769 observations, respectively. Unemployment
data is from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Teacher and student data stems from the
Florida Department of Education.
teachers (see also column 1 in Table 4.2), we add several teacher characteristics (Table 4.2).
Due to the idiosyncratic distance between recessions and our sample period, experience is
a necessary control. We therefore refer to column (2) as our preferred specification. The
value-added gap increases to 0.11 SD when dummies for teaching experience are included
(column 2).17 Adding year of birth and age at career start has little effect on the coefficient
on the recession indicator (column 3). Further controlling for teacher characteristics such
as whether the teacher holds a Master’s or PhD degree, and whether the teacher is male
or white, also does not affect our coefficient of interest.18 The specification with all
control variables indicates that recession teachers are 0.10 SD more effective in teaching
math than non-recession teachers. Since all control variables except experience represent
17The coefficient on the recession indicator increases because recession teachers are overrepresented
among rookie teachers and the first years of teaching experience improve effectiveness the most.
18Differences in the placement of recession and non-recession teachers represent another potential mech-
anism through which recessions could impact productivity (cf. Oyer, 2006). However, controlling for
important student characteristics at the school level, such as the share of black students and the share of
students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch, does not explain the value-added difference (results not
shown).
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potential mechanisms rather than confounders, we omit them in all regressions below.
Table 4.2: Recession at Career Start and Teacher Math Effectiveness
Dependent variable: VAM in math
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Recession 0.081** 0.110*** 0.105*** 0.100***
(0.040) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Year of birth -0.015*** -0.014***
(0.005) (0.005)
Age at career start -0.020*** -0.019***
(0.005) (0.004)






Experience dummies no yes yes yes
Clusters (career start years) 60 60 60 60
Obs. (teachers) 32941 32941 32941 32941
R2 0.001 0.022 0.024 0.026
Notes: Regressions of VAM in math on NBER recession indicator at career start.
Experience controls include yearly experience dummies up to 30 years. Teacher and
student data stems from the Florida Department of Education. Standard errors in
parentheses adjusted for clustering at the career start year level. Significance levels:
*** p< 1%, ** p< 5%, * p< 10%.
The simple Roy model predicts selection effects due to changing outside labor-market
options over the business cycle. Because research indicates that earnings returns are
twice as large for numeracy than for literacy skills in the U.S. labor market (Hanushek
et al., 2015), we expect selection effects over the business cycle to be weaker for reading
effectiveness than for math effectiveness. The effects on teachers’ reading value-added
are indeed similar to, but weaker than in math (Table 4.3). However, these results are
also consistent with the common finding that students’ reading scores are more difficult
to improve than their math scores (Jackson et al., 2014, cf.).The bivariate relationship
between recession at career start and teacher effectiveness is positive, but statistically
insignificant (column 1). As in math, controlling for teaching experience increases the
coefficient on the recession indicator; the estimate also becomes significant at the one
percent level (column 2). Adding the other teacher characteristics reduces the coefficient
of interest only slightly. In terms of magnitude, the recession indicator for reading is
half as large as the coefficient for math (around 0.05 SD). As selection effects among
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potential teachers should be stronger with respect to math skills, we focus on teachers’
math effectiveness in the remaining analyses.19
Table 4.3: Recession at Career Start and Teacher Reading Effectiveness
Dependent variable: VAM in reading
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Recession 0.048 0.051*** 0.047*** 0.044***
(0.064) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014)
Year of birth -0.010** -0.010**
(0.004) (0.004)
Age at career start -0.012*** -0.012***
(0.004) (0.004)






Experience dummies no yes yes yes
Clusters (career start years) 60 60 60 60
Obs. (teachers) 33134 33134 33134 33134
R2 0.000 0.026 0.027 0.030
Notes: Regressions of VAM in reading on NBER recession indicator at career start.
Experience controls include yearly experience dummies up to 30 years. Teacher and
student data stems from the Florida Department of Education. Standard errors in
parentheses adjusted for clustering at the career start year level. Significance lev-
els: *** p< 1%, ** p< 5%, * p< 10%
While Table 4.2 indicates that recession teachers are on average more effective in raising
students’ math test scores than non-recession teachers, it is unclear whether this effect
is driven by the presence of fewer ineffective teachers or more highly effective teachers in
recession cohorts. To analyze the recession impact across the distribution of math value-
added, we estimate kernel density plots and quantile regressions. The kernel density plots
of teachers’ (experience-adjusted) math value-added reveal a clear rightward shift in the
math value-added distribution for recession cohorts (Figure 4.2).20 In quantile regressions
that control for experience, we analyze this finding further (Figure 4.3 and Table D.1 in
appendix D). While teachers at the very low tail of the value-added distribution have very
similar VAMs, recession teachers are more effective than non-recession teachers from the
19The results of the following analyses show the same overall pattern for teachers’ reading effectiveness,
but are less pronounced and more volatile than the results for math. All results are available on request.
20Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests indicate that the distributions are statistically significantly different at
the one percent level.
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Experience−Adjusted VAM in Math
No Recession Recession
Notes: Kernel density estimates of VAM in math (controlling for yearly experience dummies up to 30
years), by recession cohort status. Excludes teachers with experience-adjusted |V AM | > 2.5 for better
visibility (805 of 32’941 teachers dropped). VAMs normalized to have mean 0 and standard deviation
1 among all teachers. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov-test shows the distributions are statistically significantly
different (p < 0.01).
10th percentile onwards. The largest difference between the distributions appears among
highly effective teachers, with point estimates of differences peaking at 0.20 SD in the
upper end of the distribution.
In Table 4.4, we run our preferred specification on subsamples to assess whether recessions
have differential impacts across various groups of teachers. Male teachers seem to be more
affected than female teachers (columns 1 and 2) which may suggest that the career options
of men are more strongly influenced by recessions than those of women. In columns (3)
and (4), we find similar recession impacts for teachers with and without a Master’s or
PhD degree. In line with existing research (Jones and Schmitt, 2014; Hoynes et al.,
2012), columns (5) and (6) provide indirect evidence that minorities are more affected by
recessions than whites. Finally, columns (7) and (8) indicate that teachers starting their
teaching careers at a relatively high age (above median) are more affected than those
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0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Quantile
Quantile Regression Coefficients 95% Conf. Bounds
Notes: Coefficients (and 95% confidence bounds) from separate quantile regressions of VAM in math
(controlling for yearly experience dummies up to 30 years) on NBER recession indicator at career start
at different quantiles. Dashed grey line: OLS estimate from Table 4.2, column (2). Teacher and student
data stems from the Florida Department of Education. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the
career start year level.
starting at younger ages. This may suggest that the decisions of mid-career entrants to
the teaching profession are more strongly influenced by the outside labor market.
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4.4.2 Placebo Analyses Support the Identification Assumption
We assume that it is the business cycle condition at the point in time when individuals
enter the teaching profession that matters for their effectiveness. If this is true, then the
economic conditions several years before or after career start should be irrelevant. To
test this hypothesis, we run placebo regressions where we include recession indicators for
the years before or after career start with lags and leads of up to three years. Adding
these recession indicators to the main model does not change our coefficient of interest
(columns 2 and 3 in Table 4.5). Furthermore, the estimated effects of the business cy-
cle conditions in the years before or after our preferred year are all close to zero and
statistically insignificant.21
One might worry that our career start year measure captures the effect of macroeconomic
conditions at key ages (Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2014). For example, many individuals
may decide to become teachers when entering college (around age 18) or upon completing
their undergraduate or graduate studies (between ages 22 to 24). Therefore, we include
recession indicators at ages 18-32 (in two-year steps) to confirm that it is the economic
conditions at career start that affect teaching quality. As before, all coefficients on the
indicators of recessions at specific ages are close to zero and statistically insignificant
(column 4).
4.4.3 Further Robustness Checks
Since the number of recession cohorts is limited, one might worry that our result is driven
by only one or two recessions. To investigate this issue, we include a separate binary
indicator for each recession (Table 4.6).22 Column (1) indicates that teachers in most
recessions (except in recession years 1974; and 1980–82, a highly atypical recession as the
demand for teachers decreased, see Figure 4.1) have higher math value-added than the
average non-recession teacher. In column (2), we combine the separate recession indicators
for the adjacent recession years of 1980, 1981, and 1982 and find that teachers who started
21Similarly, using each of these other recession indicators individually instead of our main recession
indicator also yields small and mostly statistically insignificant coefficients.
22Because there are fewer than 20 teachers per cohort who started teaching before 1962, we exclude
these cohorts for this analysis since estimates are less reliable for very small cohorts.
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Table 4.5: Placebo Analyses: Recession at Different Points in Life and Teacher Math
Effectiveness
Dependent variable: VAM in math
Recession at: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Career start 0.110*** 0.110*** 0.101*** 0.104***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022)
Career start -1 yr. 0.009
(0.029)
Career start -2 yrs. -0.006
(0.020)
Career start -3 yrs. 0.003
(0.025)
Career start +1 yr. 0.035
(0.022)
Career start +2 yrs. -0.011
(0.021)


















Clusters (career start years) 60 60 60 60
Obs. (teachers) 32941 32941 32941 30038
R2 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.020
Notes: Regressions of teacher VAM in math on NBER recession indicator (con-
trolling for yearly experience dummies up to 30 years) at different points in time.
Teacher and student data stems from the Florida Department of Education. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses adjusted for clustering at the career start year level.
Significance levels: *** p< 1%, ** p< 5%, * p< 10%
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Table 4.6: Recession at Career Start and Teacher Math Effectiveness (Single Recessions)
Dependent variable: VAM in math
Recession year (career start) (1) (2) (3)
1970 0.102*** 0.102*** 0.080**
(0.029) (0.029) (0.036)
1974 0.020 0.020 0.009
(0.020) (0.020) (0.025)






1990 0.076*** 0.076*** 0.092***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.009)
2001 0.138*** 0.138*** 0.124***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.023)
2008 0.264*** 0.264*** 0.230***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.049)
Included cohorts: +/- 2 years
all all around recessions
Clusters (career start years) 48 48 28
Obs. (teachers) 32897 32897 19144
R2 0.023 0.023 0.023
Notes: Regressions of VAM in math (controlling for yearly experience dummies
up to 30 years) on seperate dummies for cohorts starting during each NBER re-
cession (recession cohorts). Excludes observations with fewer than 20 teachers;
mean teacher cohort size is 1’292. In columns (2) and (3), cohorts entering in 1980
through 1982 are combined. Teacher and student data stems from the Florida De-
partment of Education. Standard errors in parentheses adjusted for clustering at
the career start year level. Significance levels: *** p< 1%, ** p< 5%, * p< 10%
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during those years are on average as effective as the average non-recession teacher. In
column (3), we only keep two non-recession cohorts immediately before and immediately
after each recession, such that the cohorts being compared are more similar. This leads
to the same finding: most recessions have positive effects on teacher effectiveness. The
recession impact is not driven by any single recession.
Table 4.7: Recession at Career Start and Teacher Math Effectiveness (Subsamples)
Dependent variable: VAM in math
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Recession 0.110*** 0.018 0.149*** 0.185*** 0.140***
(0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.033) (0.022)
Subsample: Baseline Pre-1990 Post-1990 Full teacher No exp. in
cohorts cohorts career observed other state
Clusters (Car. start yrs.) 60 40 20 9 58
Obs. (Teachers) 32941 7303 25638 15731 26709
R2 0.022 0.003 0.025 0.028 0.028
Notes: Regressions of VAM in math (controlling for yearly experience dummies up to 30 years) on re-
cession indicator at career start. In column (1), the recession indicator only takes the value of one for
the recessions before 1990. In column (2), the recession indicator takes the value of one for the reces-
sions since 1990, including 1990. Columns (3) and (4) use our preferred recession indicator and use
subsamples as indicated in the text. Teacher and student data stems from the Florida Department of
Education. Standard errors in parentheses adjusted for clustering at the career start year level. Signif-
icance levels: *** p< 1%, ** p< 5%, * p< 10%
In our main analyses, we use the variation in business cycles across teacher cohorts that
started their careers many years before our sample period begins. To assess whether recent
recessions matter more for current teacher quality than distant recessions, in Table 4.7
we present estimates of the impact of a recession at career start on teacher value-added
separately for recent and distant teacher cohorts. Columns (2) and (3) show that the
impact of recent recessions is higher than the baseline estimate and that the impact
of distant recessions is small and not significant. This could reflect differences in the
returns to experience or differential patterns of attrition with respect to effectiveness
among recession and non-recession teachers, an issue we examine directly in Section 4.4.4.
Since we estimate the year of career start, we cannot observe gaps in teachers’ careers
due to fertility, child-rearing or family mobility before our sample period begins. To
assess whether our results are sensitive to this, column (4) restricts the sample to the
entry cohorts for which we can observe the entire career. The estimate is larger than the
baseline effect and significant at the one percent level. However, because this very short
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panel only contains two recessions, we prefer to use all available entry cohorts. Finally,
we test whether our estimates reflect selection into the teaching profession or selection
of teachers with experience elsewhere into Florida public schools. In column (5), we
restrict the sample to those teachers without any teaching experience outside Florida.
The coefficient is somewhat larger than in the baseline specification.23































−1 −.5 0 .5 1
One−Year Unemployment Change (BA Holders)
No Recession Recession Fitted Values
Notes: Cohort means of VAM in math (controlling for yearly experience dummies up to 30 years) and
one-year unemployment change for college graduates. Teacher and student data stems from the Florida
Department of Education. Unemployment rates come from the BLS. 2008-09 cohort excluded as outlier
(unemployment change=2.2, mean experience-adjusted VAM=0.21).
We also evaluate the robustness of our results using alternative measures of teachers’
outside options. Figure 4.4 makes it possible to compare the variation in our preferred
binary measure of the business cycle (by comparing green and blue dots) and a continuous
measure, one-year unemployment changes. In line with our main findings, unemployment
changes and teacher value-added are positively related. Figure 4.5 displays the variation
23Moreover, there is no statistically significant difference in the the incidence of teaching experience
outside Florida between recession (20.9%) and non-recession cohorts (18.5%). Controlling for any out-
of-state experience does not change our coefficient of interest either. This makes an explanation based
on migration patterns into Florida unlikely.
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of both our value-added measure and the one-year unemployment change over time. The
time series move very closely, especially in the more reliable sample of teachers who
started their careers after 1990. In Table 4.8, we run our preferred specification using
the NBER recession indicator (column 1), GDP growth (2), the unemployment level (3),
and one-year unemployment changes (4), respectively. Both unemployment measures are
computed using the unemployment rates of college graduates (only available from 1970
onwards), as this is the relevant labor market for potential teachers.24
Table 4.8: Recession at Career Start and Teacher Math Effectiveness (Alternative Business
Cycle Measures)
Dependent variable: VAM in math













Clusters (career start years) 60 60 40 39 57 57
Obs. (teachers) 32941 32941 32402 32244 32936 32936
R2 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.022 0.021
Notes: Coefficients from separate regressions of VAM in math (controlling for yearly experience dum-
mies up to 30 years) on alternative business cycle measures at career start. Unemployment (college)
refers to BLS unemployment rates of college graduates (4 years and above until 1991, degree holders
after 1991) and are available after 1969. All unemployment rates are from the BLS; GDP growth (2009
constant dollars) from the BEA. Agriculture industries refers to private wage and salary workers. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses adjusted for clustering at the career start year level. Teacher and student data
stems from the Florida Department of Education. Significance levels: *** p< 1%, ** p< 5%, * p< 10%
Consistent with our preferred business cycle indicator, GDP growth is negatively related to
teacher value-added. The coefficients on the unemployment measures are also in line with
24The results of our preferred specification are unchanged for teachers starting after 1970. We use na-
tional rather than Florida-specific unemployment rates in this analysis because state-level unemployment
rates are not available for college graduates, the national unemployment rates are more reliable, and
because Florida recruited teachers heavily from out of state throughout our sample period (see Section
4.3.1). Thus, using Florida-specific measures of economic conditions is likely to underestimate the true
effect. In Table D.3 in appendix D, we show that graduate-specific unemployment rates have a stronger
impact on teacher value-added than general national unemployment rates and that Florida-specific un-
employment rates have around the same impact than national unemployment rates.
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our previous findings and significant at the five percent level. The coefficient estimates
for the alternative measures imply somewhat weaker, but qualitatively similar recession
effects (based on the difference in each business cycle indicator between recession and
non-recession cohorts), suggesting that none of the alternative business cycle indicators
on its own fully captures the full effects of a recession on potential teachers’ choices.25
Finally, it is unlikely that the alternative job opportunities of potential teachers are evenly
distributed across industries. For example, one would expect few potential teachers to
work in agriculture. In columns (5) and (6), we find that the one-year unemployment
change in agriculture at career start is unrelated to teacher quality, while the labor-
market conditions in nonagriculture industries do matter. This pattern is consistent with
the selection of potential teachers into teaching who alternatively would have chosen
industries requiring similar skills.
To assess the sensitivity of our results with respect to the value-added measure, we also
run our preferred specification with alternative VAMs (Table D.2 in the appendix). For
comparison, column (1) presents the results based on our preferred measure. In column
(2), we add school fixed effects when estimating teachers’ value-added. The inclusion
of school fixed effects eliminates any bias from unobserved school characteristics that
influence teacher effectiveness, but also removes variation in true teacher effectiveness to
the extent that average teacher quality varies across schools. The gap in effectiveness
between recession and non-recession teachers is somewhat attenuated, but the change is
small. In column (3), we add school-by-year fixed effects when estimating value-added,
likely removing additional variation in true teacher effectiveness. The estimate is further
attenuated, but remains significant. Finally, in columns (4) and (5), we account for the
fact that the precision of the teacher value-added measures varies across teachers. Our
results are qualitatively unaffected by weighting teachers in our preferred specification by
the number of student-year or teacher-year observations that underlie their value-added
measures.
25The same pattern appears if we use unemployment rates and changes for all workers rather than
college graduates. These coefficients are significant at the one percent level, but somewhat attenuated,
as expected.
139
Weak Markets, Strong Teachers















































1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year of career start
TVA (Math), adjusted for experience
Unemployment difference BA holders
Notes: Cohort means of VAM in math (controlling for yearly experience dummies up to 30 years) and
one-year unemployment change for college graduates. Unemployment rates from the BLS. Teacher and
student data stems from the Florida Department of Education. Shaded areas are recession periods as
defined by the NBER.
4.4.4 Differential Attrition of Teachers does not Drive Results
We find that teachers who started their careers during recessions are more effective. On
the one hand, effectiveness differences might already exist among entering teachers (se-
lection). On the other hand, recession and non-recession teachers might have very similar
VAMs at career start, but low-quality recession teachers might be more likely to leave the
occupation than low-quality non-recession teachers (differential attrition). We use our
data to assess which of these two channels is more plausible.
Since our dataset includes all teachers in the public school system in Florida, attrition
means that a teacher leaves the Florida public school system. We cannot directly address
attrition before 2000-01, the beginning of our sample period. However, if differential
attrition of recession and non-recession teachers were driving our results, then one would
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expect earlier recession cohorts to be much more effective, but more recent recession
cohorts to be only slightly more effective, than non-recession teachers. This pattern is
not present in Table 4.7, which shows that recession effects are generally larger for more
recent cohorts. We interpret this as first, indirect evidence that differential attrition does
not drive our results.
To provide direct evidence, we define attrition as not being observed as a teacher during
the last school year in our sample period (2008-09). First, we investigate whether starting
during a recession is correlated with attrition (columns 1 and 2 in Table 4.9).26 Controlling
for teachers’ value-added, we find that recession teachers are somewhat more likely to drop
out, although this difference is not statistically significant. Controlling for recession status
at career start, more effective teachers are less likely to drop out.27
Table 4.9: Recession at Career Start, Attrition,
and Teacher Math Effectiveness
Dependent variable: Attrition VAM in math
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Recession 0.039 0.017 0.182*** 0.333***
(0.039) (0.029) (0.026) (0.033)
VAM (math) -0.029*** -0.048***
(0.005) (0.009)
Recession*VAM (math) 0.005 0.039***
(0.012) (0.009)




Included cohorts: <2008 2000-07 all 2000-08
Clusters (career start years) 59 8 60 9
Obs. (teachers) 32417 15207 32941 15731
R2 0.013 0.043 0.023 0.031
Notes: Regressions of attrition indicator (columns 1 and 2) and VAM in math (columns
3 and 4) on regressors as shown in table. Attrition defined as no teacher observation in
2009. Columns (3) and (4) control for yearly experience dummies up to 30 years. Teacher
and student data stems from the Florida Department of Education, the recession indica-
tors are coded as defined by the NBER. Standard errors in parentheses adjusted for clus-
tering at the career start year level. Significance levels: *** p< 1%, ** p< 5%, * p< 10%
Among teachers who started teaching during our sample period (about 47% of the full
26Because the school year 2008-09 is the attrition target year, these regressions exclude teachers who
started teaching in 2008-09.
27Excluding teachers born before 1950 as potential retirees does not change our results (not shown).
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sample), recession teachers are also slightly more likely to leave the public school system
than non-recession teachers (column 2). More importantly, in recession cohorts, exiting
teachers are significantly more effective compared to exiting non-recession teachers. This
pattern works against our result, suggesting that the value-added gap is even larger at
career start and decreases over time. This is confirmed in column (3) when we look directly
at value-added, finding a large gap at career start which decreases with experience. Taken
at face value, these estimates imply that the gap in value-added between recession and
non-recession teachers closes after around 25 years. However, depending on the functional
form we impose on the interaction between starting in a recession and teaching experience,
the implied time period before the gap closes ranges from 12 to 26 years. Therefore, these
numbers need to be interpreted very cautiously. Column (4) confirms that the same
pattern holds, and in fact becomes more pronounced, when using only teachers who
started teaching during our sample period.
In sum, differential attrition between recession and non-recession teachers does not explain
our main finding. The observed attrition pattern seems to reduce the estimated difference
in effectiveness between recession and non-recession teachers over time. This suggests
that our main results understate the difference in effectiveness between recession and
non-recession teachers at career start.
4.4.5 Discussion
The effect of recessions at career start on teacher effectiveness might in theory be driven
by demand or supply fluctuations over the business cycle (or both). As noted in Sec-
tion 4.2, demand fluctuations can generate our findings only if school authorities (i) hire
fewer teachers during recessions (e.g., due to budget cuts) and (ii) are able to assess the
quality of inexperienced applicants and hire those most likely to be effective. Both con-
ditions are unlikely to hold in practice. First, in our data, cohort size is unrelated to the
business cycle. This is corroborated by official statistics from the BLS, which indicate
that employment in the local government education sector typically increases during re-
cessions (with the exception of the recessions in 1980-1982 and the Great Recession; see
Figure 4.1 and Berman and Pfleeger, 1997). Second, it is unlikely that school authorities
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are able to identify the best applicants since education credentials, SAT scores, and de-
mographic characteristics – typically the only ability signals of applicants without prior
teaching experience – are at best weakly related to teacher effectiveness as measured by
VAMs (e.g., Chingos and Peterson, 2011; Jackson et al., 2014). Apart from the fact that
both conditions are unlikely to hold, our quantile regression results show that the effect is
strongest at the upper end of the value-added distribution. This suggests that increases
in the supply of very effective teachers rather than decreases in the overall demand for
teachers are at work.28
In sum, increases in the supply of high-quality applicants during recessions seem to drive
our results. Teacher cohorts likely differ in their effectiveness already at career start, as
predicted by a Roy model of occupational selection.
Finally, note that we estimate a reduced-form coefficient. To gauge the quality difference
between recession-only teachers and those they replace, we have to inflate our reduced-
form estimates by the share of recession-cohort teachers who would not have entered
teaching under normal labor-market conditions. If all teachers who start during recessions
became teachers only because of the recession, the effectiveness difference would be equal
to our reduced-form estimate (0.11 SD). However, if only 10% of the recession teachers
went into teaching due to the recession, the difference in effectiveness would be 10 times
as large, around one SD. This would imply an impact on student math achievement of
being assigned to a recession-only entrant of around 0.2 student-level standard deviations.
4.5 Policy Implications
Our results have important implications for policymakers. In a Roy model of occupational
choice, worse outside options during recessions are equivalent to higher teacher wages.
28In emphasizing the role of high-quality supply, we further assume that recessions have no direct effects
on teachers’ effectiveness. This would be violated, for example, if teachers who started their career in a
recession were more fearful of losing their jobs and thus provided more effort, which raised their effective-
ness permanently. However, in this case we would expect the least effective teachers to disproportionally
better in recession cohorts. In our quantile regressions, we find that the opposite is true. If the business
cycle at career start did have a direct effect on the individual’s teaching effectiveness, we would estimate
the total effect of starting in a recession on subsequent career productivity in teaching, comprising the
combined effect of selection into teaching and the direct impact on individual’s productivity in teaching.
The reduced-form estimate still represents a causal effect.
143
Weak Markets, Strong Teachers
Thus, our results suggest that policymakers would be able to hire better teachers if they
increased teacher pay. Would such a policy be efficient? Chetty et al. (2014b) find
that students taught by a teacher with a one SD higher value-added measure at age 12
earn on average 1.3% more at age 28. Using this figure, our preferred recession effect
translates into differences in discounted lifetime earnings of around $13,000 per classroom
taught each school year by recession and non-recession teachers (evaluated at the average
classroom size in our sample). This is equivalent to more than 20% of the average teacher
salary in Florida ($46’583 in school year 2012-2013 according to the Florida Department
of Education).
Do these private benefits exceed the public costs associated with an increase in teacher
pay intended to attract more effective teachers? To shed light on this question, assume
that the entire recession effect is driven by earnings losses in the private sector during
recessions. To compute these earnings losses, we use the median earnings of BA degree
holders ($59’488 in 2010, the year Chetty et al.’s figure refer to) as a benchmark for
the average outside option of potential teachers. The adverse impact of graduating in
a recession has previously been estimated to be around 2%–6% of initial earnings per
percentage point increase in the unemployment rate (e.g., Kahn, 2010). This translates
into 4%–12% earnings differences between recession and non-recession teachers in our
sample. Based on the median earnings of BA degree holders, this implies on average
between $2’379 and $7’140 lower earnings during recessions. This admittedly coarse
comparison suggests that it may be efficient to increase pay for new teachers and thereby
improve average teacher effectiveness. Yet this conclusion comes with the caveat that it
may be difficult for policymakers to increase pay only for incoming teachers. Our evidence
does not imply that increasing pay for the existing stock of teachers would yield benefits.
Moreover, there are likely cost-neutral ways to make the total compensation package
offered to new teachers more attractive. For example, Fitzpatrick (2015) shows that the
value teachers place on pension benefits is much lower than the cost to the government
of providing them and would prefer higher salary levels.
Magnitudes aside, our findings suggest that policymakers would be able to attract more
effective individuals into the teaching profession by raising the economic benefits of becom-
ing a teacher. This is not a trivial result. If intrinsic motivation positively affects teachers’
144
Weak Markets, Strong Teachers
effectiveness, then increasing teacher pay may attract more extrinsically motivated, but
less effective individuals into the teaching profession. Since we find the opposite, intrinsic
motivation seems to be of second-order importance relative to the effects of increasing
teacher pay on selection when hiring more effective teachers.
Finally, our results indicate that recessions serve as a window of opportunity for the
public sector to hire more effective personnel than during normal economic periods. As
teachers are a critical input in the education production function affecting students’ lives
way beyond schooling, hiring more teachers in economic downturns would appear an
attractive strategy to improve American education. In the Great Recession, however,
even substantial stimulus spending was insufficient to prevent a reduction in employment
in the education sector (see Figure 4.1).
4.6 Conclusion
We provide causal evidence on the importance of outside labor-market options at career
start for the quality of teachers. We combine a novel identification strategy with a direct
and well-validated measure of teacher effectiveness. Our reduced-form estimates show
that teachers who entered the profession during recessions are significantly more effective
than teachers who entered the profession during non-recessionary periods. This finding is
best explained by a Roy-style model in which more able individuals prefer teaching over
other professions during recessions due to less opportunities in alternative occupations. In
comparison to Britton and Propper (2016), we show that the selection into teaching is af-
fected by outside options. We can additionally control for potential confounding channels
by using individual-level data and a direct measure of teacher quality. While the settings
differ, our productivity effects are qualitatively similar to, and in fact somewhat larger
than, recession effects on the productivity of PhD economists (Boehm and Watzinger,
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Compulsorily Licensed Patents by NBER Technological Subcat-
egory
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Notes: The pie chart shows the distribution of compulsorily licensed patents over 35 NBER technological
subcategories. The legend is sorted from largest share to smallest. The categorization in technological
subcategories is based on US patent classifications, following Hall et al. (2001). The data are from the
Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) of the European Patent Office.
147
Appendix to Chapter 1
Patenting of Bell in Radar and Cryptography














Notes: This figure shows the yearly number of Bell patents relating to radar and cryptography, two tech-
nologies relevant for World War II. We identify both technologies by their USPC class: We use the class
342 titled “Communications: directive radio wave systems and devices (e.g., radar, radio navigation)”
to classify radar and class 380 titled “Cryptography” to classify cryptography. The data are from the
Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) of the European Patent Office.
A.1 Appendix to Section 1.4
Comparing the Average Number of Citations of Treatment and
Control Patents
In Figure A.3 we compare the evolution of patent citations to Bell patents and control
patents in the same publication year and the same four digit technology class. We use the
weights proposed of Iacus et al. (2009) to adjust for the different number of control patents
for each Bell patent. From 1949 to 1953, the average number of citations of treatment
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Notes: This figure shows average patent citations of patents published before 1949 in every year after
publication. The line with solid circles shows patent citations of the treated patents (Bell patents) and
the line with empty circles shows patent citations of control patents, with the same publication year and
the same four digit technology class as the Bell patents. For aggregation we use the weights of Iacus
et al. (2009) to adjust for a different number of control patents for each Bell patent. The data are from
the Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) of the European Patent Office.
and control patents track each other very closely. This implies that the Bell patents and
the control patents exhibit a parallel trend in citations in the first 4 years after the plea.
The two lines diverge in 1954, with Bell patents receiving relatively more citations than
control patents, and they converge again in 1961/1962. This is prima facie evidence for
an effect from 1954 onward.
Pseudo Outcomes: Unaffected Companies have no Excess Cita-
tions
In the main part of the text we use time varying coefficients to show that there are no
yearly excess citations from the B-2 companies, which were exempt from the compulsory
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licensing agreement. In column (2) of Table A.1 we estimate the average effect for these
companies and find none. There are also two other groups of companies that were to
a lesser degree affected by the consent decree: foreign companies and companies that
already had licensing agreements in place.1 Foreign companies could license for free but
did not receive any technical description or assistance from Bell.2 In Table A.1 we show
the results using as the dependent variable the citations from from foreign companies in
column (3) and from companies that had a license before the consent decree in column
(4). In the last column we use data on all companies that did not have a license from Bell.
We do not find a measurable effect for foreign companies or companies with a license and
a large effect for companies without a license.
Pseudo Treatment: Citation Substitution is Small.
One possible interpretation of our estimates is that due to the free availability of Bell tech-
nology, companies substituted away from other, potentially more expensive technologies.
If this were the case, we should find a negative impact of the consent decree on citations
of similar patents of other companies.3 To see if this is the case, we assign a pseudo treat-
ment to the patents of GE, RCA, Westinghouse, which were part of the B-2 agreement,
and ITT. These companies were among the largest patenting firms in the ten technology
classes in which Bell had most patents between 1939 and 1949. Results are reported in
Table A.2, column (2). We find no effect, implying that the citation substitution is either
small or homogeneous to patents of these companies and the control group.
1All companies with a license agreement are listed in the hearing documents (Antitrust Subcommittee,
1958, p. 2758).
2Verbatim in the consent decree “The defendants are each ordered and directed (...) to furnish to any
person domiciled in the United States and not controlled by foreign interests (...) technical information
relating to equipment (...)”.
3This approach is suggested by Imbens and Rubin (2015).
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Table A.1: The Effect of Compulsory Licensing on Subsequent Citations of Unaffected
Companies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline B-2 Companies Foreign companies License No license
Treatment -0.4 -0.1 -0.0 0.5*** -0.9**
(0.5) (0.2) (0.1) (0.2) (0.4)
I(55-60) -6.4*** -1.2*** 2.1*** -1.1*** -5.4***
(0.6) (0.2) (0.3) (0.2) (0.5)
T x I(55-60) 2.0*** 0.2 -0.0 0.4 1.6***
(0.6) (0.1) (0.2) (0.3) (0.5)
Constant 18.3*** 2.3*** 0.9*** 3.1*** 15.2***
(1.2) (0.3) (0.1) (0.3) (1.0)
# treated 4533 4598 4533 4533 4533
Clusters 225 225 225 225 225
Obs. 896556 1096212 896556 896556 896556
Notes: This table shows the results from a difference-in-differences estimation with years 1949-1954
as pre-treatment period and 1955-1960 as treatment period. The estimation equation is
#Citationsi,t = β1 ·Belli + β2 · I[1955− 1960] + β3 ·Belli · I[1955− 1960] + εi,t (A.1)
where I[1955−1960] is an indicator variable for the treatment period 1955-1960. The variable "Bell" is
an indicator variable equal to one if a patent is published by a Bell System company before 1949 and
therefore treated by the consent decree. As dependent variable we use in the first column all citations
by companies other than the filing company. In the second column we use all citations of companies
exempt from the consent decree (GE, RCA, Westinghouse & ITT) and in the third column all cita-
tions of foreign companies. In the fourth column we use citations of companies that had no licensing
agreement with any Bell company prior to the consent decree and in the last column we look at the
citation of companies that had a licensing agreement. As control patents, we use all patents that
were published in the U.S. matched by publication year, primary United States Patent Classification
(USPC) technology class and the number of citations up to 1949. The data are from the Worldwide
Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) of the European Patent Office. All coefficients are multiplied
by 100 for better readability. Standard errors are clustered on the three-digit USPC technology class
level and *, **, *** denote statistical significance on 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Appendix to Chapter 1
For a second approach, we exploit the fact that a patent’s technology is classified twice:
once in the USPC system, which has a technical focus, and once in the IPC system,
which reflects more closely the intended industry or profession (“usage”) (Lerner, 1994).
In columns (3) and (4) of Table A.2 we assign a pseudo-treatment to all patents that
have the same USPC class and the same IPC class as the Bell patents. As control group
we use in column (3) patents with the same USPC, but a different IPC classification
as Bell patents. In column (4) we use as a control group patents with the same IPC,
but a different USPC classification as Bell patents. Thus we compare patents that are
arguably more similar to the Bell patents to two different control groups. We find a small,
negative but statistically insignificant effect. Again, this speaks in favor of limited citation
substitution or - alternatively - a homogeneous citation substitution to all control groups.
Effects are Robust to Different Matching Strategies.
In columns (5) to (7) of Table A.2 and in Figure A.4 we report results from using several
alternative matching variables. In the main specification, we use the age (measured by the
publication year), the technology (measured by USPC class) and the quality of a patent
(measured by the number of citations up to 1949). In column (6) we use patents in the
same IPC but different USPC class instead of using those in the same USPC class. In
column (7) we match on the IPC classification, independent of the USPC class. Finally,
in column (8) we do a coarsened exact matching in order to match all Bell patents.4 In all
three cases the size of the effects is similar to the one in the main specification. In Figure
A.4 we show the size of the treatment effects for different combinations of background
variables as proxy for age, technology and quality. On the vertical axis we plot the number
of matched patents. The coefficient is mostly around 2.
4Coarsened exact matching was proposed by Iacus et al. (2012). In this specification we match on one
of five publication year categories that contain 2 years each and one of 10 prior-citation categories.
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# of Bell patents matched
Significant on 10% level Insignificant
Notes: In this figure we plot the parameter estimates from difference-in-differences estimations of the
impact of the consent decree for different matching strategies, controlling for year fixed effects. As
before, as dependent variable we use all citations by companies other than the filing company. In all
regressions, we use a measure for the age, the technology and the quality of a patent for matching. As
measures for the age of a patent, we alternatively use application year, publication year or both. For
technology, we use the USPC, the USPC with subclasses, the three and the four digit IPC. As a measure
of quality, we use the number of pre-citations as exact numbers, coarsened to steps of five citations and
an indicator for at least one citation prior to 1949. The horizontal axis displays the number of matched
Bell patents. Empty symbols are insignificant and full symbols are significant at the 10% level. The data
are from the Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) of the European Patent Office.
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Patenting Behavior of Bell Relative to Comparable Companies




































Companies in field of Bell
Notes: In this figure we compare Bell’s total patenting to a synthetic Bell, the number of patents filed by
the B-2 companies (General Electric, Westinghouse, RCA and ITT), General Electric and Westinghouse
separately and all companies that existed before 1949 and had at least 100 patents in any field in which
Bell was active. The number of patents are normalized to the average number of patents from 1946-1948.
We show General Electric and Westinghouse separately, because RCA had a consent decree involving
patents in 1958 and thus might have changed its behavior. The data are from the Worldwide Patent
Statistical Database (PATSTAT) of the European Patent Office.
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Share of Communication Patents Measured with NBER Technol-
ogy Subcategories
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Notes: This figure shows the share of patents related to communication relative to all patents filed by
Bell. We define technologies related to communication as the NBER subcategories “Communication” and
“Optics” (Hall et al., 2001). We include “Optics” because after the invention of the laser at Bell Labs
in 1958, Bell officials predicted correctly that optics might be crucial for the future of communication
(Gertner, 2012, p. 253).
Effect for different definitions of small and young assignees
In Figure A.7 we estimate the main treatment coefficient separately for citations of differ-
ent size and age groups of assignees. We find that the effect is driven mainly by companies
and individual inventors without patents before 1949 and companies and individual in-
ventors that are less than one year old at the time of the citations.
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Figure A.7: Sample Split by Characteristics of Citing Firm
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Notes: These Sub-figures show results from a difference-in-differences estimation with the years 1949-
1954 as pre-treatment period and 1955-1960 as treatment period, controlling for year fixed effects. As
dependent variable we use all citations by companies other than the filing companies with a specific size
of their patent portfolio (Sub-Figure a) and a specific company age (b) as indicated in the figure. As
control patents we use all patents that were published in the U.S. matched by publication year, primary
USPC technology class, and the number of citations up to 1949. The data are from the Worldwide Patent
Statistical Database (PATSTAT) of the European Patent Office.
A.2 Appendix to Section 1.5
Effect by NBER Technology Subcategory
In this section we estimate our main treatment effect separately for citations of patents
in different NBER technology subcategories. The results are reported in Figure A.8. The
increase in citations comes mainly from technologies related to electrical components, in
particular in “Electrical Devices”. Yet, there is no increase in citations by patents in the
subcategory of “Communication”. These results corroborate the finding in our main text
that there is no increase in follow-on innovation in industries concerned with production
of communication equipment, the core business of Bell.
No Lack of Follow-on Innovation in Telecommunications
This section presents evidence that the null effect in telecommunications was not due to
a lack in potential follow-on innovation in the telecommunications market. To do this
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Notes: This figure shows difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of the consent decree on cita-
tions from patents in different NBER technological subcategories, controlling for year fixed effects. As
dependent variable we use all citations by companies other than the filing company. As control patents we
use all patents that were published in the U.S., matched by publication year, primary USPC technology
class, and the number of citations up to 1949. A solid circle means that the coefficient is significant at the
10% level. We split the citing patents by NBER technology subcategory following Hall et al. (2001). The
data are from the Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) of the European Patent Office.
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Figure A.9: Number of Citations to Bell Patents Inside and Outside of Communication
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Notes: Sub-figure (a) shows the average number of citations per year for all Bell patents that are most
likely used in the production of communication equipment (SIC 3661) and that are used in any other
industry. To classify a patent by its most likely industry, we use the data of Kerr (2008) to assign to each
USPC class the most likely four-digit SIC industry in which it is used. Sub-figure (b) shows the total
number of citations to Bell patents inside and outside of telecommunication filed in a particular year. In
this graph we use total citations, the sum of citations from other companies and from Bell to its own
patents. The data stem from the Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) of the European
Patent Office.
we look at the total number of citations, the sum of citations of other companies and
self-citations, to Bell patents inside and outside of telecommunications. In Subfigure (a)
of Figure A.9 we plot the average number of total citations to Bell patents related to
communication and related to other fields. We use the concordance of Kerr (2008) to
assign to each Bell patent the most likely SIC code.
We find that the total number of citations to telecommunications patents of Bell were
at least as high as to patents outside of communication. This speaks against a low
quality of compulsorily licensed patents as a reason for the lack in follow-on innovation in
telecommunications. In Subfigure (b) we show that the total number of patent citations to
Bell’s patents inside and outside of telecommunications were also almost identical before
and after the consent decree. This suggests that after the consent decree the potential
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Table B.1: List of All Patent Libraries
City, State Name of Library Year
Albany, New York New York State Library Cultural Education Center 1870
Boston, Massachusetts Boston Public Library 1870
Columbus, Ohio Science and Engineering Library. Ohio State University 1870
Los Angeles, California Los Angeles Public Library 1870
New York, New York New York Public Library 1870
St. Louis, Missouri St. Louis Public Library 1870
Buffalo, New York Buffalo and Erie County Public Library 1871
Cincinnati, Ohio The Public Library of Cincinnati and Hamilton County 1871
Detroit, Michigan Great Lakes Patent and Trademark Center. Detroit Public Library 1871
Chicago, Illinois Chicago Public Library 1876
Newark, New Jersey Newark Public Library 1880
Cleveland, Ohio Cleveland Public Library 1890
Providence, Rhode Island Providence Public Library 1901
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania The Carnegie Library of Pittsburgh 1902
Toledo, Ohio Toledo/Lucas County Public Library 1934
Atlanta, Georgia Library and Information Center. Georgia Institute of Technology 1946
Kansas City, Missouri Linda Hall Library 1946
Milwaukee, Wisconsin Milwaukee Public Library 1949
Stillwater, Oklahoma Patent and Trademark Library. Oklahoma State University 1956
Sunnyvale, California Sunnyvale Center for Innovation, Invention& Ideas (SC[I]3). Sunnyvale Public Library 1963
Madison, Wisconsin Kurt F. Wendt Library. University of Wisconsin-Madison 1976
Birmingham, Alabama Birmingham Public Library 1977
Dallas, Texas Dallas Public Library 1977
Denver, Colorado Denver Public Library 1977
Houston, Texas Fondren Library. Rice University 1977
Raleigh, North Carolina D.H. Hill Library. North Carolina State University 1977
Seattle, Washington Engineering Library. University of Washington 1977
Lincoln, Nebraska Engineering Library. University of Nebraska, Lincoln 1978
Sacramento, California California State Library 1979
University Park, Pennsylvania Schreyer Business Library. Paterno Library. Pennsylvania State Library 1979
Minneapolis, Minnesota Minneapolis Public Library 1980
Newark, Delaware University of Delaware Library 1980
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Troy H. Middleton Library. Louisiana State University 1981
Albuquerque, New Mexico Centennial Science and Engineering Library. The University of New Mexico 1983
Ann Arbor, Michigan Media Union Library.The University of Michigan 1983
Auburn, Alabama Ralph Brown Draughon Library. Auburn University 1983
Austin, Texas McKinney Engineering Library. The University of Texas at Austin 1983
College Station, Texas Sterling C. Evans Library. Texas A&M University 1983
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Table B.2: List of All Patent Libraries (Continued)
City, State Name of Library Year
Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis-Marion County Public Library 1983
Moscow, Idaho University of Idaho Library 1983
Reno, Nevada University Library. University of Nevada-Reno 1983
Amherst, Massachusetts Physical Sciences and Engineering Library. University of Massachusetts 1984
Anchorage, Alaska Z. J. Loussac Public Library. Anchorage Municipal Libraries 1984
Butte, Montana Montana Tech Library of the University of Montana 1984
College Park, Maryland Engineering and Physical Sciences Library. University of Maryland 1984
Fort Lauderdale, Florida Broward County Main Library 1984
Miami, Florida Miami-Dade Public Library System 1984
Salt Lake City, Utah Marriott Library. University of Utah 1984
San Diego, California San Diego Public Library 1984
Springfield, Illinois Illinois State Library 1984
Little Rock, Arkansas Arkansas State Library 1985
Nashville, Tennessee Stevenson Science and Engineering Library. Vanderbilt 1985
Richmond, Virginia James Branch Cabell Library. Virginia Commonwealth University 1985
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania The Free Library of Philadelphia 1986
Washington, District of Columbia Founders Library. Howard University 1986
Des Moines, Iowa State Library of Iowa 1988
Louisville, Kentucky Louisville Free Public Library 1988
Orlando, Florida University of Central Florida Libraries 1988
Honolulu, Hawaii Hawaii State Library 1989
Piscataway, New Jersey Library of Science and Medicine. Rutgers University 1989
Grand Forks, North Dakota Chester Fritz Library. University of North Dakota 1990
Jackson, Mississippi Mississippi Library Commission 1990
Tampa, Florida Patent Library. Tampa Campus Library. University of South Florida 1990
Wichita, Kansas Ablah Library. Wichita State University 1991
Big Rapids, Michigan Abigail S. Timme Library. Ferris State Library 1991
Morgantown, West Virginia Evansdale Library. West Virginia University 1991
West Lafayette, Indiana Siegesmund Engineering Library. Purdue University 1991
Clemson, South Carolina R. M. Cooper Library. Clemson University 1992
Orono, Maine Raymond H. Fogler Library. University of Maine 1993
Rapid City, South Dakota Devereaux Library. South Dakota School of Mines and Technology 1994
San Francisco, California San Francisco Public Library 1994
Akron, Ohio Akron-Summit County Public Library 1995
Lubbock, Texas Texas Tech University Library 1995
Mayaguez, Puerto Rico General Library. University of Puerto Rico-Mayaguez 1995
Portland, Oregon Paul L. Boley Law Library. Lewis & Clark Law School 1995
Burlington, Vermont Bailey/Howe Library 1996
Concord, New Hampshire New Hampshire State Library 1996
Hartford, Connecticut Hartford Public Library 1997
New Haven,Connecticut New Haven Free Public Library 1997
Stony Brook, New York Engineering Library. Melville Library SUNY at Stony Brook 1997
Las Vegas, Nevada Las Vegas Clark County Library District 1999
Rochester, New York Central Library of Rochester and Monroe County 1999
Bayamon, Puerto Rico Learning Resources Center. University of Puerto Rico-Bayamon Campus 2000
Dayton, Ohio Paul Laurence Dunbar Library. Wright State University 2000
San Antonio, Texas San Antonio Public Library 2000
Cheyenne, Wyoming Wyoming State Library 2001
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Table B.3: Libraries Not Used by Sample Restriction
Restriction Libraries
not used in sample
None 0 83
PTDL is not FDL 13 70
Medium and large library 3 67
Opening year in sample period 23 44
(current patent data)
Control FDL within state 3 41
Rochester, Burlington, Puerto Rico 3 38
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Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Matching Researchers to their Scientific Output
and Identifying the Treatment Group
The Scopus database groups publications by authors, which means that it is sufficient to
match the researchers from the appointment lists to their respective counterpart in Sco-
pus.1 After that, collecting the researchers’ publications and the corresponding forward
citations happens within Scopus. We apply a multi-layer matching procedure by first
using researcher-specific information from the appointment lists, and second publication-
specific information from Scopus get more precise matches.
In the following, the information used in the first step of the matching procedure are
listed. A Scopus person is only considered a match if all the following variables concur.
Name: Full first name and full last name of the researchers from the appointment lists
are used, if available. For 3.6% of the researchers we only know the last name, and for
5% we only know the initial of the first name. These missing information are largely due
to the early lists in the 1950s and 60s.
Place of origin: For 98.4% of the researchers we have information about the place of
employment at the time of application. We match these places to the standardized city
1This section stems from the companion paper, Watzinger et al. (2017b).
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and institution names in Scopus.
Field of research: From the appointment lists, we have information about the faculty
and the exact chair a researcher applied to. We match these data to the field of research
classification from Scopus.
Years of publications: After exhausting the researcher-specific information, we extract
the corresponding publications from Scopus. This gives us additional information, specif-
ically the time of activity of a researcher. We only consider matches where the year of
the appointment list falls within the time of activity, which is defined by the earliest and
latest publication of a Scopus researcher.
Manual search: For the remaining unmatched researchers, and for matches that seem
implausible (e.g. multiple matches), we try to identify Scopus matches by manually
searching the database for i.e. known publications.
To identify the treatment group, i.e., the researchers of the appointment lists who actually
accepted the position and moved to the new university, we mainly use two approaches:
First, we compare the names of the researchers to the names found in the course catalog
of the university in question. Second, we use the affiliation information from the Scopus
publications to identify the one researcher with the new university as affiliation in the years
after the move. For the remaining lists where no treated researcher could be identified and
for identified treated researchers that seem implausible (e.g., multiple treated researchers
within one list), manual searches are conducted.
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C.2 Additional Results
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Notes: This graph shows the estimated number of yearly log excess publications by highest-ranked
researchers, relative to the year of the move. Publications are weighted by the number of authors and
by the number of follow-on citations. To arrive at these estimates, we regress the yearly log number
of weighted publications by researchers on the appointment lists on an indicator variable equal to one
if the researcher is the ranked first on the appointment list (interacted with time dummies), year fixed
effects, and appointment list fixed effects. The dark blue line represents the 90% confidence bands for
the estimated coefficients. Standard errors allow for clustering at the appointment list level. The data
stems from the universe of appointment lists of one large university in Germany between 1950 and 2005.
Publication data stems from Scopus.
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Table C.1: Alternative Estimation Methods
Dep. Var.: Publications
Cit.- & Auth.-Wght. Auth.-Wght. Raw
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mover 0.07 2.32 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.03
(0.07) (2.88) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Post -0.03 -0.55 -0.04 0.06∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(0.04) (1.49) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Post x Move 0.19∗∗∗ 5.50∗∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
(0.06) (2.38) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04)
Constant 1.87∗∗∗ 28.47∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗
(0.03) (1.14) (0.08)
List FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Estimation Baseline Baseline Poisson Poisson Poisson Neg. Bin.
Dep Var Ln+1 Levels Levels Levels Levels Levels
Adj R2 0.45 0.23
Clust. (Lists) 317 317 312
Log-Likelihood -16854.86 -55694.16 -2.49e+05 -11858.91 -24669.05 -19959.10
Observations 10000 10000 9880 9900 9900 9900
Notes: This table shows regressions using alternative estimation methods on the author-by-year level.
The data comprises the 5 years before and 5 years after the appointment. The dependent variable
is the yearly number author-and citation-weighted publications of authors on the appointment list in
logs in column (1) and in levels in columns (2), (3), and (6). It is the author-weighted number of
publications in column (4) and the raw number of publications in column (5). Columns (1) and (2)
use a linear difference-in-differences model as in the baseline specifications. Standard errors allowing for
clustering on the appointment list level are in parentheses. Columns (3) through (5) use fixed-effects
poisson regression with robust standard errors (see, e.g., Hausman et al., 1984; Wooldridge, 1999). These
standard errors allow for clustering at the appointment list level. Column (6) uses fixed-effects negative
binomial regression. Standard errors are bootstrapped with 1’000 replications. In both poisson and
negative binomial regressions, observations with zero outcome are dropped. ***, **, * indicate statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The data stems from the universe of appointment
lists of one large university in Germany between 1950 and 2005. Publication data stems from Scopus.
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Table D.1: Recession at Career Start and Teacher Math Effectiveness (Quantile Regres-
sions)
Dependent variable: VAM in math
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Recession 0.029 0.096*** 0.102*** 0.088*** 0.116*** 0.139*** 0.175***
(0.035) (0.027) (0.031) (0.025) (0.026) (0.024) (0.037)
Quantile 5 10 25 50 75 90 95
Obs. (Teachers) 32941 32941 32941 32941 32941 32941 32941
R2 0.020 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.015 0.008
Notes: Coefficients from separate quantile regressions of VAM in math (controlling for yearly experience
dummies up to 30 years) on NBER recession indicator at career start at different quantiles of the VAM
distribution. Teacher and student data stems from the Florida Department of Education. Standard er-
rors in parentheses adjusted for clustering at the career start year level. Significance levels: *** p< 1%,
** p< 5%, * p< 10%
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Table D.2: Recession at Career Start and Teacher Math Effectiveness (Alternative VAMs)
Dependent variable: Various VAMs in math
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Recession 0.110*** 0.090*** 0.059*** 0.092*** 0.083***
(0.023) (0.022) (0.017) (0.029) (0.027)
Fixed effects (in VAM model) none school school-year none none
Weights none none none student obs. teacher obs.
Clusters (career start years) 60 60 60 60 60
Obs. (teachers) 32941 32941 32941 32941 32941
R2 0.022 0.018 0.014 0.019 0.020
Notes: Coefficients from separate regressions of different VAMs in math (controlling for yearly experience
dummies up to 30 years) on NBER recession indicator at career start. Teacher and student data stems
from the Florida Department of Education. Standard errors in parentheses adjusted for clustering at the
career start year level. Significance levels: *** p< 1%, ** p< 5%, * p< 10%
Table D.3: Recession at Career Start and Teacher Math Effectiveness (Further Business
Cycle Measures)
Dependent variable: VAM in math
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unemp. (College) 0.052**
(0.022)








Unempl. diff. (FL) 0.024**
(0.011)
Clusters (Career start years) 40 39 60 60 53 52
Obs. (Teachers) 32402 32244 32941 32941 32928 32923
R2 0.021 0.022 0.021 0.022 0.021 0.021
Notes: Coefficients from separate regressions of VAM in math (controlling for yearly experience dummies
up to 30 years) on alternative business cycle measures at career start. Unemployment (college) refers to
BLS unemployment rates of college graduates (4 years and above until 1991, degree holders after 1991) and
are available after 1969. Other unemployment rates are not graduate-specific. All unemployment rates
are from the BLS. Teacher and student data stems from the Florida Department of Education. Standard
errors in parentheses adjusted for clustering at the career start year level. Significance levels: *** p< 1%,
** p< 5%, * p< 10%
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